A constructivist analysis on balancing : the impact of US war on terror on China and Russia by Karademir, Burcu Sarı
  
 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS ON BALANCING: 
THE IMPACT OF US WAR ON TERROR ON CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Ph.D. Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
BURCU SARI KARADEMİR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of  
International Relations 
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
Ankara 
January 2012 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
    
   
 
My Dear Family, Everything I do is for you 
To Ayser, Mehmet İhsan and Kerim Altuğ Sarı 
 
To My Dear Husband Ekrem 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS ON BALANCING: 
THE IMPACT OF US WAR ON TERROR ON CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
of  
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
BURCU SARI KARADEMİR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
in 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
 
 
January 2012 
 I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serdar Güner 
Supervisor 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin  
Examining Committee Member 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever 
Examining Committee Member 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
 
------------------------------------  
Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Examining Committee Member 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Asst. Prof. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis 
Examining Committee Member 
 
Approval of Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
------------------------------------ 
Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel 
Director 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS ON BALANCING: 
THE IMPACT OF US WAR ON TERROR ON CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
Sarı Karademir, Burcu 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Serdar Güner 
 
January 2012 
 
This dissertation provides a constructivist analysis of balancing under 
unipolarity by examining the question of how the US war on terror has influenced 
China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the United States. To answer this 
question, this dissertation looks at how China’s and Russia’s security understandings 
have evolved as a result of their bilateral relations with the US and US security 
practices in international relations since the end of the Cold War. It points out that 
China’s and Russia’s interactions with the US have produced micro-cultures in 
which rivalry over international status and insecurity have become dominant. The 
dissertation argues that China’s and Russia’s reactions to the US war on terror were 
shaped by their security understandings. It states that after a temporary betterment of 
relations with the US, both states’ concerns about their status in international 
relations were intensified after US unilateralism in the Iraq war. In addition, the 
dissertation points out that unipolarity exists in a Lockean culture at macro-structural 
level in which the US has the primary status empowering it to shape the norms of 
international relations. It stresses that as China and Russia want to play a role in the 
rule-making process and management of the international order, they are concerned 
by US status as the system-maker. The dissertation concludes that China and Russia 
might balance against the US due to the insecurities produced at macro and micro-
structural levels. 
Keywords: Unipolarity, Balancing, Constructivism, the U.S., China, Russia.  
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ÖZET 
 
DENGELEME ÜZERİNE İNŞACI BİR ANALİZ: 
AMERİKA’NIN TERÖRLE SAVAŞININ ÇİN VE RUSYA ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ 
 
Sarı Karademir, Burcu 
Ph.D., Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç.Dr. Serdar Güner 
 
Ocak 2012 
 
Bu tez ABD’nin terörle savaşının Çin’in ve Rusya’nın ABD’ye karşı 
dengeleme eğilimlerini nasıl etkilediğini araştırmayı ve tekkutuplu dünyada 
dengeleme eğilimleri üzerine inşacı bir analiz yapmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla 
tez, öncelikle Soğuk Savaş’ın sonundan bu yana Çin’in ve Rusya’nın güvenlik 
anlayışlarının ABD’nin kendileriyle ikili ilişkileri ve uluslararası alandaki politikaları 
neticesinde nasıl değiştiğini incelemektedir. Tezde, Çin’in ve Rusya’nın ABD ile 
etkileşimlerinden güvensizlik ve rekabete dayalı mikro-sosyal yapılar üretildiğine 
işaret edilmektedir. Tez, ABD’nin Irak’a tektaraflı savaş açmasının Çin’in ve 
Rusya’nın uluslararası ilişkilerdeki statülerine dair kaygılarını arttırdığını 
savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, tezde, tekkutupluluğun Locke’çu makro yapıda varolduğu ve 
bu yapıda ABD’nin uluslararası ilişkilerin temel normlarını şekillendirebilmesini 
sağlayan birincil statüye sahip olduğu dile getirilmektedir. Tez, Çin’in ve Rusya’nın 
uluslararası ilişkilerin kuralyapım sürecinde ve yönetiminde yer almak istemeleri 
sebebiyle ABD’nin sistem kurucu rolünden rahatsız olduklarına işaret etmektedir. 
Makro ve mikro yapıda üretilen ve ABD’nin terörle savaşı süresince izlediği 
politikalarla pekiştirilen güvensizlik unsurlarına dayanarak, tez Çin’in ve Rusya’nın 
ABD’yi dengeleme eğilimlerinin kuvvetlendiği sonucuna varmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tekkutupluluk, Dengeleme, İnşacılık, ABD, Çin, Rusya. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. The Aim and Relevance of the Study  
 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to provide a constructivist analysis on 
balancing under unipolarity. The major question that it seeks to answer is how the 
US war on terror has influenced China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the 
US with reference to constructivist theory.
1
 Balancing has been a central theme of 
the Realist literature in International Relations. Second-tier powers’ tendency to 
balance against the US, the unipole, has been predominantly discussed with reference 
to the assumptions of Realist theories of International Relations.
2
 The Realist 
                                                 
1
 Constructivism is not one unified theory. It has variants that are defined as conventional and critical 
constructivism. This chapter focuses on Wendt’s constructivism due to its systemic level of analysis. 
See, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics, (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Cambridge (UK), New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a detailed discussion on two variants of constructivism; See, 
Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security 
23, no. 1 (1998): 181-186. Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research 
Program," International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 49-72. Alexander Wendt, "Constructing 
International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81. Christian Reus-Smit, 
"Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School," British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 4, no. 3 (2002): 487-509. Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," in Theories 
of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 209-230. Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social 
Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge," Millennium-Journal of 
International Studies 29, no. 1 (2000): 73-101. 
2
 On the significance of balance of power; see, Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001). Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, 
and W. David Clinton, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006). Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. 
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literature on balancing against the unipole is often centered on either Kenneth 
Waltz’s balance of power theory3 or Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory4. 
According to a Waltzian approach, states tend to balance against a state with 
preponderant power. Balancing is an effect of distribution of power and it recurs 
under anarchy. Therefore, under unipolarity, proponents of Waltzian balance of 
power theory have predicted that unipolarity would not last long because the unipole 
would be balanced by great powers. Waltian approach, on the other hand, challenges 
the proposition that states engage in balancing to avoid domination by a stronger 
power and suggests that states form balancing coalitions against a threatening power. 
Therefore, as practices shape threat perception, according to Waltian approach, 
balancing is an effect of practices, not of distribution of power. In this regard, 
balance of threat scholars argued that balancing would form if the great powers 
perceived threat from the practices of the US. 
Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, constructivism has started to 
challenge the understandings provided by mainstream International Relations (IR) 
theories and has offered alternative understandings to the puzzles that the mainstream 
IR theories deal with.
5
 For example, Lapid has argued, “culture’s ship returned” to 
the discipline of IR.
6
 One of the most significant scholars who made possible what 
                                                                                                                                          
(Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979). T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Balance of 
Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2004). Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1987). Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World 
Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56. Kenneth N. 
Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 44-
79. 
3
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
4
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
5
 Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 171. 
6
 Yosef Lapid, "Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, (Critical 
Perspectives on World Politics) (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3-20. 
3 
 
has been called a “sociological”7 or “constructivist”8 turn in IR is Alexander Wendt. 
As Copeland observes, in a series of influential articles, Alexander Wendt has 
provided “one of the most sophisticated and hard hitting constructivist critiques of 
structural realism”.9 Social Theory of International Politics10 has been Wendt’s first 
book-length critique of structural realists who draw inspiration from Kenneth 
Waltz’s seminal book of Theory of International Politics11. In addition, with the 
book, Wendt introduces his “unique brand of constructivism,”12 clarifies its central 
claims, and presents a structural and social analysis of international politics.  
In his seminal works, Wendt challenges the core neorealist assumption that 
the self-help corollary to anarchy generates an inherently competitive dynamic 
among states. He argues that “self-help and power politics do not follow either 
logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help 
world, this is due process, not structure.”13 Therefore, Wendt maintains that 
balancing, which is a practice of power politics, is a product of states’ interactions, 
not “an essential feature of anarchy”.14 In this regard, Wendt argues that in order to 
be able to predict states’ behaviors, including balancing, it is necessary to know 
whether states are friends or foes because the knowledge of how states perceive one 
another affects their security interests and the character of their interactions under 
                                                 
7
 Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," European Journal 
of International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000): 147-182. 
8
 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics 50, 
no. 2 (1998): 324-348. 
9
 Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," in 
Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics, ed. Stefano Guzzini 
and Anna Leander, (the New International Relations) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 1.  
10
 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
11
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
12
 Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," 1. 
13
 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 394. 
14
 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 395. 
Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 76. 
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anarchy.
15
 Therefore, between Waltzian balance of power theory and Waltian 
balance of threat theory, Wendt supports the Waltian approach’s main argument that 
states balance against threats, “threats being socially constructed”.16  
However, although Wendt’s work offers constructivist understandings about 
anarchy, balance of power, balance of threat, the relationship between agents and 
structure, his works are predominantly about “meta-theoretical matters”.17 As his 
critics argue, while Wendt provides “one of the most abstract” theoretical discussions 
about international politics, he offers little discussion about “actual empirics or 
politics”.18 Building on Wendt’s theoretical discussion, in the light of a gap in the 
literature on the subject, the main ambition of this dissertation is to provide a 
constructivist analysis of balancing under unipolarity by focusing on the impact of 
the US war on terror on China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the US.   
Second, by way of contributing to the gap in the literature regarding a 
constructivist analysis on balancing under unipolarity, the thesis aims to affirm 
Wendt’s statement that “Realism does not have a monopoly on the ugly and brutal 
side of international life”.19 Third, the dissertation contributes to the literature by 
pointing out the evolution of the debate on unipolarity and balancing in the Realist 
literature and by providing a categorization of the Realist literature showing its 
evolution. Fourth, the dissertation situates constructivism in the debate on balancing 
under unipolarity and highlights that between balance of power and balance of threat 
theories, constructivism sides with the latter’s arguments due to its emphasis on 
threat perception and practices. In addition, the study seeks to underline that if China 
                                                 
15
 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396. 
16
 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396.  
17
 Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, "Preface," in Constructivism and International Relations: 
Alexander Wendt and His Critics, ed. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, (the New International 
Relations) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), xvii. 
18
 Guzzini and Leander, "Preface," xvii. 
19
 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 76. 
5 
 
and Russia decide to balance against the US it will be as a result of their interactions 
and the social structure of international relations, not solely due to distribution of 
power. Besides, it endeavors to contribute to the scholarly literature on balancing 
dynamics that may emerge between China, Russia, and the US because the 
implications of balancing processes are immense for international relations as the 
Cold War once was. 
Furthermore, the dissertation provides how China’s and Russia’s security 
understandings have evolved in relation to the United States’ foreign policy practices 
since the end of the Cold War. Rather than solely comparing states’ material power, 
the dissertation suggests that social factors such as threat perception, great power 
identity and search for status are crucial factors to be considered while discussing 
states’ tendency to balance. Additionally, by way of contextualizing the US War on 
terror in China and Russia’s security understanding under unipolarity, the thesis 
seeks to explore the long-term implications of the US war on terror on the 
aforementioned countries. This, as opposed to discussing the war on terror as short 
periods of cooperation or conflict in China-US and Russia-US bilateral relations. 
Consequently, underlying the roles of interactions in producing balancing tendencies, 
it aims to pose a normative challenge
20
 to the Realist approach, which presents 
balancing as a seemingly natural result of the distribution of power. It underscores 
that balancing is an effect of distribution of ideas at macro structural level and a 
social construction generated by states’ practices at micro structural level. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 74. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 
375. 
6 
 
1.2. Theoretical Underpinnings, Approach and Methodology 
 
This dissertation aims to provide a structural analysis of balancing under 
unipolarity based on Wendtian constructivism. Wendt’s understanding of 
constructivism suggests that international structure is not only made of a distribution 
of capabilities but also of social relationships. Wendt maintains that social structures 
have three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices.
21
 To begin 
with, social structures are defined, in part, by shared understandings, expectations, or 
knowledge and they constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their 
relationships, which can be cooperative or conflictual. Second, social structures are 
made of material resources which only acquire meaning for state action through the 
structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. Wendt emphasizes that 
one cannot explain the effects of material capabilities without presuppositions about 
structures of shared knowledge, which vary and are not reducible to capabilities. 
Also, Wendt underlines that constructivism is compatible with changes in material 
power affecting social relations as long as the effects of material change can be 
shown to presuppose deeper social relations.
22
 Third, Wendt states that social 
structures exist, not in actors’ heads or in their material capabilities, but in their 
practices. He emphasizes that social structures exist only in a process like the Cold 
War, which was a structure of shared knowledge that governed great powers’ 
relations for forty years and ended once great powers stopped acting on this basis. 
Therefore, in a social structural analysis, practices or processes by which social 
structures are produced and instantiated are central. As Wendt concisely states, 
“History matters”.23 
                                                 
21
 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 76. 
22
 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 74. 
23
 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 77. 
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The dissertation also underlines that although in Social Theory of 
International Politics, Wendt prioritizes “third image”24 theorizing and focuses on 
cultures or logics of anarchy as macro-structures, the distinctiveness of Wendt’s 
approach to structure stems from his recognition of the “duality of structure” as 
macro- and micro- (interaction)level structures.
25
 According to this, macro structures 
are based on “collective knowledge,” that is defined as “knowledge structures held 
by groups which generate macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time”.26 
As defined by Wendt, macro structures are logics of anarchy, defined as Hobbesian, 
Lockean, and Kantian logics, and each logic tends to produce different tendencies in 
terms of state balancing behaviors.  
In addition, Wendt identifies the micro-structural (interaction) level as a 
distinct level of analysis due to the importance of interactions in producing and 
instantiating collective knowledge.
27
 In Wendt’s conceptualization, macro structures 
need micro-structural foundations because “macro-level structures are only produced 
and reproduced by practices and interactions at the micro-level.”28 In other words, 
the micro-structural level of analysis is “useful for explaining why one world 
happens rather than another”.29 Therefore, Wendt accepts micro-foundational 
analysis as a part of systemic theorizing as opposed to the Waltzian approach that 
neglects the interaction level to escape reductionism.
30
 Asking “how a theory of 
international politics could explain a systemic tendency like balancing without being 
able to explain foreign policy behavior at all,” Wendt emphasizes that interaction 
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level has an “inherently systemic dimension”.31 As Wendt defines balancing as a 
multiply realizable tendency, which means it is an outcome that can be reached 
through different causes at different social structural levels. Accepting balancing as a 
multiply realizable outcome, the dissertation looks at knowledge structures that may 
lead China and Russia to balance against the US at macro- and micro- structural 
levels.
32
   
The dissertation looks at what Lockean macro structure under the current 
unipolar system suggests for China and Russia’s balancing tendencies against the 
US. However, the dissertation puts more emphasis on the interaction level because it 
primarily seeks to identify knowledge structures produced and reproduced by 
interactions of the US and China and the US and Russia since the end of the Cold 
War. Therefore, it looks at the history of US interactions with China and Russia. As 
Reus-Smit argues, in order to study how micro social structures are produced and 
reproduced by interactions under unipolarity, it “cut[s] into a social order at a 
particular time, [identifies] the agents and social structures, and then trace[s] how 
they condition one another over time.”33 Therefore, due to the inextricably linked 
nature of history and the study of mutually constitutive practices, this dissertation 
adopts a historical approach to study micro-social structures of US-China and US-
Russia relations under unipolarity.  
In addition, as this dissertation emphasizes social structures, it does not focus 
on how China and Russia are positioned vis-à-vis the US in terms of material 
distribution of power. It rather looks at how China and Russia are positioned vis-à-
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vis the US in terms of distribution of ideas. In this regard, it does not only define 
current unipolarity as a structural condition in which the US has the predominant 
position in terms of distribution of capabilities
34
 but also defines it as a structural 
condition in which the US has primary status
35
 in terms of shaping the rules by which 
relations among nations work. It accepts unipolarity as a “change in material power 
affecting social relations”36 as the US practices, enabled by its power, creates social 
relations that cannot be reduced to the US’ domination. In addition, the dissertation 
does not focus on China and Russia because of their material capabilities but rather 
highlights their self-perception of being great powers that are willing to play a role in 
shaping international relations in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, it positions the 
US vis-à-vis China and Russia in terms of their status, which is a function of their 
self-perceived identity as the unipole and the great powers. Expressed differently, the 
dissertation positions the US’ unipolar identity vis-à-vis China’s and Russia’s great 
power identities because while the first is capable of shaping the rules by which 
international relations is conducted and the latter are willing to assume special rights 
and roles in the governance of international relations since the end of the Cold War.   
In this framework, as case studies, the dissertation focuses on Al Qaeda as a 
transnational terrorist organization; the US’s national security strategy in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks; and China and Russia’s security understandings under 
unipolarity. It relies on both primary and secondary resources. For primary resources, 
in the chapter concerning the US war on terror, it examines the Bush administration’s 
national security documents National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America in 2002, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003, National 
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Security Strategy in 2006 and National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 
2006. In the China case, it focuses on China’s white papers on national defense, from 
the official introduction of its “New Security Concept” in 1998 to 2008, the 
declarations made by China’s presidents, ambassadors, and spokespersons on the 
subjects discussed, and articles and commentaries appearing on the subjects under 
consideration in People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of 
China. Likewise, in the Russia case, it looks at Russia’s official documents entitled 
Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept, and Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation since the end of the Cold War and benefits from the declarations 
made by Russian presidents, foreign ministries, ambassadors and spokespersons on 
the subjects covered. 
 
 
1.3. Organization of the Study 
 
In order to answer the question of how the US war on terror has influenced 
China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the US with reference to 
constructivist theory, the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter One introduces 
the research question, discusses the relevance and aims of the study, and provides the 
theoretical underpinnings, approach, and methodology of the dissertation. In 
addition, it presents the general framework of the study. 
 Chapter Two focuses on Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization 
and its impact on formation of US foreign and security policy in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks. The chapter begins by providing a brief history of Al Qaeda 
and shows how the organization evolved into a transnational terrorist network that is 
independent in terms of decision making and self-sufficient in terms of financing its 
11 
 
cause. It describes Al Qaeda’s transnational nature with reference to its political-
religious claims, its networked organizational structure and its financial capacity. It 
underlines that Al Qaeda’s adaptation to globalization, which is characterized by the 
use of information and communication technologies, facilitated its political, 
organizational, and financial transnationalization. The chapter concludes by arguing 
that counterterrorism strategy against transnational terrorist organizations requires a 
network of coalitions responding to challenges posed by the terrorist network. 
Chapter Three provides an account of US national security and 
counterterrorism strategies designed under the Bush administration in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks. It gives a detailed account of the US’s definition of the 
terrorist threat and its counterterrorism strategy.  The Chapter focuses on two 
documents, National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002 and 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003 because they introduce the 
principles of what is known as the Bush Doctrine. It underlines that ‘sovereign 
responsibility’ as a central theme that shapes the US counterterrorism strategy and 
the US’s determination to act unilaterally and preemptively to guarantee states fulfill 
their sovereign responsibilities. The chapter evaluates US primacy as the facilitator 
of the Bush doctrine and discusses the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars as practices of the 
US war on terror. It concludes by arguing that although both wars are the practices of 
the US war on terror, both had different impacts on the perception of the US’s image 
as a unipole. 
Chapter Four analyzes the impact of the US war on terror on China’s security 
understanding looking at China’s white papers on national security. It underlines that 
China’s national security strategy has three major components: preserving China’s 
national integrity; sustaining its economic development; and attaining a great power 
12 
 
status in international relations. As China considers the international security 
environment a major factor in shaping its success to achieve its objectives, the 
Chapter emphasizes China’s willingness to shape international order based on a 
“thick” conceptualization of sovereignty. It argues that China has evaluated US 
security practices within the framework of the US war on terror in terms of the 
implications for China’s vision of international relations and its status. The Chapter 
concludes that although the war on Afghanistan has resulted in an improvement of 
US-China bilateral relations, the Iraq war has revived China’s insecurities and 
increased its calls for multilateralism and multipolarity in international relations.  
Chapter Five evaluates the impact of the US war on terror on Russia’s 
security understanding looking at Russia’s national security documents. It underlines 
that similar to China, Russia wants to preserve its political unity, restore its economic 
power and regain its great power status and it considers international security 
environment, thereby, US practices as the major determinants for achieving its goals. 
Contextualizing Russia’s insecurities in relation to certain security practices of the 
US, the Chapter argues that despite temporary betterment of relations with the US, in 
the wake of the Iraq war, Russia’s insecurities, defined in terms of its status in 
international relations, have increased and its calls for multilateralism and 
multipolarity as a structure that will guarantee its great power status and interests 
have intensified. 
Chapter Six analyzes how arguments on balancing under unipolarity have 
evolved in the Realist literature. It starts with underlining that with the end of the 
Cold War, the debate on balancing against the US is grounded on two bedrock 
Realist theories: Waltz’s balance of power and Walt’s balance of threat theories. 
Later, it looks at the flow of the debate on unipolarity and balancing in the Realist 
13 
 
literature in the unipolar era and points out four stages: the denial of unipolarity with 
the predictions of multipolarity, the acceptance of unipolarity as a temporary 
condition and questioning its stability and durability, the ‘great puzzle’ and soft 
balancing as a middle ground approach between balance of power and balance of 
threat, and the recognition of unipolarity as a distinct structural configuration. The 
Chapter points out that the recognition of unipolarity as a defining feature of 
international structure in the Realist literature is a recent development. It concludes 
that the discussions on durability and stability of unipolarity have eventually relied 
on more balance of threat arguments than balance of power. More significantly, it 
highlights that since there is no balancing against the US, Realist scholars have 
started to revise their arguments, reconceptualizing balancing, and incorporating 
‘social’ variables into their theories in order to sustain their arguments. 
Chapter Seven aims to bring a constructivist analysis to balancing and 
unipolarity and discuss whether China and Russia will balance against the US. The 
Chapter begins with looking at Wendt’s conceptualization of structure and highlights 
that Wendtian constructivism recognizes two kinds of structures: macro- and micro-
level structures. The Chapter underlines that balancing is a multiply realizable 
outcome under self-help structures that might be present at both macro and micro 
structures. Looking at Wendt’s analysis of logics of anarchy, the Chapter emphasizes 
that at the macro-structural level balancing is an outcome of distribution of ideas 
rather than distribution of capabilities. Later, the Chapter focuses on the construction 
process of self-help understanding at the micro-structural level and argues that the 
analysis of social construction processes of self-help provides a deeper understanding 
about states’ tendency to balance against threat. It can be surmised that balancing 
occurs (i) if states behave towards each other based on the role structures of rivalry 
14 
 
or enmity at the macro-structural level and (ii) if states perceive threat from one 
another at the micro-structural level. The Chapter proceeds with discussing the social 
structure of unipolarity at the macro-structural level.  
Chapter Seven further argues that unipolarity exists in a Lockean social 
structure in which most of the states, especially China and Russia, act on the basis of 
rivalry.  The Chapter maintains that under unipolarity rivalry can be defined in terms 
of having self-regarding conceptions of status among the leading powers; therefore, 
it concludes that it can be expected that China and Russia will engage in balancing 
strategies due to status-competition. At the micro-structural level, the Chapter 
focuses on how a self-regarding conceptualization of status has been produced and 
sustained with reference to the discussions provided in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five. Therefore, looking at micro-structural dynamics, Chapter Seven states that if 
shared knowledge about micro-social structures between the US and China and 
Russia does not change, China and Russia will tend to engage balancing strategies 
against the US. Consequently, the Chapter concludes that as macro and micro 
structural social factors generating balancing tendencies merge, it is likely that China 
and Russia will engage in balancing behavior against the US.  
Chapter Eight provides an overall summary of the conclusions drawn from 
the dissertation. It concludes by stating that balancing is not a natural and inevitable 
outcome of distribution of power in the system. As argued in Chapter Seven, it is 
balancing an outcome of self-regarding and competitive social structures produced at 
macro and micro levels. As it is the practices that produces and reproduces 
structures, the dissertation argues that under unipolarity, the US is capable of shaping 
social structures in a direction that it wants especially at micro-structural level. 
Therefore, the dissertation concludes by emphasizing that the US may escape from 
15 
 
creating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ by changing its self-regarding conception of 
security and unilateral security practices. 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: AL QAEDA 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 
Terrorist movements appear within a political context and aim to change the 
political status quo in favor of their allegedly just political causes. On September 11, 
2001, Al Qaeda, defined as the first example of transnational terrorist 
organizations
37
, aimed to challenge to the US-led international political and 
economic order especially considering the impact of the US policies in the Middle 
East.  As Walt stated the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
caused “the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy” and 
made a “global war on terror” the most significant item of the US security agenda.38  
This chapter aims to discuss the components of Al Qaeda’s power toward providing 
a basis for evaluating the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy until 2008. 
The chapter begins with a brief analysis of how Al Qaeda transformed itself from an 
international to transnational terrorist organization. Later, it describes Al Qaeda’s 
transnational nature with reference to its political-religious claims, its networked 
organizational structure and its financial capacity. It underlines that Al Qaeda’s 
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adaptation to exploit information and communication technologies for political, 
organizational, and financial purposes have facilitated its transnationalization. The 
chapter concludes by arguing that counterterrorism strategy against transnational 
terrorism requires a network of coalitions responding to challenges posed by the 
terrorist network. 
 
 
2.2. Evolution of Al Qaeda 
 
Transnational terrorism is regarded as the latest wave or generation of 
terrorism.
39
 The most distinctive characteristics of transnational terrorist 
organizations, when compared to the former waves of terrorist organizations, are 
their independence and self-sufficiency. Transnational terrorist organizations are 
independent because they are able to make decisions independently without being 
ordered by a sponsor-state. They are self-sufficient because they are able to raise 
their own resources without sponsor-states that provide sanctuary, money, weapons 
etc.  As suggested by the generational approach to terrorism, transnational terrorist 
organizations develop self-sufficiency and independence by accumulating resources 
and learning from the experiences of their predecessors.
40
 As the first major 
representative of generation of transnational terrorist organization, Al Qaeda is 
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considered to be a model for transformation of terrorist organizations from an 
international to a transnational terrorist organization.
41
   
 International terrorist organizations carry out terrorist actions so that they can 
cause ramifications by transcending national boundaries through using perpetrators 
from different nationalities, attacking locations in other states, or victimizing people 
from different nationalities.
42
 Although the ramifications of international terrorist 
organizations’ actions aim to transcend the borders of the state they actually target, 
the political objectives of international terrorist organizations are usually domestic. 
In another words, international organizations use their international capacity to 
achieve domestic political goals. The purpose in internationalizing their terror is to 
get more public support and create more publicity for their political cause such as 
establishing a new state. Unlike transnational terrorist organizations, international 
terrorist organizations are highly dependent upon sponsor-states. They are not self 
sufficient in terms of capabilities and are not independent in terms of decision 
making and political agenda setting as transnational terrorist organizations are. 
In its initial phases, Al Qaeda also was not a self-sufficient and an 
independent organization. It gained these features gradually by exploiting 
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opportunities provided by superpower and regional rivalry over Afghanistan during 
the Cold War era. To begin with, it was the US that preferred to get involved in the 
region by proxy means such as supporting dissident groups like the mujahedeen 
under the pressure of a nuclear war to counter the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan.
43
 
In addition to the U.S. which aimed to counter the U.S.S.R. in the context of the Cold 
War, Pakistan supported extreme religious dissidents considering its own power 
position in the context of regional rivalry in Southeast Asia. As Ahmed stated, 
Pakistan’s objectives in supporting the mujahedeen in Afghanistan were to counter 
Afghan claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun majority areas, to gain access to oil and gas 
recourses of Central Asia via Afghan territory, to undermine Iran’s influence on 
Southwest and Central Asia, to gain strategic depth against India, and to recruit 
Afghan religious extremists as well as Taliban-trained Kashmiri and Pakistani 
militants for the insurgency in Kashmir.
44
  
Sharing a common goal and pursuing their global and regional interests, the 
U.S. and Pakistan granted financial, military and political support to the mujahedeen 
who also received training in the camps at Pakistan. It was also stated that during this 
period, the CIA recruited thousands of religious extremists from the Middle East and 
North Africa including Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen.
45
 Moreover, in order to provide economic support, the mujahedeen’s 
production and sale of opium to finance their jihad against the Soviets was tolerated. 
In line with their supporters’ expectations, the mujahedeen, one of which was Usama 
bin Laden, played a significant role in bringing about the Soviets’ withdrawal from 
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Afghanistan in 1989. After this long war, a period of power struggle in Afghanistan 
ended in favor of Talibans.  
In 1989, the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan was a victory for the 
US. However, the US was not the only beneficiary of the superpowers’ proxy war 
over Afghanistan. In 2001, it became clear that the mujahedeen also benefitted much 
from the global rivalry and security competition. They gained state of the art 
weapons, millions of dollars and invaluable training and operational experience. In 
addition to these direct benefits, the mujahedeen group established the core cadre of 
Al Qaeda and laid the foundation of its international network, gathering recruits from 
different nationalities. Most importantly, Al Qaeda established its sanctuary in 
Afghanistan, where they were able to their organizational capabilities. Having 
Afghanistan as a sanctuary, it became easier for Al Qaeda to make extensive 
trainings and planning, to collect financial support, to recruit new members and make 
propaganda.
46
 Afghanistan became the base where Al Qaeda had the opportunity to 
multiply its strength, establish its web of organizations and consolidate its political 
ideology.
47
 In Hoffman’s words, serving as a safe haven, Afghanistan functioned as a 
force multiplier.
48
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This section briefly discussed how Al Qaeda exploited international 
conditions and found itself a sanctuary to excel its organizational capacity. The 
following section will look at components of Al Qaeda power, which turned it into a 
self-sufficient and independent terrorist organization with a transnational character. 
This section will focus on Al Qaeda’s transnational political cause that attracted its 
human capital, globally networked organizational structure that connected 
international sympathizers, recruits and supporters and transnational financial 
network that provided weapons for the attacks. The last but not least, this section will 
discuss how Al Qaeda’s capacity to adapt to globalization characterized with the 
effective use of  information and communication technologies played a crucial factor 
in facilitating Al Qaeda’s political, economic and propaganda processes.49 
 
 
2.3. Transnational Political Cause  
 
Making a political claim is existential for terrorist organizations because 
terrorists gather their operatives, sympathizers, supporters and audience using 
attractive political promises. The political cause underlying these promises provides 
a reason for existence, a means to explain the past, to rationalize the present, and to 
elucidate the future.
50
 Since ancient times, terrorists claimed that they opposed a 
repressor authority and asked for justice.
51
 Mostly, their opponents were 
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governments of the same nationality and their political cause only appealed to their 
own nationals. These terrorist organizations were defined as domestic terrorist 
organizations in terms of their political claims. 
However, terrorist organizations that have political claims appealing for 
people from different nationalities are transnational in character. Terrorism experts 
observed that terrorist organizations with radicalized religious and political claims 
tend to attract larger operatives, sympathizers, supporters and audience in the 21
st 
century terror.
52
 Religions such as Islam and Christianity are transnational. Believers 
of a religion may live in different states as majorities or minorities. Radicalized 
claims of terrorists may attract people of the same faith who live within different 
nation states. Also, radicalized religious and political ideologies provide terrorist 
groups a new identity and replace their former allegiances. Religious-political 
ideology serves terrorists as ‘software’ to rationalize the sacrifices they make by 
promises of rewards in afterlife.
53
 In addition, radicalizing their political cause with 
religion, terrorists close the possibility of negotiation with their adversaries as they 
tend to perceive the world as ‘us vs. them’. Moreover, as a function of the absolute 
worldview of friend and enemy, victims are not regarded as innocents but 
blasphemous people, and attacking them becomes a justifiable act. In short, as 
Kimball states, making religious claims justify the end, enable the holy war, make 
sure blind obedience, provide absolute truth claims and promise ideal times to 
rationalize terrorism.
54
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Fundamentalists all over the world act and perceive themselves to be ‘true’ 
believers and practitioners their belief.
55
 Therefore, Islamic fundamentalists, who 
narrowed Islam down to a political ideology that combine religion with politics, do 
not use Islam to legitimize their political actions.
56
 On the contrary, like all 
fundamentalists, they perceive themselves to be ‘true’ believers and practitioners of 
Islam. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalist see no contradiction between their 
conviction and political actions, on the contrary, they accuse their co-religionists of 
apostasy, infidelity and treachery.
57
 The truth claims of religious terrorists allow 
them to use “religious structures and doctrines almost like weapons” for their 
political movements.
58
 As a result of these staunch religious convictions, religious 
fundamentalists tend to see themselves as God’s agents on Earth. 
Al Qaeda’s political ideology was shaped by the ideologues whose Islamic 
ideas were regarded as representing ‘true Islam’. Hassan pointed out that in every 
statement, Al Qaeda cited verses from the Qur’an, quoted from the Prophet’s 
traditions and provided opinions of classical Muslim scholars in order to make it 
clear that it was striving for Islam and its ideas represented true Islam.
59
 Furthermore, 
Al Qaeda continuously used fatwa (religious rulings) of various Muslim scholars 
without showing any hesitation to phrase its opinion as if fatwa for the Muslim 
umma. Ideas such as: “armed jihad is the only means to change the current fate of the 
Muslims, Muslims should be in constant war against non-Muslims until they obtain 
glory for Islam, Muslims are obligated to reestablish the Caliphate, killing oneself is 
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not suicidal but an act of martyrdom and the ultimate way is to sacrifice for the 
religion, and that Allah the Great will not neglect one who strives for the glory of His 
religion” were presented in the cloth of fatwas or they were presented to the global 
umma as ijtihad of  classical Muslim scholars.
60
  
Ideologues who became influential in defining and justifying political cause 
were Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Abd Al-Salam Faraj, Ayman al-Zawahiri and 
Usama bin Laden.
61
 To begin with, Ibn Taymiyya was considered as the one who 
laid the foundations for the extremist fundamentalism in the twentieth century.
62
 In 
1996, when Usama bin Laden declared war against America, he referred to Ibn 
Taymiyya by saying that  
The right answer is to follow what have been [sic] decided by the 
people of knowledge, as was said by Ibn Taymiyya (Allah's mercy 
upon him): people of Islam should join forces and support each other 
to get rid of the main ‘Kufr’ who is controlling the countries of the 
Islamic world, even to bear the lesser damage to get rid of the major 
one, that is the great Kufr.
63
  
 
Taymiyya’s thoughts about state and religion reflect Al Qaeda’s ideal type of 
government to be established in the world. According to this, the only proper 
government was one that was ruled by the Shari’ah. A ruler (or individual) who did 
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not apply (or live by) the Shari’ah was in fact an infidel, apostate, or kafir.64
  
He also 
suggested that jihad was as crucial as the ‘five pillars’ of Islam and that the defense 
of the umma against apostates was an individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims.
65
 
Benjamin and Simon argued that by suggesting that jihad was no longer a collective 
duty, but rather an individual duty, Ibn Taymiyya provided a useful recruiting device 
for many radical Islamic groups.
66
 Also, Taymiyya’s emphasis on raising the 
spiritual value of jihad to the level of the five pillars contributed to terrorists’ beliefs 
that their battle was for the sake of Allah.  
Qutb translated the logic of Ibn Taymiyya’s thoughts regarding apostasy into 
a comprehensive perspective on the problems of the Islamic states in contemporary 
world during the 1960s.
67
 He provided the underpinnings of violent resistance to 
existing regimes, which were defined as regimes claiming to be Muslim but whose 
practice of Islamic rule was imperfect. He stated that the world was in the state of 
sin, ignorance and moral darkness as it was before the Prophet Muhammad’s arrival 
in the jahilliya age. Qutb called for the creation of a violent revolutionary vanguard 
to wage jihad and restore Islam, to end egoism, exploitation of man by man, petty 
class hierarchies and other alleged ills of liberal democracy.
68
 
Faraj’s work, entitled The Neglected Duty, underlined two themes:69 First, 
jihad or armed struggle against moderate Muslims, apostates, and infidels has been 
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neglected by the ulama (leading Muslim scholars) and Muslims.  Second, a united 
Islamic world ruled by Shari’ah must be established, which has been a neglected 
duty by the Muslims. He called all Muslims for the establishment of the rule of Allah 
on this Earth and if this obligation could not be fulfilled without war, he said, then 
war was an obligation. Before achieving this goal, he regarded the purification and 
revitalization of existing Muslim societies as the primary goal because any weakness 
in war would harm the primary goal. Therefore, apostates and infidels were the initial 
targets before waging jihad on external infidels. According to Faraj, any strategies 
and tactics that were suitable for the fewest losses and easiest means possible were 
permitted. The killings of children of the enemies were allowed if needed and 
justifiable for the act. He promised an eventual victory to Muslims regardless of the 
size and strength of their opponents.  
Al Qaeda’s leader Usama bin Laden and his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri 
expressed their political objectives in line with global jihad and targets in clear terms 
as to overthrow Arab rulers that did not adhere to the Islamic Shari’ah rules and in 
the meantime as to attack targets of the Jewish-Crusader alliance who were 
supported by the corrupt internal system.
70
 Thus, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri 
postulated a simultaneous jihad against internal and external enemies. The external 
target of Al Qaeda was America and its allies.  Internal targets were all Muslim 
governments that did not follow al-Qaeda’s path of Islam. They targeted the US 
because if they succeed, the defeat of the internal ‘apostates’ regimes would be easier 
if ‘crusaders and Zionists’ did not support them. They suggested guerilla warfare and 
other ‘asymmetric’ ways of struggle as appropriate strategies because these strategies 
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were able to defeat even the largest and most sophisticated armed forces, as it was 
proved in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in Vietnam against the U.S armed 
forces.
71
 Similar to aforementioned ideologists, Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri also 
believed that they would eventually succeed in transforming the world in line of their 
fundamentalist vision because Allah was on their side.
72
  
In the 1998 fatwa, Usama bin Laden openly declared that it was the duty of 
all Muslims to kill Americans (including civilians) and US allies, and plunder their 
money whenever and wherever there was an opportunity on the basis of three 
reasons.
73
 First, bin Laden claimed that the United States has been “occupying the 
holiest places of the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, 
humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula 
into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples”.74 Second, 
referring to the First Gulf War, he stated that the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’ was the 
responsible for the devastated situation of the Iraqi people and blamed the alliance of 
the desire to further massacre Iraqi people with the prolonged blockade imposed after 
the war. Third, he claimed the United States aimed to serve “Jews’ petty state and 
diverted attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there.” 
Laden claimed that the alliance’s eagerness to destroy Iraq and its endeavor to 
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fragment all the states of the region such Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into 
fragmented and weak statelets proved the “alliance’s” desire to guarantee Israel's 
survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Arab Peninsula. 
Al Qaeda not only held the United States responsible for economic, political 
and military backwardness but also social and moral corruption of Muslim societies. 
Thus, he defined the United States as ‘the Great Satan’ who was the major obstacle 
against the foundation of a new world in accordance with Allah’s order.75 Al Qaeda 
specifically considered the dissemination of secularization, consumerism, 
democratization, the growth of market economy and Westernization as offensive to 
the basis of Islamic society.
76
 Al Qaeda criticized the United States as an imperialist, 
assimilator, hegemonic, arrogant and corrupt power due to its overwhelming role as 
the purveyor of Western culture and values.
77
 The attacks on World Trade Center 
and Pentagon were symbolic in the sense that they represented the liberal economic 
and political system backed by the American military power.
78
 In his statement 
referring to the September 11 attacks, Laden stated that the United States was 
attacked because of its crimes committed against Muslims, the American occupation 
of Islam’s holiest places, devastation of Iraq, and its support of the Jewish state.79 He 
claimed that the attacks were defensive since Muslims have been exploited, 
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oppressed and victimized over the years; therefore, the U.S. deserved to be attacked 
as the leader and the major backer of the morally corrupt international system. 
The leader of Al Qaeda thus contextualized local and regional conflicts as 
part of a global jihad and depicted the world in terms of a stark and ultimately 
irreconcilable dichotomy between the Muslims and the U.S and its foreign and 
domestic allies.
80
 In October 2001, bin Laden stated that “these events [September 11 
attacks] have divided the whole world into two sides: the side of the believers and the 
side of infidels.”81 Again, he called every Muslim to rush to make his religion 
victorious. It was also made clear that the global jihad was waged against the 
enemies of Islam, both internal and external, residing throughout the world. 
Therefore, the global jihad was not confined to a defined territory. Rather, wherever 
the enemies were present that was defined as the theater of fundamentalists’ war. 
And, it was duty of the every Muslim to attack and harm their enemies whenever and 
wherever possible by all means. Thereby, global jihad was transnationalized, calling 
for allies and recruits beyond borders.  
To sum up, a political cause is crucial for terrorist organizations because 
combining its political cause with religion provides terrorist organizations with 
transnational human resources, which reflects in recruitment, sponsorship and 
operational capabilities of the terrorist organization. Al Qaeda’s radical political 
ideology and its political aims served as its grand strategy that it appealed to like-
minded individuals and organizations so that they could establish the rule of Allah on 
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Earth. In line with its strategy, Al Qaeda’s political religious claims served to be ‘the 
base’, as its name suggested, for the global jihadist movement.82  
 
 
2.4. Transnational Organizational Structure  
 
Having an attractive political-religious ideology is not enough to bring 
operational effectiveness. Therefore, organizational structure is as important as the 
attraction of political-religious causes.  Differently from the previous generations of 
terrorist organizations, transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda do not have 
hierarchical structures. They have loosely connected, non-hierarchical, and flexible 
structures.
83
 They are adaptive to changes and are able to capitalize on the talents of 
all members of the organization.
84
 Instead of one man leadership commanding from 
defined headquarters, transnational terrorist organizations are decentralized.
85
 
Combined with an overarching ideology, transnational terrorist organizations are the 
sum of loosely connected and geographically dispersed networks. These dispersed 
groups communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in the interconnected 
manner without a precise central command and control.
86
  
Flexibility of structuring has important implications for transnational terrorist 
organizations. To begin with, survival is the guiding principle for all terrorist 
organizations and it highly depends on maintaining secret membership and 
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operational security.
87
 Loosely connected terrorist organizations have less risk of 
infiltration. Organizational damage is expected to be lesser than hierarchically 
organized groups in case of betrayal.
88
 Second, since transnational terrorist 
organizations lack a central authority, smaller groups are also empowered in deciding 
to hold an attack. With more power left to their discretion, smaller units may 
undertake deadly attacks to prove themselves. Third, networked terrorist 
organizations can easily defeat geographical obstacles for operation because such 
organizations are able to work within an alliance system due to shared ideology, 
beliefs and political cause. Fourth, in the absence of a hierarchic command structure, 
younger recruits are motivated by showing their individual talents and creativity in 
order to prove their commitment to the cause.
89
 Fifth, each unit is able to gather 
support and financial help, which would contribute to overall capability of the 
terrorist network. Finally, due to the flow of information within the terrorist network, 
terrorists learn from each other and adapt to new conditions. Thereby, transnational 
terrorism has become deadlier and more widespread over the years. 
Al Qaeda’s organizational structure has been a contested issue. Some experts 
argue that Al Qaeda has never been a hierarchical organization with monolithic 
leadership and central control while some others claimed that the organization had 
clear-cut structure, hierarchy, and command and control mechanisms.
90
 Despite the 
differences of opinion on its organizational structure, it has been widely accepted that 
the organization acted in a rational manner weighing ends and means like other 
political units and it considered alternative organizational approaches that are best for 
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its survival.
91
 Therefore, even though the organization had a hierarchic 
organizational structure initially, as Rabasa argued, in the end, with a strategic 
choice, it preferred to become a networked organization to benefit from 
abovementioned advantages before September 11.
92
  
Cruickshank and Hage argued that the idea of transforming Al Qaeda from a 
vulnerable hierarchical organization to a resilient decentralized movement predated 
the 9/11 attacks.
93
 According to their research, the architect of Al Qaeda’s post 9/11 
organizational strategy was Abu Musab al Suri, whose real name was Mustafa 
Setmariam Nasar. The authors maintained that the ‘new Al Qaeda’ or ‘Al Qaeda 2.0’ 
or ‘Al Qaeda the movement’ was not only a spontaneous evolution but also an 
intelligent project. Cruickshank and Hage said that Setmariam’s most important 
strategic concept was “individual terrorism” which, as he argued, needed to replace 
hierarchical terrorism.
94
 In Setmariam’s view, individual terrorism was attractive for 
young Muslims, who did not want to participate in secret and hierarchical 
organizations. He suggested new recruits to form their own brigades without 
exceeding ten members and to work directly with their own brigades. He encouraged 
the recruits to make “wonderful individual initiatives” and claim responsibility for 
terrorist actions including those that they did not do, so that new recruits could be 
attracted and integrated to the global jihad.
95
 The authors argued that both Laden and 
al-Zawahiri acted in line with these suggestions and that eventually Al Qaeda turned 
into a decentralized and networked organization, which vastly encouraged 
‘individual initiative’.  
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 Dishman, on the other hand, argued that Al Qaeda did not choose but was 
pushed to become networked and dispersed organization due to severe 
counterterrorism measures against the organization in the post-September 11 
environment. He argued that the organization was harmed especially after Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the battle of Tora Bora.
96
 Although Al Qaeda was still 
capable of undertaking attacks in Afghanistan, the US military presence in 
Afghanistan severely harmed the organization’s hierarchical structure by killing its 
core members and professional operatives in Afghanistan after September 11.
97
 The 
most significant step that struck the organization’s hierarchical structure, if there 
were any, was the killing of Usama bin Laden in 2011. However, it was even before 
the killing of Laden that experts stated that communication links between Al Qaeda’s 
central committee and its operatives were disrupted, bin Laden’s direct control and 
influence over the operations were severely decreased.
98
 Therefore, before his death, 
Usama bin Laden was considered more as an “inspirational leader” who encouraged 
his followers to conduct attacks rather than an ‘acting leader’ who directly provided 
funding, gave orders, or planned operations.
99
 Hoffmann argued that Al Qaeda 
became more an idea than an organization since 9/11.
100
 He noted that as a less 
tangible transnational movement, it might be more convenient to call Laden’s Al 
Qaeda as a ‘base’ or foundation because it inspired many smaller terrorist groups. 
Experts argued that inspired and glued by Al Qaeda’s ideology, a global 
network emerged and it was composed of cells and affiliates in over 60 countries 
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from four continents.
101
 Al Qaeda with its worldwide web of affiliates and cells 
became the most dispersed leaderless terrorist organization of history. This network 
has been described as ‘a global jihadist ‘nebula’ which holds together its affiliates by 
bonds of varying degrees of intensity, and collectively seeks to harm the U.S., the 
West and apostate governments in the Muslim world’.102  For instance, Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, the Afghan Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and Saudi 
Islamic extremists were listed among the organizations that openly allied themselves 
with Al Qaeda.
103
 Hoffmann argued that Al Qaeda’s success in networking depended 
on its success in exploiting local causes and realigning its parochial interests with its 
transnational, pan-Islamist ideology.
104
  
Owing to its transnational network structure, Al Qaeda became more capable 
of conducting global jihad both internally and externally at one time. Using local 
operatives, the organization could reach a wider audience, supporters and most 
importantly to new recruits from all around the world. States like France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom also had a small but determined presence of Al 
Qaeda.
105
 In a study from 1993 to 2004, it was concluded that 41 percent of terrorist 
operatives were from European and North American nationalities, and 35 of 375 (9 
percent) operatives were converts to Islam out of 16 percent were U.S citizens, 10 
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percent French and 6 percent were British.
106
 This also showed that Al Qaeda eased 
its way of penetration into the United States and its allies using counter-profile 
operatives such as converts, women and Caucasian-looking people.
107
 The high 
profile of European and North American operatives created vulnerability for the U.S. 
and its European allies because of no visa policy.
108
 
For instance, the perpetrators of the London bombings of 2005 were “self-
starters” who had ideological affinity with the original Al Qaeda network but 
operated without institutionalized training or recruitment.
109
 The perpetrators 
preferred global umma to their national identities and shared the sufferings of their 
‘Muslim sisters and brothers’. They considered civilians in democratic countries 
justifiable targets since they shared responsibility for the acts of their governments. 
These four self-radicalized and self-activated men undertook the London attacks by 
means of the internet. In addition to connecting small cells and radical groups, Al 
Qaeda’s ideology encourages individuals participate in global jihad by committing 
suicide bombing for instance. As Pape argued, suicide bombing attacks were rational 
acts that were closely related to the political cause of an organization rather than 
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irrational individual self-destruction.
110
 In that sense, suicide-bombing attacks can be 
considered in the relation to the ideological network of Al Qaeda.
111
  
Thus, the dispersed networking of Al Qaeda’s operatives within states at 
different regions constituted one of the most important tenets of Al Qaeda’s 
description as a transnational terrorist organization. By means of this global network, 
the organization has become able to conduct deathly operations with minimum cost 
and defeat the disadvantage of geographical distance from its enemies. Its dispersed 
nature of the operatives reduced the organizational difficulties in recruiting and 
undertaking operations.  
 
 
2.5. Transnational Financial of Network 
 
Terrorist organizations’ ability to act more efficiently and effectively is 
closely linked to their financial capabilities.
112
 The bigger the financial resources that 
they have, the bigger terrorist operations they can conduct. As stated before, 
transnational terrorist organizations are self-sufficient as opposed to international 
terrorist organizations that rely on state-sponsors. Benefiting from the attraction of 
their political ideology and transnational organizational structure, they raise and use 
funds from different recourses pursuing diverse methods and rely on their own 
resources to survive, travel, communicate, obtain equipment, and conduct attacks.
113
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As opposed to the general belief that Usama bin Laden was the chief financer 
of the organization, Rabasa argued that Al Qaeda’s financial power stemmed from 
money that was being raised at the grassroots level.
114
 The CIA has estimated that it 
cost Al Qaeda approximately $30 million a year to sustain itself during the period 
preceding the September 11 attacks and it could rely only on Laden’s support.115 If 
this considerable amount of money was collected from grassroots, then Al Qaeda 
must have a really powerful and organized financial network. Fundraising was 
considered as one of the most important sources that Al Qaeda exploited people for 
money. US sources argued that the network that helped with the financing of the 
mujahedeen extended to all corners of the world from the Persian Gulf States to 
Europe and even to the United States.
116
 Charities, nongovernmental organizations, 
mosques, websites, fundraisers, intermediaries, facilitators, banks, and other financial 
institutions were exploited for raising funds for Al Qaeda.
117
 
Al Qaeda has used its religious identity for reaching the religious diaspora 
and calling the global umma for financial support.  In addition to the contributions of 
wealthy supporters, small amounts of donations collected from individuals in 
charities make huge amount of money.
118
  While some people knowingly donate to 
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charity organizations linked to Al Qaeda, some consider that they support a 
humanitarian cause. As Comra stated there were more than 50 international and local 
charities related to funding the organization.
119
 Experts mentioned Zakat as a 
commonly exploited way of collecting money for the organization.
120
 Zakat is a 
regular charitable donation as a part of religious obligation that asks all competent 
Muslims to give at least 3 percent of their income to the people in need. Zakat 
provides cash and is usually given to trusted organizations or community leaders to 
be distributed for the purpose. However, this widely unregulated, seldom audited and 
mostly undocumented transfer of money creates a financial resource that is open to 
exploitation.
121
 
In addition to charities, seemingly legal activities in infrastructure, mining, 
banking and agricultural sectors were mentioned among Al Qaeda’s economic 
activities.
122
 Illegal and criminal activities that Al Qaeda extensively benefited from 
were counted as the poppy and opium trade, drug-trafficking, gemstone smuggling 
especially diamond and gold, human smuggling, counterfeiting of American dollars, 
audiovisual material, perfumes, and brand clothing.
123
 Nevertheless, the most 
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innovative method to raise funds came through the use of the internet. According to 
the 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, terrorists used the Internet “to direct 
solicitation for the organization itself; exploit charitable organizations by soliciting in 
that guise; perpetrate on-line crime, such as identity and credit card theft; to organize 
and implement other fund-raising activities.”124 Known methods that Al Qaeda used 
for transferring the money included the global financing system, Islamic banking 
system and couriers who physically carry large amounts of cash, diamond, gold and 
other valuables.
125
 
One significant implication of the financial independence for terrorist 
networks is that financially independent small cells and affiliate groups become able 
to realize their own plans for the sake of global jihad. Also, it was argued that 
especially after the counterterrorism measures taken in the wake of the September 11 
attacks, international transactions were targeted more than domestic transactions 
might have contributed to the increase in domestic financial activities due to the 
lesser risk.
126
 Kiser called this tendency “localization of terror” because terrorist 
activities relied on more local groups and their resources since the September 11 
attacks.
127
 For instance, the 2004 Madrid attack was undertaken by the Spanish cell 
of Al Qaeda organization recruited from the local mosques and largely funded 
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through the sale of drugs.
128
 Given that it is not easy to organize internationally 
orchestrated and spectacular attacks, some scholars argued that financially 
independent and local terrorist activities might be the new strategic trend for 
terrorists.
129
  
 
 
2.6. Transnational Information and Communication Network 
 
Communication, coordination, and the conduct of terrorist campaign is the 
major difficulty in loosely connected and geographically dispersed networks. 
Coordinated and efficient operation of transnational terrorist organizations require a 
capacity for constant information and communication flows within the loosely 
connected and geographically dispersed units.
130
 The need for constant information 
and communication flows is facilitated by the latest information and communication 
technologies such as World Wide Web sites, electronic mail, computer conferencing, 
mobile phones, digital cameras, web cameras, and fax machines and so on. 
Especially, increases in the speed of communication, dramatic reductions in the costs 
of the communication, expansion of bandwidth and integration of communication 
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with computing technologies have enabled transnational terrorist organizations to 
reach their highly dispersed constituents.
131
 
Communication technologies have always been significant for terrorist 
organizations since terrorists’ violent actions aim to communicate with a wider 
audience.
132
 In other words, terrorists make propaganda by deed and they need 
communication technologies to publicize their actions.
133
 Researches on media and 
terrorism indicate that the media enables terrorists to reach a wider audience and 
magnify the enormity of terrorists’ actions by creating an ‘echo effect’.134 It is 
maintained that the more terrorists’ actions are dreadful and frightening, the more 
they secure coverage, the more terrorists are encouraged to undertake dramatic and 
destructively lethal actions so that they can achieve the same effect every time. 
However, the message that terrorists want to transfer via most media vehicles such as 
television channels, newspapers and weekly magazines have been mediated and 
filtered, so they looked for independent ways of communication with their audience.  
The internet provided transnational terrorist organizations with unmediated 
and unfiltered opportunity not only for communicating with the outside world but 
also communication within the group members, thereby enabling coordination with 
their operatives and affiliates. As Tsfati and Weimann have stated “the network of 
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computer-mediated communication is ideal for terrorists-as communicators because 
it is decentralized, it cannot be subjected to control or restriction, it is not censored, 
and it allows access to anyone who wants it.”135 Terrorists made use of the internet as 
a forum in which they could present their views, publications, communiqués and 
actions and justifications. As Hoffman stated, using the internet as a forum, terrorists 
were able to challenge states’ monopoly over the mass communication of terrorist 
message.
136
 
Transnational terrorist organizations’ creativity in benefiting from the internet 
also challenged state sovereignty. Hoffman pointed out that the internet provided 
terrorists with a virtual sanctuary  by ‘providing an effective, expeditious and 
anonymous means through which the movement can continue to communicate with 
its fighters, followers, sympathizers and supporters world-wide.’137 Similarly, Tsfati 
and Weimann supported the idea that internet became the virtual sanctuary and 
argued that the internet became the “virtual state”  which terrorist organizations’ 
used for distributing their propaganda, communicating with ‘virtual ummah’138, and 
even executing virtual attacks.
139
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In this regard, it can be argued that the internet as a virtual sanctuary fulfilled 
the functions of an actual sanctuary for terrorist organizations. Actual sanctuaries 
provided terrorists with opportunities to command and control recruits, train and plan 
operations, and collect financial help within a defined geographic area.
140
 Under 
virtual sanctuary of the internet, terrorists were able to undertake all of these 
activities on a global scale.  Hofmann stated that formerly terrorists acquired the 
capabilities, such as training, access to weapons and operational knowledge, through 
training undertaken in camps run either by terrorist organizations and/or in concert 
with state sponsors. However, today the internet provide terrorists with the same 
opportunities that were provided by actual sanctuaries. In short, the internet became 
the new safe haven of terrorist networks.
141
 
The importance of the internet presence has been so widely appreciated by 
terrorists that almost all terrorist organizations have their own websites.
142
 According 
to Weimann, the internet served eight different purposes: Psychological Warfare, 
Publicity and Propaganda, Data Mining, Fundraising, Recruitment and Mobilization, 
Networking, Sharing Information and Planning and Coordination.
143
 Al Qaeda was 
considered as the terrorist organization that succeeded to use the internet with at most 
efficiency defined with reference to the purposes mentioned above.
144
   
By including media and publicity as one of the four operational committees 
under its consultative committee, known as the shura majlis, Al Qaeda’s leadership 
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showed that they grasped the importance of communication.
145
 Rabasa mentioned the 
presence of around 4000 websites making propaganda for jihad and argued that the 
enormity of Al Qaeda’s internet presence supported the idea that the internet was 
very crucial for the organization.
146
 For instance, in these websites, Al Qaeda 
conducted psychological warfare by providing its audience with access to 
prerecorded videotapes, audiotapes, CD-ROMs, DVDs, photographs, and 
announcements. It made announcements of an impending attack on US targets, 
which aimed to create a widespread sense of insecurity among the audience within 
the U.S. and throughout the world. These websites constantly used the images of the 
destruction of the World Trade Center. In addition, the websites were exploited for 
providing publication that propagandized the purposes of Al Qaeda and justified its 
violent actions.
147
  
Furthermore, the internet provided the terrorists a digital freely available 
information pool. Following the internet, terrorists were able to find out significant 
amount of information regarding their targets such as transportation facilities, nuclear 
power plants, public buildings, airports, and ports, and even about up to date 
counterterrorism measures.
148
 They also received updated information about 
developing counterterrorism measures. Hoffmann stated that research on Al Qaeda 
affiliated websites exposed that jihadist chatters constantly monitored America, 
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studied and weighed reactions to intelligence gathered on them and adapted their 
own plans accordingly.
149
 He cited the message, “If we know the importance of the 
information for the enemy, even if it is a small piece of information, then we can 
understand how important are the information that we know,” that appeared in a 
jihadist website to underline the importance of information for terrorists as well.
150
 
 Search engines, e-mail distribution lists, and chat rooms and discussion 
groups are among the data collection tools that terrorists can benefit from.
 
For 
instance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking on January 15, 2003, 
stated that an Al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan told its readers that 
“using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to 
gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.”151 Besides 
legal information collection methods, terrorists are capable of devising hacking 
stratagems, sabotaging networks, and developing codes and creating and spreading 
viruses thereby targeting and circumventing governmental websites.
152
  
As it was stated in the former section, Al Qaeda’s financial strength heavily 
depended on donations from foundations, charities, nongovernmental organizations, 
and other financial institutions that used websites and cyber chat rooms and forums. 
For instance, the US government froze the activities of three seemingly legal charity 
organizations operating within the borders of the United States, based on the 
evidence that they funneled their money to Al Qaeda.
153
 In addition, the internet was 
used for establishing networks by finding and mobilizing recruits. Social capital is 
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the premium asset for terrorist organizations.
154
 The more the terrorist organization 
has recruits, the more capable it is because as Jenkins states the quantity of terrorists 
translates into quality.
155
 It was argued that for recruitment, Al Qaeda captured 
information about the users who browsed their websites and contacted those who 
seemed most interested in its cause or well suited to its operational purposes.
156
 
Online chat rooms and cyber-cafes, electronic bulletin boards and user nets (issue-
specific chat rooms and bulletins) served as vehicles for reaching out to potential 
recruits. In some cases, it was mentioned that potential terrorists contacted terrorist 
cells via the internet to be active members. The internet became also a place for 
sharing information and training the recruits. Using facilities in the internet, they 
searched for how to build chemical and explosive weapons, prepare homemade 
poisons, poisonous gases and other deadly materials.
157
 By the use of internet, 
terrorists were able to share their violent ‘software’158 and ‘know-how’159 online 
instead of sharing them in actual camps and safe havens as it used to be. 
The internet enabled terrorist organizations function as a loosely knit network 
defeating geographical restraints. The internet provided the opportunity for 
exchanging messages almost instantly, with the minimum cost and maximum 
accuracy. Using the internet, terrorist organizations were able to connect with not 
only their group members but also other groups.
160
 Networked as such, terrorists 
were able to plan and coordinate their activities almost in real time.  As findings 
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suggest, Al Qaeda managed the plan 9/11 attacks by means of encrypted messages 
that were posted in an area of a website protected by a password and by assuring 
anonymity using the internet in public places to send emails.
161
 For instance, the 
eighteen terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks read Mohammed Attar’s 
simple message: “The semester begins in three more weeks. We have obtained 19 
confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the 
faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering.”162 Consequently, Al Qaeda’s 
adaptation to information and communication technologies facilitated 
transnationalization. 
 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization.  It 
argued that Al Qaeda’s religious-political causes functioned as the base and attracted 
co-religious from international audience. It stated Al Qaeda’s cause as ending the 
presence of the United States and its allies in the Muslim lands as it considered the 
US policies as the major source of economic, political, social problems of the 
Muslims. It also aimed to change the regimes in the Muslim world as they 
cooperated with the United States and wanted to establish a large shariah state as the 
solution. Al Qaeda’s transnational political-religious claim attracted geographically 
dispersed group of people and created networks that shared the same ideal. The 
larger Al Qaeda’s network became the larger financial resources it possessed. 
Therefore, it was able to organize massive terrorist attacks such as September 11. It 
was underlined that Al Qaeda’s adaptation to the use of communication and 
                                                 
161
 The 9/11 Commission Report. 
162
 Thomas, "Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of 'Cyberplanning'," 119. Weimann. 
48 
 
information technologies played the major role in its transnationalization. Briefly, the 
chapter defined Al Qaeda as a stateless, self-sufficient and independent organization 
which had capability to conduct operations internationally.  
“Know your enemy” is one of the most accepted maxims in warfare as it 
enables one to produce the best counterstrategy against the enemy. Having defined 
the components of Al Qaeda’s power, the chapter concludes that countering Al 
Qaeda requires the use of a mixture of military, political, intelligence, law 
enforcement, and financial instruments.
163
 As Al Qaeda is a transnational 
organization, these counterterrorism strategies should also be pursued at national and 
international levels. Therefore, international cooperation is crucial to fighting against 
Al Qaeda’s network.164 Also, as Rabasa states “ideology is the center of gravity” of 
the global jihadist terror network; therefore, the major part of the strategy against the 
organization should focus on countering and discrediting terrorists’ political 
causes.
165
 The second move against the organization should be to localize terrorist 
groups by breaking the links among the network,
166
 which can be achieved by 
cooperating with the local governments or forcing them to deny physical or virtual 
sanctuary for terrorists.  Also, a powerful strategy against Al Qaeda must focus on 
denying terrorists from seemingly legal and illegal sources of finance at national and 
international level. The last but not the least, as the organization adapted to the use of 
information and communication technologies, especially the internet, and facilitated 
its ideological, organizational and financial capacity, a counterterrorism strategy 
against the network also should find methods, albeit they will be limited, to control 
the flow of information, communication, propaganda and finance through these 
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means. In conclusion, countering the Al Qaeda network requires multi-national and 
multi-layered approach.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
US COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
Before the September 11 attacks took place, national security priorities of the 
Bush administration were defined to ensure America’s military preeminence, to 
promote liberal economic and political order, to renew international relationships 
with allies and friends to share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity and 
freedom, to focus on relationships with big powers, particularly Russia and China, 
and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes supporting terrorism and 
developing weapons of mass destruction.
167
 However, after the September 11 attacks, 
“business-as-usual approach” to foreign policy vanished and war on terror started to 
dominate US foreign policy agenda.
168
 Counterterrorism became the prism through 
which the Bush administration saw international relations. This chapter aims to give 
a detailed account of two US national strategy documents that subsequently provided 
US definition of the terrorist threat and counterterrorism strategy. These documents 
are the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002
169
 and 
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003.
170
 Although the Bush 
administration publicized two more documents in 2006, National Security Strategy 
and National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the focus will be on the 
national strategy documents in 2003, which summarized what was called as the Bush 
Doctrine and provided the major principles of the Bush administration. The Chapter 
underlines the US primacy as the facilitator of the Bush doctrine and discusses the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars as practices of US war on terror. Finally, the Chapter 
concludes by arguing that although Afghanistan and Iraq wars were part of the same 
war and legitimate from the perspective of the United States, the lack of 
authorization from the UN Security Council in the Iraq war caused a legitimacy 
problem for the U.S war on terror. 
 
 
3.2. National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002 
 
In his speech on 14 September 2001 President George W. Bush declared that 
the conflict began on the timing and terms of others and declared that the United 
States was “at war against terrorists of global reach”.171 National Security Strategy in 
2002 (NSS 2002) stated the enemy was terrorism, which was defined as 
premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocent people. It was clearly 
stated in NSS 2002 that terror could be justified by no grievances and that the United 
States would make no concession to terrorists’ demands and would fight against 
those who knowingly harbored and provided aid to terrorists. The United States 
declared that terrorists and their supporters would be fought without distinction. 
More specifically, the document put the priority of the Bush administration as to 
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disrupt and destroy “terrorist organizations of global reach” and attack their 
leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. 
By achieving these, the Bush administration aimed to disable terrorists’ ability to 
plan and operate. 
172
 
On the military response to terrorists, NSS 2002 declared that the United 
States would take continuous and direct action against terrorists and their supporters 
by using all elements of its national and international power. The immediate focus 
was defined as those “terrorist organizations of global reach” and any terrorist or 
state sponsor of terrorism which attempted to gain or use weapons of mass 
destruction or their precursors. In order to defend itself, the United States declared its 
intention to identify and destroy the threat before it reaches the borders of the United 
States. Although it was said that the United States would strive to enlist the support 
of the international community, there was a firm statement indicating that the United 
States would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, the United States would exercise 
its right of self-defense by acting preemptively against terrorists.
173
 The Bush 
administration declared that it adopted the view that the best defense was good 
offense.
174
 It clearly stated the United States’ determination to stop further 
sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to 
accept their sovereign responsibilities. The Bush administration showed that it was 
willing to act unilaterally and preemptively when states did not cooperate to fulfill 
their “sovereign responsibilities”.175 
Another military issue that the document dealt with was prevention of the use 
of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and terrorists. The document stated 
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that the international security environment has undergone profound transformation 
and unlike the Cold War, strategy of deterrence would not be sufficient to respond to 
rogue states and terrorists.
176
 It argued that rogue states and terrorists were 
determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction and to target the world’s 
strongest.
177
 Therefore, these new enemies were classified as imminent threats to the 
security of the United States and its allies and as more dangerous compared to the 
Soviet Union. The document said that even though uncertainty remained as to the 
time and place of the enemy’s attack, the threat was imminent and unavoidable.178 
Stating that the enemy cannot be deterred, the threat was imminent and the 
magnitude of the potential harm was high, the United States declared its decision to 
adopt preemptive strategy and advocated it as a right of self-defense. The United 
States announced that it would weigh the consequences of its actions and proceed by 
building better integrated intelligence capabilities for receiving timely and accurate 
information on the threat; coordinating closely with allies to form a common 
assessment of the most dangerous threat; and transforming its military forces for 
increased ability to conduct rapid and precise operations with decisive results. 
Finally, NSS 2002 advocated that preemptive action would be used for protection of 
the United States and its allies and actions would be clear, the force would be 
measured and the cause would be just.
179
  
In addition to the military war, the Bush administration waged “a ‘war of 
ideas’ to win the battle against international terrorism.”180 The ‘war of ideas’ 
included: using the full influence of the United States to make clear that all acts of 
terrorism were illegitimate like slavery, piracy or genocide so that no respectable 
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government would condone or support terrorism; ensuring support to moderate and 
modern governments especially in the Muslim world so that conditions and 
ideologies that promoted terrorism did not find fertile ground; diminishing conditions 
that  spawn terrorism by the help of the international community; using  effective 
public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle hopes 
and aspirations of freedom in societies living under the rule of sponsors of 
terrorism.
181
  
NSS 2002 did not mention international cooperation as the major strategy 
against terrorists. In the document, the Bush administration stated that it would 
‘encourage’ its regional partners to adopt a coordinated effort to isolate and localize 
terrorists.
182
 The United States promised that it would provide military, law 
enforcement, political, financial tools to the state that helped to localize terrorists. 
The major issue mentioned as a subject of cooperation in NSS 2002 became 
counterterrorism strategies in the financial field. It stated the United States’ intention 
to work together with allies in disrupting financing terrorism. In this framework, NSS 
2002 announced that the United States would continue to work together with allies to 
identify and blockade sources of funding, freeze terrorists’ assets, deny terrorists 
access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from 
terrorists’ exploitation and prevent terrorists from using alternative financial 
networks. The document underlined that the success of financial counterterrorism 
depended on cumulative action across all geographic regions and demanded 
cooperation.
183
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On military cooperation, the United States stated its need for support from 
allies and friends but while leading the campaign against terrorism, it also declared 
its intention to forge new, productive international relationships and to redefine 
existing ones in ways that met the challenges of the century. In other words, the 
United States stated that it would reorganize its relations with other states 
considering their contributions to the US war against the global terrorist network. 
NSS 2002 declared that the United States would consult regional organizations and 
states’ cooperation wherever possible. The United States implied that it would not 
rely on regional or international organizations such as NATO and the UN but on 
coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements to confront 
transnational threats.
184
  
However, the United States declared its intention to work with the United 
Nations, non-governmental organizations and other countries to rebuild 
Afghanistan.
185
 Also, the United States considered cooperating with other states to 
defuse regional conflicts. It called on other states to cooperate engaging in critical 
regional disputes to prevent their escalation and minimize human suffering.
186
 In an 
interconnected world, regional conflicts are considered risky because these conflicts 
may deteriorate relationships between the major power and cause humanitarian 
sufferings. The document stated that the United States had finite political, economic, 
and military resources to meet its global priorities; therefore, NSS 2002 underlined 
that US engagement in the regional conflicts would be defined based on its strategic 
priorities.  
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NSS 2002 document showed that how the September 11 attacks redefined US 
foreign policy priorities. The document portrayed transnational terrorists and their 
sponsors as the new enemy. It introduced the United States’ new military doctrine 
that was preemptive war. The Bush administration clearly stated that it would not 
allow disagreements to obscure its determination to secure its interests and values, if 
necessary it would act alone to perform requirements of its unique responsibilities.
187
 
Therefore, it implied that the United States would not rely on its previous alliances 
but it would rather prefer new partnerships or coalitions of the willing in countering 
terrorism. The document also underlined that the United States expected all states to 
act responsibly and willingly in fighting against terrorists. If they acted otherwise, 
the United States implied that they would bear the cost and would be punished. The 
emphasis on preemptive war and the linkage assumed between the rogue states, 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction informed about the upcoming war on Iraq. 
 
 
3.3. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 
 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT 2003) was introduced in 
February 2003. The document aimed to announce the United States’ resolution to 
defeat the enemy, its definition of terrorist threat, its strategic intent, goals and 
objectives of US counterterrorism strategy. NSCT 2003 started with a quote from 
President Bush who said the US would not rest until terrorist groups of global reach 
were found, stopped and defeated. Repeating the US determination to pursue global 
terrorists, the document stated that the terrorist threat was directed to the US, its 
allies and civilized society, to the idea of freedom and way of life. It defined the war 
as taking place between freedom and fear. It clearly stated that the enemy was 
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terrorism, which defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. NSCT 
2003 cautiously noted that the threat was not one person, single political regime, or a 
religion. 
188
 
The document underlined that the struggle against international terrorism was 
different from any other struggles that the US faced before. For this reason, NSCT 
2003 argued that success would not solely or primarily rely on the use of military 
power. It stated that the United States would use every instrument of its national 
power including diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, 
intelligence and military. In parallel with NSS 2002, it underlined the United States’ 
determination to destroy the enemy, win the “war of ideas” and strengthen its 
security at home and abroad. For this purpose, the document underlined that it would 
pursue a preemptive strategy to identify and defuse threats before they reached US 
borders. Following the principles of NSS 2002, the document stated that the Bush 
administration would search support from the international community. However, 
NSCT 2003 also underlined that the United States would primarily rely on its own 
power,  fighting against the enemy and if necessary it would not hesitate to act alone 
to exercise its right to self-defense. In this regard, echoing NSS 2002, the document 
stated that the United States would forge new international relationships and would 
redefine existing ones in terms that suited to the transnational challenges of the 21
st
 
century.
189
  
In addition to reiterating US determination to act alone and preemptively, 
NSCT 2003 more clearly stated that the US administration considered democracy 
promotion as a counterterrorism strategy. The document put emphasis that the fight 
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against terrorists was about defending fundamental democratic values of the United 
States and its way of life. NSCT 2003 stated that the United States sought to integrate 
nations and peoples into mutually beneficial democratic relationships that would 
protect them from forces of disorder and violence. It put that the Bush administration 
would promote democracy as a counterterrorism strategy considering that it would 
help to promote a freer, prosperous and secure world. The document ended the 
introduction by stating that the US fight against terrorism would help foster an 
international environment where democratic interests were secure and the values of 
liberty were respected around the world.
190
  
 
 
3.3.1. Defining the Nature of the Terrorist Threat 
 
The first section of NSCT 2003 was dedicated to the analysis of the common 
characteristics of terrorists to understand the weaknesses and strengths of its 
enemies.
191
 The document stated that despite diversity in motive, sophistication and 
strength, terrorists shared a basic structure which was depicted in a pyramid figure. 
According to this, from bottom to top, the structure of terror consisted of underlying 
conditions, the international environment, states, organization, and leadership.
192
 
Underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife 
were put at the base because terrorists exploited these real or manufactured 
conditions to justify their actions and expand their support. One layer above 
underlying conditions, NSCT 2003 put the international environment because it 
defined the boundaries within which terrorists planned their strategies. It was argued 
that although freer and open orders provided terrorists access to safe havens, 
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capabilities and other support, access alone was not sufficient for terrorists because 
they needed an actual physical base to operate.  
Therefore, NSCT 2003 put states above international environment. It argued 
whether through ignorance, inability or intent states still supported terrorists and 
provided sanctuary -both physical (e.g., safe houses or training grounds) and virtual 
bases (e.g., reliable communication and financial networks)- where terrorists needed 
to plan, organize, train and conduct their operations. Once the terrorist organization 
had a safe operating environment, the document argued, it found ground to solidify 
and expand.
193
 On the top of the pyramid, NSCT 2003 put the terrorist leadership 
because it provided overall direction and strategy that linked all these factors and 
brought life into a terrorist campaign. Leadership was defined as the catalyst for 
terrorist action. However, the document noted that for some terrorist organizations 
while the loss of the leadership could result in collapse, some organizations could 
become more resilient by changing the leadership or adapting and morphing into 
decentralized, leaderless, autonomous cells. This kind of threat was considered as a 
greater challenge to the United States.
194
 
In addition to the analysis of the structure of terror, NSCT 2003 underlined 
the changing nature of terrorism. It stated that the terrorists’ evolved by adapting to 
the advances in transnational communication, travel and commerce and turned the 
advances of the 20
th
 century into destructive capabilities. It mentioned Al Qaeda as 
an example of how terrorist networks twisted the benefits and conveniences of the 
open, integrated and modernized world to serve its terrorist purposes. NSCT 2003 
defined Al Qaeda as a multinational enterprise with its operations in more than 60 
countries. It gave examples regarding how Al Qaeda used communication 
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technologies to coordinate its global activities and recruits, used the banking system 
to transfer funds for terrorism, made propaganda in the media or exploited freedom 
of travel. Furthermore, exploiting the opportunities provided by global environment, 
the document pointed out terrorists became more self-sufficient in terms of their 
financing through illegal means. 
NSCT 2003 also highlighted the interconnected nature of terrorist 
organizations and Al Qaeda. It defined terrorist threat as a flexible, a transnational 
network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose 
interconnectivity both within and between groups. It argued terrorists worked 
together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, and planning and 
undertaking attacks.
195
 As a less direct way of connection among terrorists, the 
document mentioned presence of cooperation among terrorist networks for 
promoting the same ideological agenda or reinforcing a favorable image for one 
another. Due to their interconnectivity, the document underlined, terrorist groups 
became more resilient and diffuse today; therefore, it characterized interconnectivity 
as the force-multiplier.
196
  
Finally, in its analysis of the terrorist threat, NSCT 2003 underlined that 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed direct and serious threat to the security 
of the United States and the international community. It argued that terrorists’ 
tendency to use WMD increased significantly during the past decade. The document 
also noted that the availability of critical technologies, the willingness of some 
scientists and others (implying rogue states) to cooperate with terrorists and the ease 
of intercontinental transportation facilitated it for terrorists to acquire, manufacture, 
deploy and initiate a WMD attack against the United States. Reminding domestic and 
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international community that Usama bin Laden defined acquiring WMD as a 
“religious duty,” NSCT 2003 defined the acquisition of WMD as a clear and present 
threat to US security and stated its intention to prevent the danger.
197
 
 
 
3.3.2. US Statement of Strategic Intent and  
Design of Counter Strategy 
 
Having defined the characteristics of its enemy, the US administration 
announced its strategic intent to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its 
citizens, its interests, and its friends and allies, and to create an international 
environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support terrorists. NSCT 
2003 declared that the United States would accomplish the task by taking action on 
four fronts. The four front strategy called 4D strategy composed of defeating terrorist 
organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, command 
and control, and communications, material support and finances; denying 
sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminishing the underlying 
conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; defending US citizens and interests at home 
and abroad.
198
 
To begin with, the first tenet of the 4D strategy called for defeating 
transnational terrorist organizations through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic, 
economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence and other 
instruments of US power. NSCT 2003 stated that the United States would use all of 
its resources, including its ability to marshal and sustain international coalitions, to 
defeat terrorist networks and prevent them from establishing new organizations. The 
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document underscored that the United States and its partners would target 
individuals, state sponsors, transnational networks that enabled terrorists’ activities. 
NSCT 2003 declared that the United States would identify, locate and destroy 
terrorists and terrorist organizations.
199
 It stated that the United States would not wait 
for terrorists to attack and then respond. Rather, it would act preemptively to disrupt 
and degrade terrorists’ ability to act and compel supporters of terrorists to cease and 
desist. Under section on defeating strategy, the document mentioned preventing 
terrorists from acquiring WMDs as the highest priority.   
The second front of the National Strategy was denying sponsorship, support 
and sanctuary that enabled terrorists to exist, gain strength, train, plan and execute 
their attack. The document stated that the United States would hold accountable 
those who harbored terrorists in the past and present and accused those states of 
acting like accomplices who provided shelter for criminals. NSCT 2003 stated that it 
was the responsibilities of all states to fulfill their obligations to combat terrorism 
both in their borders and internationally. It declared that the United States would 
provide assistance to weak states that were willing to combat terrorism but did not 
have the capacity to do so. However, it strongly emphasized that the United States 
would not tolerate when states proved reluctant or unwilling to meet their 
international obligations to deny support and provide sanctuary to terrorists. 
Underlining that states’ responsibilities as sovereigns, the United States declared that 
it would adopt a “zero tolerance”200 policy and would act in cooperation with willing 
and able states (friends and allies), or if necessary, would take appropriate steps to 
convince them to change their policies.
201
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The third component of the 4D Strategy was diminishing the underlying 
conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. The document stated that this component 
was made up of collective efforts to diminish conditions that terrorists could exploit. 
It was argued that although poverty, deprivation, social fractions, unresolved regional 
conflicts did not justify the use of terror, many terrorist organizations exploit them 
for their own advantage. NSCT 2003 stated that ongoing US efforts to solve regional 
disputes, foster economic, social and economic development, market based 
economies, good governance, the rule of law did not necessarily focus on 
counterterrorism but contributed to the campaign by addressing underlying 
conditions that terrorists exploited. Additionally, the document emphasized that 
diminishing these conditions required the United States and its allies to win the “war 
of ideas,” to support democracy and promote economic freedom.202 As it stated in 
NSS 2002, the United States stated that it did not propose to undertake this task alone 
because it has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every corner of the 
world. Reminding to domestic and international addressees that the threat of 
terrorism was a common threat to all states, it called for international cooperation to 
strengthen weak states and prevent the reemergence of terrorism.
203
 
The fourth tenet of the National Strategy encompassed defending US 
sovereignty, territory, and its national interests at home and abroad. This included 
both physical and cyber protection of the United States, its population, property and 
interests as well as its democratic principles. Different from the previous strategies, 
the fourth strategy heavily focused on continuous law enforcement and intelligence 
collecting measures. NSCT 2003 underlined that to reduce the vulnerability of US 
personnel, critical infrastructure, and its other interests, the United States needed to 
                                                 
202
 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), 23. 
203
 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), 23. 
64 
 
develop a coordinated and focused effort from the federal, state, and local 
governments, the private sector and individuals. In this framework, NSCT 2003 
declared that it would implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security; 
integrate intelligence gathered from different agencies in a single place; enhance 
security of critical infrastructures; develop measures to protect US citizens abroad; 
and ensure an integrated incident management capability.  
Overall, NSCT 2003 provided a detailed account of how the United States 
defined the nature of the threat and its counter strategy. It recognized networked and 
transnational nature of terrorist organizations. Yet, it stated that states still played a 
major role in providing physical or virtual sanctuary to terrorists. It categorized states 
as willing and able states, weak states, reluctant states and unwilling states depending 
on their approaches to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities and to cooperate with 
the United States. The document underlined that the United States adopted “zero-
tolerance” strategy against those who opposed to fulfill the obligations of their 
sovereignty. As with NSS 2002, NSCT 2003 also declared US determination to act 
alone, if necessary preemptively. Despite its determination to act unilaterally and 
preemptively, the United States invited other states to cooperate on issues such as 
eliminating the underlying causes that terrorist exploited or supporting “war of ideas” 
to promote democratic values and economic freedom. Finally, although NSCT 2003 
defined 4D strategy, both NSS and NSCT documents underlined the crucial role that 
democracy would play in eliminating the underlying causes that terrorists exploited.   
However, the emphasis on the “war of ideas” and democracy as “the antidote 
to the ideology of terrorism” became the most significant themes that NSS 2006204 
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and NSCT 2006
205
 documents underlined. NSS 2006 mentioned the “genius of 
democracy” in countering factors that the US administration defined as causing 
terrorism.
206
 These factors were defined as political alienation, grievances that could 
be blamed on others, sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and ideology 
that justified murder. It argued that democracy can defeat terrorism in the long-run 
by offering people change to shape their own future, by bringing the rule of law, the 
habit of advancing interests by compromise and the peaceful resolution of disputes, 
by providing ground for freedom of speech, independent media and market place of 
ideas and by offering respect for human dignity that abhorred the deliberate killings 
of innocents. The document stated that democracy was the “opposite of terrorist 
tyranny” and it is a long-term solution to be empowered in time. “To create the space 
and time for the long-term solution to take root,” NSS 2006 stated that the United 
States would follow four strategies in the short-term.
207
 These short-term strategies 
were to prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occurred; deny WMD to 
rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation; deny 
terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states and denying the terrorists 
control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.  
Similarly, NSCT 2006 clearly defined “advancing effective democracy” as 
the primary long-term solution for the winning the war on terror and the “battle of 
ideas”. The document showed that the Bush administration adopted democracy 
promotion as a counterterrorism strategy. NSCT 2006 stated that effective 
democracies honored and upheld basic human rights, including freedom of religion, 
conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press and that democracies were 
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responsive to their citizens. NSCT 2006 underscored that “effective democracies” 
exercised “effective sovereignty” and maintained order within their own borders, 
addressed causes of conflict peacefully, protected independent and impartial systems 
of justice, punished crime, embraced the rule of law, and resisted corruption.
208
 The 
document stated that “effective democracies” were a “long-term antidote to the 
ideology of terrorism today” and “this is [was] the battle of ideas”.209 As a 
conclusion, from NSC 2002 and NSCT 2003 to NSCT 2006, with increasing emphasis 
on democratization, the US 4D strategy eventually became 5D strategy.  
 
 
3.4. US Primacy as Foundation of the Bush Doctrine and the 
Practices of 5D Strategy  
 
Describing the United States’ international strategy, NSS 2002 started by 
underlining that the United States possessed “unprecedented” and “unequaled” 
strength and influence in the world.
210
 As Barry Posen put it, the United States 
possessed “the command of the commons,” that has unquestionable military 
dominance over the sea, air and space.
211
 The implication of this power 
preponderance in terms of the Bush administrations’ counterterrorism was that the 
United States could act alone and/or preemptively, if necessary, without needing 
other states’ capabilities. As “the only state capable of projecting military power 
globally”212, the United States could afford not having support of its allies and 
friends. It also did not need help from international organizations such as NATO to 
fight against a threat. Therefore, although the United States declared that 
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international cooperation was necessary to fight against terrorism, the Bush 
administration stated that it would act alone, “if necessary,” which if not supported 
by others, it would form “coalitions of the willing” to fight against terrorism.213 
Therefore, the underpinning of the Bush administration’s unilateralism and its 
willingness to act as the leader of “coalitions of the willing” was US primacy. 
The first front of the war on terror was Afghanistan.  After the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States received a very broad based 
support from the international community, states, and international organizations.  
On September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which 
recognized the United States’ inherent right of individual and collective self-defense 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and declared such terrorist acts 
as threat to peace and international security.
214
 Similarly, NATO invoked Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history. The North Atlantic Council 
stated that  
The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was 
directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as 
an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states 
that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all.
215  
 
 
Invoking Article 5, many NATO members expected that the United States 
would conduct military response against Al Qaeda under NATO or that it would 
coordinate its actions with the integrated military structure and political institutions 
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of NATO.
216
 This expectation was stated in NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson’s conversation with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Lord Robertson 
stated that  
invoking Article 5 would be a useful statement of political backing, 
that it would help the United States build an instant anti-terror 
coalition based in part on the moral authority behind Article 5, and 
that it would be a deterrent - in that whoever was responsible for the 
attack would know they had taken on not just the United States, but 
also the greatest military alliance in the world.
217
  
 
However, the Bush administration considered NATO’s support mostly as a 
political and moral support.
218
 On October 7, 2001, the United States started military 
operations together with Britain, Australia and the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan 
without NATO states’ contribution to the mission. As De Nevers stated, the United 
States’ exclusion of NATO from the initial phases of Afghanistan reflected President 
Bush’s desire to avoid allies from dictating how the war would be fought as well as 
the preference of some in the Pentagon
219
to avoid searching for consensus on 
strategy.
220
 US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld summarized the Bush 
administration’s approach on coalitions saying that the mission determined the 
coalition and not vice versa.
221
 As Rhodes put it, from the Bush administration’s 
perspective, “America’s sovereign responsibilities superseded its commitment to 
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international institutions.”222 Nevertheless, NATO’s involvement in the Afghanistan 
War began in subsequent weeks when NATO agreed to assist the US-led coalition 
with providing intelligence, helping to defend states that were participating in the 
Afghanistan War, and allowing overflight rights.
223
 Although NATO’s attempt to 
lead the war on terror failed, the Bush administration’s coalition composed of 
individual states and NATO, which was in line with the administration’s strategy to 
be the unbounded leader.  
The preemptive war doctrine has widely been accepted as the cornerstone of 
the Bush doctrine.
224
 Although the national strategy documents defined the terrorist 
threat as a network, it strongly emphasized the role of states in providing sanctuary to 
terrorists. Therefore, the United States adopted sovereign responsibility approach and 
demanded all states to fulfill their responsibilities to fight against terrorists. The 
document defined states that might help terrorists to acquire a WMD capability as the 
major and imminent threat to US security. In Jervis’ words, under the Bush 
administration, combating terrorism and limiting WMD proliferation went hand in 
hand.
225
 Therefore, in line with its “zero-tolerance” policy towards states that the 
United States suspected supporting terrorists to acquire WMD, the United States 
accused Iraq of supporting terrorists and developing WMD.  
In September 2002, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly and 
argued that Saddam Hussein violated international law by his continuous attempts to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction, by supporting terrorism and by suppressing the 
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Iraqi people.
226
  At this speech President Bush also made it clear that the United 
States would stand against this threat alone and act unilaterally. On October 25, the 
United States proposed a resolution that formally demanded authorization for war 
against Iraq. Rather than giving authorization for war, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1441
227, which declared that it found Iraq in “material breach” of 
previous resolutions, demanded a new inspections regime and warned Iraq of 
“serious consequences” if it failed to disarm.228  
On February 5 when US Secretary of State, Colin Powell addressed the 
United Nations Security Council, he stated that the United States was informed that 
Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorists.
229
 He 
also argued that the United States had strong evidence for both cases to present for to 
the Security Council and demanded a UN Security Council resolution that allowed 
US military action on Iraq. However, on February 14, the inspectors reported to the 
UN Security Council that, they could not find evidence of WMD in Iraq although 
they noted there remained many unaccounted items. After ten days, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Spain proposed a resolution under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter (the section dealing with the threats to international peace and 
security)that would declare Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity to fulfill the 
demands of Resolution 1441. On 14 February, President Bush said that if the UN 
Security Council did not authorize use of force against Iraq, it would be an 
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“ineffective, irrelevant debating society.”230 However, US efforts failed to convince 
France, Germany, Russia and China to pass the resolution because these states 
proposed that inspectors needed more time in Iraq. 
On 28 February, the Bush administration declared that it would not only seek 
disarmament but also regime change in Iraq.
231
 On March 7, President Bush stated 
that the United States had been negotiating with the UN Security Council members 
but if its efforts to pass a resolution failed, the United States would act because the 
United States “really” did not need the United Nations’ approval to act on its own 
security.
232
 In the same speech, President Bush stated that he wanted to work with 
the UN and wanted the UN to be “effective,” “robust” and “capable body” and he 
repeated that the United States did not “need anybody’s permission”.233 
Consequently, on 22 March 2003, despite opposition, the United States declared war 
on Iraq without the authorization of UN Security Council. The US-led coalition 
started Operation Iraqi Freedom ‘‘to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to 
end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people”.234 The 
United States’ efforts to get a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the war 
showed that the Bush administration wanted to work with the UN but not through it. 
It preferred to lead the members of the UN Security Council rather than being 
restricted by them.  
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3.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter focused on two US national security documents, which 
summarized the Bush Doctrine, in order to understand the US definition of the 
terrorist threat, its counterterrorism strategy and practices.  The national security 
documents defined the enemy as terrorism, which was defined as premeditated, 
politically motivated violence against innocent people and declared fighting against 
“terrorist organizations of global reach” with desire to acquire WMD as the primary 
security objective of the Bush administration. The documents recognized the 
flexible, transnational networked structure of the threat that was facilitated by 
modern information and communication technologies. However, the Bush 
administration put emphasis on states as major structures within which terrorist 
organizations survived. Therefore, the documents repeatedly underlined concepts 
like “effective sovereignty,” and “sovereign responsibility”. Effective sovereignty 
referred to states’ ability to govern their territories, maintain control over within their 
borders. Sovereign responsibility referred to states’ willingness to act in accordance 
with international law, norms and rules. In the context of the war on terror, the Bush 
administration underlined states’ responsibility to combat terrorism. Based on the 
concepts of effective sovereignty and sovereign responsibility, the Bush 
administration categorized states as ‘willing and able states’, ‘weak states’, ‘reluctant 
states’ and ‘unwilling states’. The Bush administration declared that it had ‘zero-
tolerance’ towards states that do not fulfill their sovereign responsibilities in 
combating the terrorist threat and stated its determination to act unilaterally and 
preemptively, if necessary.  
The documents stated that the US war on terror was composed of two parts:  
“battle of arms” and “battle of ideas”. However, the Bush administration heavily 
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focused on “the battle of arms” both in theory and practice.  From 2002 to 2006, all 
national strategy documents elaborated on “the battle of arms,” which was named 4D 
strategy. The four front strategy composed of defeating terrorist organizations of 
global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, command and control, and 
communications, material support and finances; denying sponsorship, support and 
sanctuary to terrorists; diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 
exploit; defending US citizens and interests at home and abroad. In addition, the 
success in “battle of arms” was prioritized because it was considered as the 
foundation of the success in “battle of ideas,” which the Bush administration 
considered to attain in the long-term. Although the 2002 national strategy documents 
mentioned “struggle over ideas” or “war of ideas,” the most systematic and detailed 
discussion on the concept of “battle of ideas” emerged in the 2006 national strategy 
documents. Although the initial documents stated the United States would promote 
democracy due to its merits for providing a better future, the national strategy 
documents of 2006 discussed democracy promotion as the most significant 
component of the war of ideas and defined democracy as “the antidote to the 
ideology of terrorism”. The increasing emphasis on the ideational aspect of the war 
on terror might be considered as a development that took place in parallel with the 
Bush administration’s military successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Finally, the chapter underlined the preemptive war doctrine, the United 
States’ willingness to form and lead “coalitions of the willing” and its determination 
to act unilaterally, if necessary, as the crucial components of the Bush doctrine and 
discussed the US primacy as the underpinning force behind these preferences. In 
discussion of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, it argued that although the Bush 
administration looked for international cooperation, it did not want to be constrained 
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by international organizations or suffer from coordinating actions with others. The 
Bush administration wanted to lead coalitions of the willing states and preferred to 
work with, not through, international organizations. Enabled by its primacy, both in 
Afghanistan and Iraq cases the United States was able to lead the operations. 
Although the both wars were practices of the US war on terror, the US war on Iraq 
lacked authorization from the UN Security Council and support of the great powers 
that had granted legitimacy to the Afghanistan war. However, both wars received 
different reactions from the international community and great powers and had 
different impacts on how the United States was perceived. The following two 
chapters will focus on how China and Russia evaluates the US war on terror by 
contextualizing their perception of the US primacy since the end of the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
CHINA’S SECURITY UNDERSTANDING AND  
THE US WAR ON TERROR 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter aims to analyze the impact of the US war on terror on China’s 
security understanding. For this purpose, it begins by looking at China’s security 
understanding since the first introduction of its New Security Concept in 1998. 
Contextualizing the introduction of the New Security Concept, it underlines the link 
between the evolution of China’s security understanding in the post-Cold War era 
and the United States’ security practices. It underscores that China’s security strategy 
is based on preserving China’s national integrity, sustaining its economic 
development and attaining great power status in international politics. In line with 
this strategy, it suggests that China continues to pursue a strategy of non-
confrontation with the United States except the issues of direct national security such 
as Taiwan. It argues that the introduction of the New Security Concept is designed to 
promote an international order based on a ‘thick’ conceptualization of sovereignty 
and non-intervention and an enhanced role for the UN and the UN Security Council. 
China’s purpose in promoting such an international order is to delegitimize the US-
led international order, to protect itself from any form of  intervention by the United 
States and to achieve great power status for itself.  
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The Chapter looks at China’s reaction to the US war on Afghanistan in 2001 
and on Iraq in 2003 as aspects of the US war on terror. It argues that in line with its 
security understanding, China approaches counterterrorism as an international 
problem that should be dealt within the framework of the UN and its Security 
Council under the presence of clear evidence. In this regard, the Chapter maintains 
that China’s support to US war on Afghanistan relies on its evaluation of the war as a 
legitimate act. Likewise, China’s opposition to the Iraq war relies on its evaluation of 
the United States’ motivation and preemptive doctrine as illegitimate. Therefore, the 
Chapter suggests that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars had opposite impacts on China’s 
evaluation of the international security environment, of the United States and of itself 
as a respected great power. It underlines that despite the betterment of the cordial 
relations after the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war enhanced China’s insecurities 
regarding its status in international relations under the US primacy and resurrected 
China’s perception of the United States as hegemon. The chapter concludes that 
since the end of the Cold War, the US security practices shaped China’s security 
understanding and threatened China’s status as a great power. From China’s 
perspective, the Iraq war will not be the last instance of US hegemonism and 
multipolarization is the only order that will prevent US hegemonism and assure 
China’s status as a great power. However, having recognized that multipolarity will 
not arrive soon, China’s reaction to the United States shows that it will also be 
satisfied with unipolarity with multilateral characteristics in the near future but in the 
long run China will prefer to balance US power by power. 
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4.2. China’s Post-Cold War Security Strategy:   
The New Security Concept  
 
Until the official introduction of the New Security Concept in 1998, China’s 
national security strategy was defined by the Chinese leadership. Deng Xiaoping, 
who was China’s President from 1978 to 1992 and the successor to Mao Zedong, has 
been very influential in shaping China’s security strategy. Chinese President Deng 
Xiaoping suggested that China should follow a strategy based on “peace and 
development”.235 The Chinese leader’s strategy was based on the fact that China’s 
development required international peace and China’s peaceful relations with other 
states. In line with the “peace and development” strategy, China focused on its 
economic development and sought good relations with others, including capitalist 
states and the United States. China’s peace and development strategy has been the 
prevailing approach since 1978 and Jiang Zemin, who acted as China’s President 
from 1993 to 2003, also adhered to peace and development as China’s foreign policy 
objectives. These objectives were based on promoting cooperation and avoiding 
confrontation to create a permissive environment for China’s development. In this 
regard, it should be noted that China’s New Security Concept is not a break from 
China’s past strategy; on the contrary, it builds on the peace and development 
strategy. 
The international security environment underwent a process of transition with 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War 
international political landscape has been defined by unipolarity and US 
preponderance. Like most states in the early 1990s, China adjusted its national and 
international policies according to its evaluation of the emerging international 
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environment led by the United States and started to formulate a new security 
concept.
236
 Towards the end of the 1990s, Chinese political leaders started to talk 
about a new security concept at presidential meetings, international conferences and 
in public addresses. For instance, the need for a new security concept was underlined 
at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Regional Forum in March 
1997; at a summit between President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris 
Yelstin in April 1997 and in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s speech at the 30th 
anniversary celebration of ASEAN in December 1997.
237
 However, the most 
authoritative and mature announcement of the Concept was made in China’s White 
Paper on National Defense in 1998.
238
  
China argued that its New Security Concept was an alternative security 
understanding that aimed to negate the “Cold War mentality” that was based on zero-
sum thinking. According to China, this mentality manifested itself in international 
relations with the presence of hegemonism and power politics. As China defined it, 
the best examples of the Cold War mentality in international relations in the post-
Cold War era were the enlargement of military blocks, the strengthening of military 
alliances, the use of military advantages for powerful states’ military and economic 
interests and the infringement of sovereignty. China argued that for the establishment 
of lasting peace it was imperative to abandon this power-oriented logic and cultivate 
a new concept that enabled alternative means of seeking and safeguarding security.  
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According to the New Security Concept, the major themes of the new era 
were defined as peace and development, which China argued should be promoted by 
following certain principles regarding politics, economics and the military. China 
defined the political principles that should govern international relations in the new 
era as follows: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit and peaceful existence. Briefly, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
were characterized as the political basis of global and regional security. Furthermore, 
China underscored the right of each state to choose its own social system, 
development strategy and regime without being subject to political or military 
interference in any way or under any pretext. 
 In the realms of economy, China emphasized the need for mutually 
beneficial cooperation, which required countries to open markets to each other and 
eliminate unequal and discriminatory policies in economic and trade relations. It 
called for seeking common prosperity by assuring the gradual reduction of the 
development gap between countries. In addition, China underlined that success of 
national economies was not sufficient in the new era; states must strengthen regional 
and global economic cooperation. It argued that the recognition of economic 
globalization and interdependence would encourage states to create a stable and 
secure economic environment.  
On military disputes, the New Security Concept maintained that dialogue and 
cooperation should be the foundation of mutual understanding and trust and invited 
states to employ peaceful means to settle international divergences and disputes. 
China noted that it had firmly pursued a national defense policy that was defensive in 
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nature and suggested other states also adopt defensive strategies, with the goal of 
peaceful international relations.  
In an editorial piece in the People’s Liberation Army’s publication, China 
Defense Daily (Zhongguo Guofang Bao), the requirements of the above-mentioned 
principles were drawn more specifically and directly: The political body and system 
of a state cannot be changed by another state. Encroachment on a state’s sovereignty 
and its unification cannot be tolerated. No state shall intrude into the internal affairs 
of another state. In international affairs, all states, big or small, poor or rich, strong or 
weak, are equal. The big and strong states should not be allowed to dominate the 
small and weak. The “superpowers” should be prevented from “ordering” other 
countries around, pursuing power politics and “imposing” their values on others. 239  
On economic security, the New Security Concept outlined the following 
principles: The economic security of a state must not be infringed upon or 
threatened. Economic relations among states should be based on equality, 
cooperation and common development. Economic sanctions should not be allowed as 
retaliation against one another and they should not be used in order to obtain political 
gains and advantage. Economic and trade relations should be based on the principles 
of mutual benefit; most-favored-nation status and entry to the World Trade 
Organization should not be used as “cards” to put pressure on another state and 
disrupt its economic development. Finally, economic competition should be 
undertaken in accordance with international rules and regulations. Problems, frictions 
and differences among parties should be solved through dialogue based on equality 
and consultation. 
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On military security issues, the New Security Concept allowed states to 
strengthen their armies, develop armaments and reform their military organizations 
because the mission of military forces is to defend sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, to resist foreign aggression and to protect a country’s unification. However, 
states’ military policies and strategies should be defensive in nature; states should 
avoid conflicts and wars and prevent crises. If conflicts do occur, de-escalation 
measures should be implemented. In addition, military forces should be used in non-
traditional areas such as dealing with terrorism and drug trafficking and participating 
in rescue missions and humanitarian aid efforts. Moreover, it was underlined that not 
all states should be allowed to pursue the doctrine of military interference and resort 
to military force at every turn. Further, international military cooperation and arms 
trading should not target a third party. 
China’s New Security Concept relied on the ‘old’ and established principles 
of international relations such as inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
mutual non-aggression, non-intervention and equality of states. Therefore, building 
on China’s peace and development strategy, the New Security Concept was supposed 
to be ‘new’ for the United States and it was promoted by China to shape the United 
States’ security practices. The introduction of these principles as ‘new’ indicated 
China’s discontent with the emerging norms of international relations in the post-
Cold War era. As the United States was the major force behind these norms, the 
introduction of the New Security Concept became an expression of China’s 
discontent with the US-led order which would threaten China’s national security 
interests defined in terms of its rising to the status of a great power. 
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4.2.1. Understanding China’s Security Concerns:  
US Hegemony and National Vulnerabilities 
 
In order to better understand the underlying reasons for China’s introduction 
of the New Security Concept, it is necessary to look at the strategic context of China-
US relations. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China-US relations 
reached its lowest ebb. This was because of the economic, military, and political 
sanctions applied by the United States and its major allies following the bloody 
events of June 4, 1989 at Tiananmen Square.
240
 Hirshberg states that the Tiananmen 
Square massacre led China to be perceived as an “evil and oppressive state like the 
Soviet Union” and created a harsh contrast with the good, freedom loving, and 
democratic US.
241
 Since then, China felt the influence of the issue of human rights in 
its relations with the United States. The United States made human rights a part of 
bilateral relations with China and used it as political leverage to affect improvements. 
Renewal of the Most-Favored-Nation status with the United States, and membership 
to the World Trade Organization were linked to the human rights violations until the 
Clinton administration which gave up the linkage strategy in 1994 with an executive 
order.
242
 
The Clinton administration officially changed the linkage policy with an 
executive order since the administration thought that China was significant for US 
economic, political and security interests.
243
 However, the change of the linkage 
policy did not practically change the fact that human rights became an important part 
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of the diplomatic exchanges between China and the United States. The only change 
was on the emphasis. In fact, at the time, President Clinton thought that more trade 
with China would lead to more cooperation and create more opportunity for intense 
and constant dialogue on human rights issues.
244
  
However, China’s concerns about the US intervention in China’s domestic 
affairs and its strategy to constrain China’s rise as a great power were intensified due 
to discussions about “China threat theory”245 in the US political and scholarly 
environment. After the end of bipolar era, the prevailing view in China regarding the 
future of the international structure that multipolarity would emerge eventually and 
with its rising power China would be one of the poles in this new multipolar 
structure.
246
 However, the proponents of the “China threat theory” argued that an 
increasingly powerful China would most likely to destabilize regional and global 
security in the near future.
247
 Therefore, they suggested that the United States should 
contain China in military, economic and diplomatic terms.
248
 For instance, 
Krauthammer argued that the United States should strive to contain China by 
building and maintaining a security agreement, working to undermine the communist 
party regime and prompting political liberalization in support of political dissidents, 
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publicly criticizing China’s human rights abuses, and opposing Beijing’s efforts to 
accumulate international prestige.
249
  
Such policy recommendations strengthened the Chinese idea that the United 
States still pursued a Cold War mentality and replaced China with the USSR. China 
considered the United States’ imposition on betterment of human rights issues for 
economic, political and military affairs as violation of its sovereignty and 
intervention in China’s domestic affairs.  China considered that in order to contain 
Beijing’s rise as a great power in the post-Cold War international relations, the 
United States exploited humanitarian issues and would intervene in domestic affairs. 
In other words, in China’s view, US containment strategy was based on violating 
China’s sovereignty. In addition, Chinese leaders argued that the United States was 
using the “China threat” arguments to enhance its position in the Asia-Pacific region 
and to create justifications for increasing its military spending and maintaining US 
hegemony.
250 
Therefore, China perceived threat from the United States to status as a 
great power and China became a firm defender of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Chinese leaders defended the central authority of the state within its borders 
and the ultimate right of the state authority in conducting its domestic and 
international affairs excluding any other actor.
251
 According to this notion, state 
authority is free and independent to stipulate its own national system and form of 
government, and the form of legally sanctioned use of force. China did not want any 
state, group of states or an international organization, especially the ones in which  it 
did not have  veto power, to develop a supranational authority that could disregard 
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the rights of state authority emanating from the principle of sovereignty.
252
 China’s 
strict adherence to the concept of sovereignty aimed to serve China’s protection by 
enhancing its legitimacy, preventing it from external interference, and criticism for 
its domestic policies.  
Being treated as a major rival by the United States, China’s evaluation of the 
US security practices was influenced by its perception of the United States as a 
hegemon that wanted to constrain China as a major power in the post-Cold War 
international relations.  Desiring to be one of the poles in the multipolar structure, 
China wanted to prevent itself from any ‘hegemonic’ intervention that might hinder 
its growth as a major power. Therefore, promoting its conception of sovereignty and 
preventing interventions into states’ domestic affairs for humanitarian reasons 
became two significant components of China’s strategy to rise as a great power. 
After the demise of the Soviet Union and dismemberment of Yugoslavia, preserving 
its political unity became a major security concern for China and a precondition of 
having a great power status in international relations. However, it had vulnerabilities 
that might have been exploited to intervene in China’s domestic affairs.253   
China’s political vulnerabilities were separatist movements in Tibet and 
Xinjiang. China’s sensitivity did not stem from the capacity of these forces to be 
independent or the possibility of military intervention against China due to its abuse 
of human rights. The reason of China’s concern was the US foreign policy strategy 
linking human rights issues with security and economic relations.
254
 China 
considered the linkage policy as a violation of its sovereignty and as an attempt to 
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degrade its status as a great power.  China stated its position on the linkage strategy 
in its 1991 White Paper on Human Rights by stating that the United States used 
human rights issues to “sell its own values, ideology, political standards and mode of 
development” and interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries, hurting 
their sovereignty and dignity.
255
 Having experienced this process with the United 
States, China was concerned about its recurrence because it still had human rights 
problems. 
However, Taiwan’s independence was the most pressing security issue 
threatening China’s political integrity and it could be a source of US military 
intervention. China had been frustrated by the United States’ cordial relations with 
Taiwan and considered the United States’ economic, political and military ties with 
Taiwan as intervention in China’s domestic affairs, violating its sovereign rights. 
When the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to the region to show its 
position against China’s military exercises that aimed to deter Taiwan from pushing 
for independence in 1996, a major crisis broke out between two powers.
256
 Following 
that crisis, the US decision to increase its arms sales to Taiwan and include Taiwan’s 
security in its strategic planning for the region further increased China’s sensitivities 
about the US containment strategy.
257
 Considering that strict adherence to the 
principle of China’s version of sovereignty would preserve China’s national security 
and its position as a great power, Bejing became a firm defender of the principle of 
sovereignty. It perceived violations of sovereignty as the reflections of US hegemony 
                                                 
255
 "White Paper on Human Rights in China (1991)," Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China (November 1991). http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm (accessed 
02/01/2012). 
256
 Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait - Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US-China 
Relations," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002): 48. 
257
 "China’s National Defense in 1998".  
87 
 
and threat to its security defined in terms of its great power status in the post-Cold 
War era. 
Due to the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and China’s status 
in the post-Cold War era, the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo deeply influenced 
China’s perception of the United States as a hegemon. In Chinese use of the term, 
hegemon meant a country that employs force to control and contain others - thus 
interfering in others’ domestic affairs.258 After the Kosovo operation, China started to 
define the United States as a hegemon. China opposed the Kosovo operation and 
criticized the United States for acting without direct authorization from the UN 
Security Council. China had not had a positive approach towards NATO because it 
was a Cold War institution and represented persistent Cold-War mentality. In 
addition, when the US led-NATO forces bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade 
during the Kosovo operation, China’s reactions to NATO intensified. In a 
commentary published on People’s Daily, the missile attack on the Chinese Embassy 
was regarded as “barbaric atrocities committed by the United States” that “have fully 
laid bare the hegemonist ferocious features and the imperialist nature of 
aggression.”259 The article stated that the armed intervention was not an isolated and 
accidental phenomenon but a step up towards the implementation of US global 
strategy seeking hegemony and the major indication of US “hegemonism”. 
This article described “US hegemonism” as a new trend in international 
relations and criticized the United States on five grounds. The article accused the 
United States of “poking its nose everywhere into the affairs of other countries,” and 
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violating the United Nations Charter as well as international law and international 
conventions relying on its mighty economic, technological and military strength. The 
commentary stated that the use of NATO in operations against Yugoslavia outside of 
its traditional defense area created a dangerous precedent for intervention in the 
affairs of a sovereign state and the intervention was an implementation of US 
hegemonic strategy. It pointed that the military alliances of the United States in the 
West (NATO) and in the East (with Japan) were institutions that were facilitating 
“US hegemonism” and helping it to build up a US-led global security system. 
Together with Kosovo, the article specifically mentioned the renewal of the Japan-
US defense cooperation, the presence of 100,000 stationed troops in the Asia-Pacific 
region, US-Japanese initiative for developing the war zone missile defense system 
(TMD) and building up a missile defense system as reflections of “US hegemonism”. 
It pointed to the United States’ increasing military investment and developing high-
tech weaponry which were indications of US determination to guarantee its absolute 
superiority in the military area.  
The article charged the United States of attempting to guide the international 
economic new order, and establishing its status as “global overlord” in the economic, 
trade, science, technology and finance fields. In addition to indicating “US 
hegemonism”, the commentary stated that the United States launched a new Cold 
War against the socialist countries and the third world. It argued that the United 
States disliked China’s adherence to the socialist road and did not want to see China 
developing into a powerful country. It maintained that the United States aimed to 
contain socialist countries’ development in political and economic terms. Moreover, 
the United States was criticized for its interference in the internal affairs of 
developing countries under the banner of freedom, democracy, and human rights and 
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for attempting to act as the “human rights judge” and “conducting trials” of 
developing countries. The article severely criticized the United States and its allies 
for posing challenges to the widely recognized norms of international law, creating 
new theories for pushing “hegemonism” and legalizing their “hegemonist” acts under 
the “signboard of human rights and humanitarianism.”   
The commentary published in the media organ of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party further stated its ‘anti-hegemonic’ sentiments by arguing that 
the US was “imperialist by nature” and that “US hegemonism” was rooted in 
domestic and international as well as political and economic factors. It accused “the 
US ruling clique” for its ambition to maintain the unique status of the United States 
as “the overlord”. The article argued that “US hegemonism” and power politics were 
the root causes of the threat to world peace and stability. However, it stated that the 
United States would not be able to dominate the world, expand its political and 
economic spheres of influence, and push through neo-colonialism in the post-Cold 
War era. 
Following the NATO operation on Kosovo, another opinion piece published 
in the People’s Daily was entitled “Let History Be a Mirror to Modern 
Hegemonism”.260 In this article the United States and its allies were compared with 
the Third Reich and Hitler due to their claimed similarities in pursuing hegemony. It 
was stated that both “hegemonists” searched for world dominance, made military 
expenditure and expanded their armed forces, built military alliances and blocs. It 
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further stated that both “hegemonists” wanted to replace the global international 
organization with military alliances and committed war crimes. The United States 
was accused of contributing to other nations’ racial problems to sow national discord 
and bring about their dismemberment because it had sophisticated military force 
enabling it to do “what it pleased to do.”261   
In addition to anti-hegemonic statements in commentaries of People’s Daily 
after the Kosovo operation, the Chinese military’s view on US strategic posture and 
global behavior were similar. In a study on the Chinese military’s view on US 
strategic posture, it was found that numerous Chinese officials and military analysts 
defined the United States as a hegemonic and expansionist power with the ambition 
of global and regional domination.
262
 According to the study, the intensity of US 
criticism and attacks increased in the wake of the Kosovo operation.
263
 The study 
found out that the members of People’s Liberation Army considered that the United 
States was in quest for global hegemony because it dominated international trade and 
financial systems, started an ideological crusade to enlarge democracies and to 
subvert states that oppose US foreign policy. They believed that the US led 
humanitarian interventions, sent US military peacekeeping forces overseas and 
strengthened its old and new military alliances and defense partnerships for its 
hegemonic purposes. Additionally, with its increased willingness to use military 
coercion in pursuit of political and economic goals, its direct military intervention in 
regional conflicts, its determination to press for arms control regimes on weaker 
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states and its domination and manipulation of regional multilateral security 
organizations, the United States manifested its search for global hegemony.  
In this regard, the United States was defined by hegemonism in China. 
Except for the Taiwan case, China did not consider a military confrontation with the 
United States.  Its strategy to fight against US hegemonism was based on denouncing 
the United States as hegemon and delegitimizing its practices by indicating that they 
violated established rules and norms of international law.  The New Security Concept 
became the foundation of China’s anti-hegemonic struggle and the concept became 
its tool to promote an alternative vision against the US-led order, both of which 
relied on different conceptions of sovereignty. 
 
 
4.2.2. China's Official Evaluation on  
International Security Environment in 2000 
 
The influence of the concern about the US hegemony can be seen in China’s 
official national defense strategy published in 2000. China’s National Defense in 
2000 is the first white paper after the introduction of the New Security Concept and 
the Kosovo operation.
264
 It provides an overall evaluation of how China sees its own 
security and the international security environment. It also describes the international 
order that China envisioned for the post-Cold War era. China’s 2000 document 
started by repeating that “the profound international changes in the international 
system” required the “discard of the Cold War mentality,…the development of a new 
security concept and a new international political, economic and security order”. It 
stated that for China, peace and security could be guaranteed “only by establishing a 
                                                 
264
 "China’s National Defense in 2000," Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China (September 2000). http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17524.htm 
(accessed 02/01/2012). 
92 
 
fair and reasonable new international order” in the post-Cold War era. In the 
document, China underlined that, developing countries that have great potential for 
growth could promote a “fair and reasonable new international order” as followers of 
“peace and development”. Obviously, China saw itself as the major candidate for 
establishing this new order. 
The 2000 White Paper pointed to “the relaxation in the international security 
environment” after the end of the Cold War. According to China, the major powers 
both cooperated and checked each other’s power. It defined relations among great 
powers as “complicated” because of “many interwoven contradictions and frictions”. 
It argued that factors contributing to instability and uncertainty in world affairs were 
on the increase; therefore, international relations were defined as being “far from 
peaceful”. In China’s view, there was serious disequilibrium in the distribution of 
power among states. Although China pointed to the momentum of multipolarity and 
economic globalization, it underlined that the “old, unfair and irrational international 
political and economic order” was continuing without any significant change. It 
argued that “hegemony and power politics” still existed and were developing further. 
China called for international disputes to be solved by dialogue, consultation and 
negotiation conducted through the principle of equality.  
China’s evaluations of the general state of international security and the great 
powers’ relations were reflected in its position on the US-led NATO operation on 
Kosovo in 1999.
265
 China criticized the Kosovo operation by stating that NATO 
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attacks against “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” by-passed the UN Security 
Council and resulted in “an extremely negative impact” on the international situation 
and relations between countries. It criticized “certain big powers” for pursuing “neo-
interventionism”, a “neo-gunboat policy” and “neo-economic colonialism” and for 
“damaging [the] sovereignty, independence and developmental interests of many 
states”. According to China, those “certain big powers” seriously challenged the 
authority and role of the United Nations in handling international and regional 
security affairs by using “humanitarianism” and “human rights” to resort to the use 
of or threat of force. It accused those states as being in “flagrant violation” of the UN 
Charter and other universally recognized principles governing international relations.  
In addition, the document criticized the United States for its policies in the 
Asia-Pacific region. It stated that the efforts of a “certain country” to develop and 
introduce the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
systems were undermining the international community’s efforts to promote the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and disarmament.
266
 
Additionally, it stated its uneasiness with the United States’ decision to strengthen its 
military presence and bilateral military alliances in the region. The United States’ 
relationship with Taiwan was China’s most crucial security concern. China held the 
United States responsible for instilling the “arrogance of the separatist forces in 
Taiwan”. China viewed three US policies in particular as seriously undermining its 
sovereignty and security and jeopardizing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region. These are, the sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan; the US Congress’ 
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decision to pass the “so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act”; and US efforts to 
incorporate Taiwan into the TMD system. 
China strongly emphasized that the settlement of the Taiwan issue was 
“entirely an internal affair”. For this reason, it frequently stated that it opposed “any 
country” selling arms to Taiwan, entering into a military alliance with it in any form 
or any kind of interference in the Taiwan issue. Although the document emphasized 
the “defensive” nature of its national defense strategy, it openly stated that China 
would resort to the most “drastic measures possible”, including “the use of force” to 
safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and achieve “the great cause of 
reunification”. It stated that it would use force if Taiwan separated from China, if 
Taiwan were invaded or occupied or if it refused the peaceful settlement attempts of 
the Chinese government. Moreover, China reiterated its “absolute determination, 
confidence, ability and means” to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity 
without “tolerating, condoning or remaining indifferent” to the realization of any 
“scheme” to divide its homeland.  
The 2000 White Paper underscored China’s priorities to protect its 
sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and to ensure a peaceful international and 
regional environment for its modernization and development strategy. However, it 
pointed out that “the existing and increasingly developing hegemonism and power 
politics imperil[ed] China’s reunification”. For this reason, China declared its 
intention to enhance its ability to defend its security priorities. China declared that it 
would not seek alliance with any state or block of states but would invest in science, 
technology and industry to increase its “self-reliance”. However, despite the earlier-
noted desire to modernize its military, China stated that it would subordinate national 
defense to economic construction to achieve their coordinated development. In this 
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regard, economic development was declared to be at the center of China’s national 
strategy unless its sovereignty and unity were endangered. Finally, as rebuttal to 
prospective criticisms and China-threat arguments, the document made “solemn 
pledge[s]…never to seek hegemony” and that its development and power would pose 
“no threat to anyone”. 
 
 
4.3. The Strategic Context Just Before September 11, 2001:  
The EP-3E Plane Crisis 
 
As discussed above, China already had fears concerning the projection of US 
power before the Bush administration came to power in 2001. However, the Bush 
administration’s approach to China intensified China’s concerns and fears even 
more. In an article in the Foreign Affairs, then US national security advisor, 
Condoleezza Rice defined China as a “strategic competitor” and “revisionist” power 
that needs to be contained.
267
 She stated that China posed a security threat and that 
the United States needed to contain China using economic interdependence, US 
military power, and good relations with allies in the region. She reminded China that 
the United States was a part of the equation when dealing with Taiwan. Apart from 
regional security concerns, Rice argued that with its record of cooperation with Iran 
and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, China posed an 
obvious security problem to the United States. Rice stated that China would do what 
it could to enhance its position, and even steal nuclear secrets for this purpose. In this 
article, Rice gave a clear sign that the ‘China threat’ thesis would prevail at least in 
the next four years under the Bush administration. 
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The vision of the new US administration did not promise a better future for 
China-US bilateral relations. China and the Bush administration had their first crisis 
on April 1, 2001, when an American EP-3E surveillance plane collided with a 
Chinese F-8 fighter jet. As a result of the incident the US plane entered and landed at 
a Chinese air field and the Chinese military pilot died. From the Chinese point of 
view, the US plane intruded upon China’s territorial airspace, encroached upon 
China’s sovereignty in violation of international law, the provisions of relevant laws 
of China as well as the bilateral consensus that parties reached on May, 2000. China 
regarded the act as a threat to its national security and demanded that the United 
States take full responsibility for the incident along with issuing an official apology 
to the Chinese people.
268
 
Following the incident, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stressed 
China's consistent position that state-to- state relations, including China-US relations, 
must be based on such basic norms governing international relations as mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-
interference in each other's internal affairs.
269
 The Chinese minister asked the United 
States to strictly abide with international law and refrain from harming bilateral 
relations, which would not serve the interests of either country or the world at large.  
The United States stated that US pilot did not violate China’s sovereignty and 
the incident took place over international waters because the Chinese pilot flew too 
close to the US airplane. The United States resisted demands for an apology since 
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there was no fault and demanded access to the plane and crew. In an opinion piece in 
People’s Daily, American politicians were severely criticized for having bad 
manners, being self-centered, and overtly disregarding foreign people and foreign 
sovereignty.
270
 It was stated that the United States did not learn from history, and 
abandonment of the Clinton administration’s agreement with China to work for a 
constructive partnership, and these provocative actions indicated the Bush 
administration’s failure in appreciating the lessons of history. The newspaper 
published articles criticizing US hegemony and the continuation of US intelligence 
activities over China since the Cold War.
271
 The newspaper also gave place to news 
that stated other states’ criticism of the United States for the incident to support its 
position.  For instance, one of the news stories that appeared in the aftermath of the 
incident reported that Russia acknowledged that US planes spied on the Far East on a 
daily basis therefore the collision was not a surprise for the Russian defense 
community.
272
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The articles in People’s Daily, starting from the day of the collision, 
constantly accused the United States of hegemonism, disregarding international law 
and bilateral China-US agreements, violating China’s sovereignty, and disrespecting 
basic rules of humanitarianism and human rights violations of which the United 
States often criticized China. On April 11, 2001, the US Ambassador to China gave a 
letter to the Chinese Foreign Minister stating that President Bush and Secretary of 
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State Colin Powell were regretful of the loss of the Chinese pilot and were “very 
sorry” for entering China’s airspace and landing without verbal clearance.273 
After the ‘very sorry’ message from the United States, in an opinion piece 
entitled “Turn Patriotic Enthusiasm into Strength to Build a Powerful Nation: 
Commentary” on People’s Daily, China’s evaluation of the outcome of the situation 
appeared.
274
 They stated that they carried out a justified, advantageous and restrained 
struggle against US hegemonism with the support of the international community. 
The Communist Party of China’s Central Committee with Jiang Zemin was praised 
for its success in handling the complicated situation, as the crisis was solved with 
effective diplomatic negotiations and public strategies of relations. The article 
depicted this success as an initial victory in China’s struggle against hegemony and 
unipolarity. It was stated that China advocated justice and feared no powers and the 
Chinese people won the anti-hegemonism struggle by support from the international 
community. Consequently, before the September 11 attacks, the incident increased 
China’s insecurities and enhanced its perception of the United States as the hegemon. 
 
 
4.4. China’s Reaction to the September 11 Attacks  
 
Before the September 11 attacks, China was concerned that “China threat 
theory” would prevail under the newly elected Bush administration and that the new 
administration would pursue strategies that would risk China’s security. 
Nevertheless, September 11 attacks changed the priorities of the Bush administration 
and it focused on fighting against ‘the terrorist network of global reach’. For the 
purpose of fighting the terrorist network, President Bush declared that the United 
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States was at war and invited “every nation, in every region” to support the US war 
on terror or to accept consequences.
275
 Although President Bush gave an ultimatum 
to the states to push them supporting the United States, the same ultimatum provided 
some states with an opportunity to position themselves with the United States in the 
war on terror. Moreover, the US administration stated its willingness to reconsider its 
existing relations with the former and prospective adversaries in light of the United 
States’ new security considerations. As stated in the NSS 2002, the United States 
declared that it aimed to forge new, productive international relationships and to 
redefine existing ones in ways that met the challenges of the century.
276
 Also, NSCT 
2003 repeated the United States’ willingness to reconsider its relations with the 
major powers by stating that the United States would take the opportunity provided 
by the absence of great power rivalry and leave past differences behind to recast its 
relations with the great powers.
277
 
China welcomed the US proposal to leave past differences behind and recast 
relations against the threat of terrorism and showed its willingness work within this 
new framework. Likewise the majority of the leaders in the world, just after the 
September 11 attacks, Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed his deep sympathy 
and condolences to the US government and people and stated that his government 
condemned and opposed, as always, all violent activities by terrorists.
278
 After the 
first support message to the United States, China clarified its position in the war on 
terror. On September 12, 2001, the permanent representative of China to the UN, 
Ambassador Wang Yingfan stated that international terrorism was an open challenge 
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to the international community.
279
 Therefore, China would support the United 
Nations to strengthen its work on preventing and combating terrorism and approve 
continued cooperation among the member states in a concrete effort to implement 
anti-terrorist conventions and bring the perpetrators of terrorism to justice. He also 
underlined that the United Nations and the UN Security Council should play its due 
role in dealing with international terrorism as the primary responsible organ for 
maintaining international peace and stability. As stated in the Ambassador’s speech, 
China wanted the fight against international terrorism to be guided by the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other well-established norms 
of international law. 
The Ambassador’s statement not only clarified China’s approach to terrorism 
clear but also declared the terms of China’s involvement in the fight against 
terrorism.  According to the statement, China would attend international cooperation 
on terrorism within the framework of the United Nations Charter and the established 
norms of international law. In China’s view, if every state complied with the 
international anti-terrorism agreements and the UN Security Council resolutions, 
then international cooperation would be successful. Therefore, in China’s view, by 
way of doing its part in compliance with the agreements, it would be fighting 
terrorism actively.
280
 For China, accepting the UN and the UN Security Council as 
the only international arbiter and enforcer of the international rules and norms, China 
made a very diplomatic maneuver. China gave the message that it would not be part 
of an international action organized outside of the United Nations and invited the 
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United States to act within the realm of the United Nations and its Security Council. 
Thereby, China hinted that it would not support US unilateral use of force and would 
not be part of the US-led military coalitions.
281
   
In line with this position, when a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman was 
asked whether China would support the United States and NATO using force against 
Afghanistan without the approval of the UN or a vote of support by the Security 
Council, he responded by underlining three specific points. First, the spokesman 
stated that China always opposed all sorts of terrorism and supported attacks on 
terrorists. Second, the attacks on terrorist should be built upon valid evidence; the 
action should have clear targets and should be taken without harming innocent 
civilians. Third, the action should follow the UN Charter and it should help 
strengthen the role of the UN and its Security Council. After noting these principles, 
the spokesman declared that China was ready to discuss any proposals at the Security 
Council that would be conducive to the fight against terrorism.
282
 
 
 
4.4.1. China’s Cooperation with the US on Counterterrorism 
 
The expectations of the United States in terms of China’s support were not 
very high. After a meeting between the foreign ministers of China and the US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that China was an influential state in the 
region with knowledge and information that might be helpful to the United States.
283
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When he was specifically asked whether China expressed its explicit support for US 
military action, Powell stated they did not get into any details of a military 
component, nor did he ask the Chinese Government what their reaction might be, nor 
did they suggest to him any participation. Powell underlined that the United States 
considered a complete campaign which would involve finances, information, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and possibly a military component and implied that 
the United States would be satisfied with China’s support in these aspects of the US 
war on terror.  As expected by the United States, China provided support to the 
United States at the UN Security Council, it cooperated on intelligence matters and it 
acted as diplomatic facilitator in convincing Central Asian states for the US military 
presence and taking part in convincing North Korea not to develop  nuclear weapons. 
It should be underlined that China’s cooperation with the US war on Afghanistan and 
its support at the UN Security Council was driven by its perception of the war as a 
legitimate self-defensive act. 
To begin with, although China was not one of the states that took an active 
part in the US-led coalition of the willing states’ operation on Afghanistan on 
October 7, 2001, China supported the war. It supported the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1368 that recognized the United States’ right of self-defense and use of 
force against Afghanistan.
284
 In addition, China supported all counterterrorism 
resolutions passed in the UN. After the initiation of the Afghanistan war, Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin briefly stated that military strikes should be targeted at 
specific objectives so as to avoid hurting innocent civilians.
285
 In addition to its 
support in the UN, as expected by the United States, China provided intelligence to 
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the US administration and acted as a diplomatic facilitator for US presence in Central 
Asia. 
After the Afghanistan war began, President Zemin and President Bush met on 
October 19, 2001 for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, President Bush stated 
China’s firm commitment to cooperate in intelligence matters and in interdicting the 
financing of terrorist organizations.
286
 In line with its commitments, China enacted 
domestic regulations to address terrorist financing.  As a result of bilateral diplomatic 
exchanges to discuss the financial and economic dimension of anti-terrorism 
campaigns, a Financial Counter-Terrorism Working Group was founded between the 
two states.
287
 As a result of these exchanges, China supported the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), which was designed by the United States to increase the screening of 
container cargo entering the United States for weapons of mass destruction.
288
 
According to CSI, US custom inspectors would be stationed at the world’s top 20 
ports that shipped to the United States and they would check the cargo with the local 
agents before it left for America. Three of the world’s top 20 ports are under China’s 
control. By agreeing to control port trade from Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
China agreed to control two-thirds of its total port trade.
289
 The opening of the first 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) liaison office in China was agreed to as a 
result of the decision for cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement.
290
  
Besides this, China provided crucial diplomatic support to the US war on 
terrorism in Central Asia. The major phase of the US war on terror was the 
destruction of al Qaeda camps and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. For military 
strikes the United States needed close military bases in the region. Therefore, the 
support of Central Asian states like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was 
critical for the conduct of operations. In addition to Central Asian states, Pakistan 
was another key player in the region due to both its borders with Afghanistan and the 
intimate links between Pakistani intelligence services and warlords and extremists in 
Afghanistan.
291
 
China had good relations with both Pakistan and the Central Asian states. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s relations with the Central Asian 
states evolved and had economic, political, and military dimensions. Considering 
China’s strategic importance as a great power, Central Asian states also wanted to 
establish good relations with China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
292
 
represents the importance that both China and Central Asian states attach to good 
relations in the region. Despite China’s fear of geostrategic encirclement and the 
importance of the region for China’s economic, political, and military interest, China 
did not oppose US military presence in Central Asia for the operation in Afghanistan 
in the initial phases of the US counterterrorism campaign. In other words, by not 
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opposing the US presence in the region, China provided a permissive geostrategic 
environment for the United States. 
Likewise, China and Pakistan had long shared economic, political, military 
ties, including transfer of technology for development of weapons of mass 
destruction to Pakistan. China’s support for the US war on terror and its active 
encouragement of Pakistan in supporting the United States provided a very valuable 
contribution to Washington.
293
 In his visit to China, General Musharraf stated that 
“the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy is its close association and relationship 
with China.”294 Chinese President Zemin stated that China supports the role that 
Pakistan plays in Afghanistan and that it understands and supports the decision 
Pakistan has made in light of its national interests and the current situation.
295
 Even 
though China did not participate in the war in Afghanistan militarily, the accord 
between China and the United States on the war on terror and their expectations from 
Pakistan provided military advantages to the United States.  
By not putting Pakistan or the Central Asian states in a position to choose 
between the United States and Beijing, China not only escaped risking its relations 
with the United States but also reduced the diplomatic cost of US operations in the 
region. In addition, China took part in dissuading North Korea from developing 
nuclear weapons. As stated before, the Bush administration considered the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the gravest danger to the United 
States national security and wanted to prevent the acquisition of WMD by 
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terrorists.
296
 For this purpose, the Bush administration’s primary strategy was to 
dissuade states that it defined as “rogue states” or “the axis of evil” from having any 
transaction with terrorists related to WMD.
297
 In this context, North Korea, Iran and 
Iraq were the major targets of the US non-proliferation strategy.  
Before the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration criticized China for 
transferring missile and chemical weapons technology to these states.
298
 In the post 
September 11 environment, however, China pursued more reassuring strategy on 
non-proliferation strategy and showed open cooperation with the United States. To 
begin with, China took substantial domestic steps to enhance the security of nuclear 
materials, increase the security of its nuclear facilities, and improve its management 
of control of radioactive sources.
299
 In addition to the domestic regulations, China 
underlined the importance of international agreements and its membership in the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty to promote participation in international non-proliferation 
agreements and to give diplomatic support to the non-proliferation regime.
300
 
China also supported US non-proliferation strategy within the context of the 
war on terror in its international relations. China actively took part in dealings with 
                                                 
296
 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), 13. 
President George W. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point United States 
Military Academy " (June 1, 2002). www.usma.edu/class/2002/2002_graduation_speach.html 
(accessed 02/01/2012). 
297
 President George W. Bush, "The President's State of the Union Address," The United States 
Capitol, Washington, D.C, (January 29, 2002). http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed 02/01/2012). Colin L. 
Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 22-34. 
298
 David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," Survival 
42, no. 1 (2000): 112. Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance," 67. Adam Ward, "China 
and America: Trouble Ahead?," Survival 45, no. 3 (2003): 47-50. 
299
 "China’s National Defense in 2002," Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China (December 2002). http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm (accessed 
02/01/2012). Yunhua Zou, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A View from China," Nonproliferation 
Review 13, no. 2 (July 2006): 253-273. 
300
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China., "China's Non-Proliferation and Export 
Control Laws and Regulations (1980-2007) " 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/fksflfg/t141341.htm. 
108 
 
North Korea. It played an active diplomatic role in the crisis between the United 
States and North Korea, which arose in 2002 when North Korea declared its 
uranium-enrichment program, withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
reactivated its nuclear facilities frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Bush 
administration stood for a hard line policy against North Korea. President Bush 
stated that “North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction, while starving its citizens.”301 The Bush administration believed that 
North Korea was more susceptible to diplomatic pressure than Iraq because it was 
dependent on outside assistance. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated 
that the North Koreans were desperately in need of help from the outside. The United 
States had leverage on North Korea that it did not have on Iraq.
302
 In his meeting 
with the Chinese President in 2003, President Bush said that the Chinese had a lot of 
influence over North Korea and probably in many ways more than the United States 
had.
303
  
The leverage that the US administration thought China had over North Korea 
was Korean dependency on China’s food, energy, and economy. The United States 
also put international pressure on North Korea and emphasized that North Korea 
risked the security of the other states in the region. In this regard, the United States 
called for a multilateral approach.
304
 Considering its own national interest such as: 
achieving denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, maintaining peace and stability 
in the region, and preventing the United States from unilateral involvement in the 
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region, China played a major role in responding to US insistence upon Asian 
countries to jointly put pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear plans so that 
the crisis can be resolved peacefully.
305
 After the United States showed its 
determination to act preemptively to prevent the use and development of weapons of 
mass destruction with the war on Iraq, China decided to play a more active role in 
convincing North Korea. In April 2003, China initiated a series of multilateral 
talks.
306
 China constantly stated that it favored peaceful resolution of the situation 
and made diplomatic effort to prevent the United States from using military methods 
to halt North Korea’s sales of weapons of mass destruction and other controlled 
items.
307
 As expressed by Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department at the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Liu Jieyi, China considered military 
action against North Korea as “an attempt to shoot a mosquito with a cannon, which 
would cause worse collateral damage and would miss the mosquito.”308  
 
 
4.4.2. China and US National Missile Defense System 
 
In the wake of September 11 attacks, the Bush administration declared that it 
would build a National Missile Defense system. China reacted to the decision of the 
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Bush administration to withdraw from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty 
and build a National Missile Defense (NMD) system as a necessity for defending the 
United States against terrorist attacks because China evaluated US decisions on the 
ABM treaty and NMD as actions having a negative impact on international arms 
control and the disarmament processes as well as on the global strategic balance.
309
 
President Zemin evaluated the development of a NMD system as an attempt to ‘harm 
security interests of any side on related affairs’ and US strategy for seeking global 
supremacy.
310
  Despite US efforts to ensure China that the NMD system would not 
target China, China’s concerns over the issue remained unchanged even after the 
September 11 attacks.
311
 
On September 11, 2001 when the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman was 
asked “Don’t you think the NMD under studies is of no use after the happening of 
the terrorist attacks?” the spokesman stated that China’s stand on NMD was explicit 
and remained unchanged.
312
 Presenting the Chinese view on the use of the NMD 
system on terrorists, the opinion piece published in the organ of the Chinese 
Communist Party argued that the conception of NMD was to protect the United 
States from threats from outside of the territory of the United States or in outer space 
but the occurrence of the September 11 incident has proved that NMD could not 
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completely be put into use for the realization of these purposes.
313
 Also, as Friedberg 
mentioned, Chinese scholars and observers also expressed the view that the use of 
airplanes as weapons of mass destruction demonstrated the futility of building 
expensive high technology defenses against ballistic missiles and the missile defense 
system would be the least cost-effective way to attain security for the United 
States.
314
 By emphasizing the uselessness of the NMD against terrorists and rogue 
states, China expressed that it found US argument on the necessity of the NMD 
system as a defense project against terrorists and rogue states groundless. However, 
knowing the Bush administration’s sensitivity on nuclear weapons and terrorism, 
China did not want to risk improving relations with the United States and itself by 
opposing the United States.  
 
 
4.5. China’s Gains from the Cooperation with the United States 
 
In the China-US counterterrorism cooperation, the United States was not the 
only benefiting party. China also benefited from its cooperation with the United 
States against the terrorists.
315
 The most practical gain for China was that it was able 
to align its counterterrorism strategy with the US campaign and had the US fight 
against the Taliban that China accused of supporting Uyghur separatists. Before the 
betterment of relations with the United States, China was constantly being criticized 
by the United States due to its treatment of Uyghur extremists. After the September 
11 attacks, China started to emphasize that it opposed all sorts of terrorism and that 
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there should be no double standards in cracking down on all kind of terrorism.
316
 In 
other words, it wanted the United States not to criticize China for its counterterrorism 
strategy at home. Although after his meeting with the Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that there would be no quid pro 
quo for Chinese support
317
 or later President George W. Bush stated that the war on 
terror must never be an excuse to persecute minorities,
318
 the US criticisms against 
China declined.
319
 
In the meantime, Chinese authorities argued that Uyghur ‘terrorists’ had 
transnational links and were connected to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Their attempts in 
persuading the US to identify the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a 
terrorist organization succeeded in August 2002.
320
 Assistant Secretary of State 
James Kelly defended the US decision concerning ETIM because ETIM’s link to Al 
Qaeda was based on evidence and ETIM used violence against civilians. Kelly 
argued that this move was “not as a concession to the PRC.”321 In addition to 
accepting ETIM as a terrorist organization, as a result of the betterment of the 
relations with China, the United States supported China’s membership to the World 
Trade Organization and China eventually became a member of WTO in 2002. 
Moreover, the Bush administration started to waive some of the sanctions imposed 
after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Crackdown, which related to the export of defense 
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articles and services, crime control equipment, and satellites to China.
322
 The United 
States also resumed military to military contacts with the People’s Liberation Army 
and held defense consultative talks with China.
323
  
Nevertheless, the most significant gain for China became the betterment of its 
relations with the United States. The US-China cooperation strengthened China’s 
role as a great power as the United States asked China to play a larger role dealings 
with Central Asian states, Pakistan, and North Korea. From China’s perspective, the 
Bush administration respected China’s status as a great power and considered China 
as an asset to establish and maintain international peace and security rather than 
following the “China threat” line. During its cooperation with the United States on 
Afghanistan, China considered that it was treated as a great power and its interests 
were respected. The betterment of relations with the United States reflected on 
China’s evaluation of international security and its perspective was document in 
White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2002.  
 
 
4.6. China's Official Evaluation on  
International Security Environment in 2002 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, China evaluates its own security in relation 
to the international security environment and the security practices of the United 
States. Likewise similar documents, the 2002 White Paper on China’s National 
Defense
324
 provided China’s evaluation of its national security in the international 
security environment led by the United States.  The document began by reiterating 
the significance of peace and cooperation for development and progress and 
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underlined that China would endeavor to cultivate the New Security Concept. It 
stated China’s determination to act as a “staunch force to create an international 
environment defined [by] peace, stability and security”. It declared that China would 
pursue “the policy of peaceful development”, an “independent foreign policy of 
peace” and a “defensive” national defense policy to secure national and international 
security. Thereby, China underlined that its rise should not be considered as threat to 
a international security. 
On international security, the document mentioned the presence of “the 
profound changes towards multipolarization and economic globalization” that had 
taken place in the past two years. It noted the presence of “fierce competition among 
major powers” to increase their capabilities. In this regard, it defined economic 
development, scientific and technological progress and increasing “comprehensive 
national power” as “strategic trends” in international relations.325 The 2002 White 
Paper put special emphasis on “the extensive applications of new and high 
technologies” in the military field and argued that these applications created a “new 
serious disequilibrium” in “the balance of military power”.326 According to the 
Chinese leadership, the military technological gap constituted a serious challenge to 
developing countries’ efforts to safeguard their sovereignty and security. 
The paper further characterized the international environment as having 
increasing “uncertainties impeding peace and development” and “far from being 
tranquil”. It repeated the contention that “the major powers, while cooperating with 
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and seeking support from each other, are nonetheless checking on and competing 
with each other” and criticized the “old”, “undemocratic”, “unfair” and “irrational 
international political and economic order” in which “new manifestations of 
hegemonism and power politics” were present. However, it acknowledged that the 
major powers had “stepped up their coordination and cooperation” since the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It noted that  a new world war was “unlikely in 
the foreseeable future” but that non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, 
transnational crimes, environmental degradation and drug trafficking increasingly 
posed threats to international security.  
Under the influence of the September 11 attacks and the international security 
environment, the 2002 paper specifically defined terrorism as the “real threat to both 
global and regional security” and stated that China opposed “all forms of terrorism, 
separatism and extremism”. On counterterrorism, China delicately stated its concerns 
while stressing the importance of “international cooperation, dialogue and 
consultation in [the] fight against terrorism” rather than US unilateralist tendencies. 
In addition, it underscored that efforts against terrorism must eradicate both the “root 
causes” and the “symptoms” and should rely on “conclusive evidence” and “clear 
targets”. In addition to a military solution, China demanded a comprehensive 
approach, including the solution of the development problem, narrowing the North-
South gap and ending regional conflicts.  
Furthermore, it underlined that any action taken against terrorism must be 
aligned with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter as well as the universally 
acknowledged norms of international law. In this regard, China believed that the UN 
and its Security Council should lead all actions so that their long-term implications 
did not damage global peace and security. Finally, it warned that the fight against 
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terrorism should not be confused with a fight against a specific nation or religion. In 
addition, the paper noted that there should not be “dual standards” in fighting 
terrorism; all states must condemn terrorist attacks regardless of whom they are 
directed against and regardless of the form they appear. In addition, China outlined 
its cooperative efforts, especially within the framework of the UN and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, to fight against terrorism. China also took the opportunity 
to emphasize its role in passing and implementing a series of resolutions and 
conventions on anti-terrorism. Pointing to its contributions, China underscored its 
image as a responsible major power in the context of the global war on terror.
327
 
 
 
4.7. China and the Iraq War 
 
China pursued a very careful opposition to the United States on Iraq. Before 
the United States took action against Iraq, China underlined diplomatic efforts to 
solve the Iraq problem within the framework of the United Nations.
328
 On October 
2002 in Texas, President Bush and President Zemin discussed the Iraq issue and 
Bush stated that he urged President Zemin to support a new Security Council 
resolution demanding that Iraq to fully disarm itself of weapons of mass 
destruction.
329
 On November 8, 2002, China supported the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1441, which stated that Iraq will face “serious consequences” if 
inspections were not permitted.  
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 However, after voting for the resolution, China, Russia and France made a 
joint declaration stating that the resolution “excludes any automaticity in the use of 
force.”330 The Chinese government summed up its stance on the Iraq issue in four 
points: First, it would support political solution of the Iraq issue within the 
framework of the United Nations and would use all means possible to avoid war. 
Second, it would support strengthening of the UN arms inspectors in Iraq to 
implement the UN Resolution 1441. Third, it would call Iraq to fully and strictly 
comply with the relevant UN resolutions and honor its promises of not possessing 
any weapons of mass destruction. Finally, it emphasized that sovereignty, 
independence, and integrity of territories of Iraq should be respected. 
On February, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United 
Nations Security Council and stated that the United States was informed about Iraq’s 
possession of weapons of mass destruction, involvement in terrorism and violation of 
UNSC Resolution 1441 and other resolutions and repeated the US demand for a final 
Security Council resolution for the use of force against Iraq.
331
 China’s answer to the 
United States call for a new Security Council resolution was stated in Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin and Vice-President Hu Jintao’s meetings with US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell during his visit to China February 23-24, 2003.
332
 In these 
meetings, the Chinese side emphasized that along with most of the members of the 
international community, China believed the priority at the current stage should be 
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the continuation of arms inspection in Iraq to find out the truth, rather than working 
on a new UN resolution on Iraq.  
Chinese President Jiang Zemin had bilateral contacts with heads of Russia, 
France and Germany, whose positions also did not change after a presentation of US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council. China, along with other 
states opposing the use of force against Iraq, underlined the responsibility to take 
every step to avoid war and should jointly maintain the credit and authority of the 
United Nations. All agreed on the issue of arms inspection in Iraq and on the need for 
urging Iraq to further explain and clarify the questions raised by the inspectors.
333
 In 
March 2003, Russia, France, and Germany made another joint statement saying that 
inspections were producing positive results and they would not “allow a draft 
resolution authorizing the use of force to go through.”334 China also joined the other 
three powers’ joint statement and supported their position. However, the United 
States acted with the coalition of the willing states and initiated war on 20 March, 
2003 without the authorization of the UN Security Council.  
 
 
4.7.1. China’s Reaction to the Iraq War 
 
China adroitly managed the diplomatic process before the Iraq War started on 
20 March 2003 and let European states take the lead in the opposition against the 
United States. On the day of the military operation against Iraq, the Foreign Ministry 
of China issued a statement which said the United States and other countries had 
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launched the operation bypassing the UN Security Council.
335
 The Chinese 
government underlined the efforts it made for political settlement of the Iraq issue 
within the UN framework, urging the Iraqi government to fully and earnestly 
implement Security Council resolutions and called for respect to Iraq’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity by the international community, which refers to the United 
States and allies. China argued that Security Council Resolution 1441 was an 
important basis for political settlement and it was a widely held view in the 
international community that the strict implementation of Resolution 1441 could 
deny Iraq weapons of mass destruction through peaceful means.  
It can be inferred from the statement that China regarded the war on Iraq as 
an unnecessary war. In the statement, China stated that its position in international 
disputes was to search for settlement through peaceful means and reject the use or 
threat of force.
336
 China called together the relevant countries to stop military action 
and return to the right path of seeking a political solution to the Iraq question. China 
raised its concerns regarding the war in three aspects.
337
 First, China was concerned 
because the operation was waged disregarding most of the countries and bypassing 
the United Nations Security Council. Second, China was concerned about the 
humanitarian consequences of the war on the Iraqi people and the profound influence 
military action might bring to regional and global peace. Third, China stressed the 
importance of maintaining the unity and authority of the UN Security Council in 
resolving the Iraq issue.  
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Besides official statements, Chinese views on the Iraq war were reflected in 
commentaries which appeared in People’s Daily. The paper wrote that the real 
reasons behind the Bush administration’s starting the war against “so-called” security 
threats in a preemptive way were the US desire to maintain its superpower status, to 
ensure US control over the oil supplies, and to attract votes in upcoming presidential 
elections. It was pointed out that although the United States started the war in the 
name of anti-terrorism, there was not sufficient reason to support the unilateral US 
military action. It was stated that the United States has not provided any hard 
evidence to prove Iraq’s collaboration with Al Qaeda and proof that Iraq was 
involved in the September 11 attacks. Also, it was stated that the majority of the 
states did not believe that Iraq posed a military threat to the world. Therefore, from 
the Chinese perspective, the war on Iraq was an extension of US global strategy 
searching for military and ideological domination.
338
 
The commentary also argued that the war did not have legitimacy or moral 
strength because it was started without the approval of the UN and the international 
community.  The article underlined that the United States’ disregard of the strong 
voice of objection was the objective evidence of the existence of power politics in 
present day international relations. It suggested that major powers’ opposition to the 
Iraq war mirrored the multipolar tendency’s containment of unilateralism and its 
limitations. The commentary pointed out that although the war had a regional 
character, it could cause uncertainties about the future of the world.  
Another opinion piece published in the People’s Daily marked March 20, 
2003 as the day when international law was replaced by bombs in dealing with 
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regional and global conflicts.
339
 It argued that the war shattered confidence in justice 
and international law and lacked legitimacy. It underlined that US action created a 
precedent for the settlement of international conflicts in the future and made 
international law the first casualty of the war. It stated that President Bush’s authority 
over the international community caused the invasion of a sovereign country and 
created clear breach of UN and international law. The article further argued that the 
United States has challenged the efforts made in the past half century to create an 
effective international structure and replace perpetual war with peace. The article 
maintained that if attempts for such international structure would be abandoned, 
nations would need to depend on their security and military might, which implied 
that the United States was forcing other states to engage in power politics and arms 
race.  
A week later, People’s Daily commented that the Iraqi war would not only 
change the destiny of the country but also had a profound impact upon the world 
order and the international status of the United States.
340
 The article posed the idea 
that with the US war on Iraq the authority of the United Nations was weakened. The 
article argued that the United States’ failure to show a clear link between terrorists 
and Iraq led the United States to confront the major states, including China, Russia, 
and its Cold War allies like France and Germany. The commentary stated that the 
Iraq war was an example of the United States’ desire to control and dominate 
international relations, which according to the article would bring "American issue" 
into the agenda of the world.  
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In addition to the commentaries published in People’s Daily, the articles in 
the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, which was established to provide 
the Central Government with policy recommendations, dealt with the ‘American 
issue’ and evaluated the meaning and implications of the Iraq war for China in 
particular and for the international system in general.
341
 The articles published in the 
Institute’s journal evaluated the US war on Iraq as an expression of the deep-seated 
US strategic scheme for strengthening US predominance and creating favorable 
conditions to establish a new unipolar world under its domination.
342
 It was argued 
that implementing the preemptive war doctrine on Iraq, the United States violated the 
relevant UN resolutions and put the authority of the UN in danger. More importantly, 
it violated the fundamental principles of the UN Charter such as respect for the 
sovereign equality of all UN members, the principle of settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means, and the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, it was 
argued that the United States endangered international peace, security and justice.
343
 
The publications of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs defined 
the regime change in Iraq as an example of US hegemony. They argued that 
imposing democracy was a part of US grand strategy for the establishment of a new 
political and economic order of its design. It was argued that, as illustrated by the 
example of Iraq, small and weak nations could no longer master their own destiny 
and feel secure. Small and weak states would need to follow US prescriptions. It was 
stated that the United States was acting as a “world cop” and as an “international 
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dictator”.344 They suggested that international peace did not depend on the increase 
of the democratic states in the system as the Bush administration advocated.  Instead, 
they suggested that peace would come by democratizing international relations that 
was under unipolar hegemony. 
In addition, Zhiming argued that the US war on Iraq aimed to harm its rivals’ 
economic and military development, which was again a part of the US grand strategy 
based on preserving its dominance. The articles in the journal of the Chinese 
People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs underlined that with the Iraq War, the 
equilibrium among great powers was threatened because by dominating Iraq, the 
United States gained the advantage over the oil resources in the Middle East. In this 
context, the increased presence of the United States in Central Asia, which was 
defined as the rising star of oil resources, started to be evaluated in relation to the 
United States’ domination of Iraqi oil. This created a deep security concern in China, 
whose grand strategy was based on peace and development. As understood from the 
articles, the war on Iraq was also an American attempt to hinder China’s rise and 
prevent multipolarization of international relations.  
However, Chinese scholars writing for the Chinese People’s Institute of 
Foreign Affairs argued that the Iraq war played a significant role in accelerating the 
process of multipolarization despite the United States’ efforts to prevent it. Liu 
Baolai, former ambassador of China to the United Arab Emirates and Jordan and 
current Secretary General of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, stated 
that the struggle among great powers in the region  was a miniature version of 
international rivalry.
345
  He suggested that the divide between the United States and 
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France, Germany, Russia and China should be considered as a sign of emerging 
multipolarization of international relations and a push for multilateralism against the 
United States.
346
 Consequently, it can be argued that China’s evaluation of the US 
war on Iraq within the framework of its war on terror China to intensify its 
perception of the United States as hegemon and increased China’s insecurities 
regarding its status in international relations under unipolarity. 
 
 
4.7.2. China's Official Evaluation on  
International Security Environment in 2004  
 
Written after the Iraqi War, the 2004 white paper on China’s National 
Defense
347
 raised issues that were very much influenced by China’s reaction to and 
evaluation of the war. The document started by pointing to the simultaneous 
existence of opportunities for and challenges to peace and development. The opening 
statements reflected the spirit of the New Security Concept and the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. It argued that “unless diverse civilizations, social systems, and 
development models live together harmoniously, trust each other and engage in 
cooperation”, international opportunities could not be taken advantage of and 
challenges could not be overcome. As before, China implied that international 
cooperation, peace and stability relied on the principles of peaceful coexistence.  
China’s evaluations of the international security environment of the previous 
two years focused on the impact of the Iraqi War.
348
 The 2004 document pointed to 
the increase of factors contributing to “uncertainty, instability and insecurity” in 
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international relations. The document stated that “multipolarization and economic 
globalization” were deepening despite “twists and turns”. It noted “new and 
profound changes” in the balance of power among the major global players; the 
major powers were “in the process of realignment” and involved “in the 
redistribution of interests”. In this context, it underscored the necessity for 
developing countries to promote a “multipolar world” and “democratized 
international relations” and repeated its call for the establishment of a “fair and 
rational” new international political and economic order. Moreover, the paper 
claimed that “hegemonism and unilateralism gained new ground” in the struggle for 
“strategic points, strategic resources, and strategic dominance”.  In this regard, it 
stated that “the Iraqi War has exerted a “far-reaching influence on the international 
and regional security situations”. 
Compared to previous documents, which emphasized economic factors, the 
2004 document emphasized the role of military factors in international configuration 
and national security. It noted that the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) was now worldwide and that forms of war were changing; in addition to 
traditional confrontations on the battlefield, it mentioned “asymmetrical, non-
contiguous and non-linear operations” as new methods.  It noted that the major 
powers were readjusting their security and military strategies by developing high-
tech weaponry, military equipment and new military doctrines. It argued that this 
tendency further increased the military imbalance among states, which in turn made 
military power in protecting national security more compelling. Although China did 
not name the United States specifically, it implied its discomfort with the practice of 
a preemptive war doctrine and the high-tech warfare capability in the Iraqi War.    
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The 2004 document addressed the intertwined nature of traditional and non-
traditional security issues, stating that geopolitical, ethnic, religious and other 
conflicts interacted with political and economic contradictions and resulted in local 
wars and armed conflicts. Highlighting the growing danger that stemmed from the 
combination of traditional and non-traditional threats, the document put more 
emphasis on the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as “major factors 
affecting the international security situation”. China stated that issues such as 
“terrorism and WMD,” “radioactive weapons” and “observance of international 
treaties on disarmament and arms control and non-proliferation” should be discussed 
and settled within the multilateral arms control framework. China’s request for the 
use of multilateral efforts on the non-proliferation issue was a diplomatic move to 
prevent the repetition of the experience of the Iraqi War in the North Korean
349
 or 
Iranian
350
 cases.  
China addressed the prolonged existence of unipolarity vis-à-vis multipolarity 
among the major factors that influenced its security. Referring to Taiwan’s 
independence, China declared its determination to safeguard its national sovereignty 
and security “no matter how the international situation may evolve, and what 
difficulties it may encounter”. However, it underlined that China’s rise should not 
create “concerns” because it only relied on its own capabilities for development. 
Implying that it was not pursuing balancing strategies, China restated that its rise 
posed “no obstacle or threat to any one”. It repeated that its increased power would 
                                                 
349
 On North Korea’s demilitarization; See, Andrew Scobell, "Making Sense of North Korea: 
Pyongyang and Comparative Communism," Asian Security 1, no. 3 (2005): 245-266. On North 
Korea’s relations with the US; See, Dong Sun Lee, "US Preventive War against North Korea," Asian 
Security 2, no. 1 (2006): 1-23. Robert Scalapino, "North Korea - Challenge for the Major Powers," 
Asian Security 3, no. 1 (2007): 2-11. 
350
 On China’s role in the Iranian Nuclear Program; See, Nicolo Nourafchan, "Constructive Partner or 
Menacing Threat? Analyzing China's Role in the Iranian Nuclear Program," Asian Security 6, no. 1 
(2010): 28-50. 
127 
 
be an asset to the international environment and it would “never go for expansion” or 
“ever seek hegemony”. China underlined that it needed a peaceful international 
environment for its development and that it would act to enhance international peace 
and stability. It pledged to follow an “independent foreign policy of peace” and a 
“national defense policy of [a] defensive nature” to contribute to peace, development 
and international cooperation.  
 
 
4.8. China-US Relations after the Iraq War 
 
In the wake of the Iraq War, the Bush administration made diplomatic efforts 
to gain major powers’ support in the UN Security Council for Iraq’s reconstruction. 
Despite its opposition to the war, China cooperated with the United States on passing 
UN Security Council resolutions such as 1472 on adjusting the oil for food project, 
1783 on lifting UN sanctions on Iraq, 1500 on welcoming the Iraqi Governing 
Council, 1511 on Iraqi postwar reconstruction, and 1546 on the transfer of 
sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government.
351
 Like other members of the UN 
Security Council, China welcomed the US decision to act within the United Nations’ 
multilateral framework. However, the Bush administration demanded more 
cooperation from China on international affairs and invited China to be a 
“responsible stake holder in international affairs”.352 
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who delivered the speech inviting 
China to be a responsible stakeholder, stated that it would be easier to handle the 
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wide range of global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and poverty if the United States and China cooperated.  Deputy Secretary 
of State urged China to suggest that it should adjust its foreign policy to “less focus 
on national interests and more on sustaining peaceful prosperity,” contribute to 
reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq and further cooperate in applying greater 
pressure on Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear programs. He also stated 
that China should refrain from maneuvers towards a” predominance of power” in 
Asia and “openly explain its military priorities, doctrines and intentions.”353 Despite 
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s criticisms, the speech was well-received 
in China and considered as an invitation from “the biggest developed nation” to “the 
world’s biggest developing nation”.354 China evaluated the introduction of the 
“stakeholder” concept as a sign of the changing mentality of the Bush administration, 
which previously defined China as a “strategic competitor.” 
This rapprochement reflected on China’s evaluation of the international 
environment in its white paper on national defense document in 2006. Like others, 
this document started by reiterating China’s dedication to peace and development.  In 
order to refute views that saw China’s military strategy and modernization as a 
potential threat,
355
 China stated that it was pursuing a path of “peaceful 
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development” and building close ties with the rest of the world as “never seen 
before”.356 It strongly maintained that China’s fundamental national interests and the 
common interests of the world were complementary. In this regard, China endorsed 
its national defense strategy and military modernization as part of mutually enforcing 
processes of national and global security. Hence, the document repeated that it would 
not “engage in [an] arms race” or “pose a military threat to any other state”. The 
document strongly emphasized its persistent efforts in following a peaceful 
development strategy, fostering a cooperative relationship based on mutual benefit 
and promoting common security in a multilateral international framework.
357
  
In evaluating the previous two years in the international security 
environment, China stated that although uncertainties and destabilizing factors 
existed, there were more opportunities than challenges. The world was at a “critical 
stage, moving toward multipolarity”. The relations among the major powers 
proceeded mainly on the basis of the balance-of-power dynamic; but there were also 
notable coordination and “practical cooperation” efforts. The 2006 paper noted that 
China expected progress in addressing serious imbalances in the international 
strategic alignment; there had been increasing dialogue on traditional security issues 
as well as a higher level of cooperation on non-traditional security issues. It also 
noted increasing multilateralism and the strengthened status of the UN in 
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international affairs. In this atmosphere, China viewed a world war or major 
confrontation between great powers as “avoidable for foreseeable future”. 
On traditional security affairs, the document still cited the presence of 
“hegemonism and power politics” as key factors in international relations. 
Nevertheless, in the overall evaluation, the paper noted a broadened international 
security agenda, including issues in the social, energy, natural resources, finance and 
information spheres. It highlighted the presence of comprehensive, diverse and 
complex security threats and pointed to the intermingled nature of political, 
economic and security problems with geographical, ethnic and religious conflicts. 
More specifically, it called attention to non-traditional security threats such as local 
unrest, the impact of economic globalization on international terrorism, natural 
disasters, international crime and environmental degradation. In particular, it 
emphasized military competition based on “informationization”, which meant the 
production and application of information and communication technologies (ICT) in 
all spheres, including industry, education, culture and agriculture. 
The 2006 White Paper also focused on the “complexities” in the Asia-Pacific 
region. First, it defined the situation regarding the non-proliferation of WMD as 
“grave and complex” in general. It warned that the international non-proliferation 
regime faced major challenges because of “the practices of a small number of 
countries that have intensified their military alliances and resorted to force or threats 
of force in international affairs”. It specifically stated that North Korea’s nuclear 
weapon test made the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia more 
challenging. Among regional “complexities”, China highlighted that “new strategic 
alignments” among the major countries brought “new changes in the hotspots in the 
region”. The paper stated that the United States was enhancing its military capability 
131 
 
in the area and expressed China’s discomfort with the strengthening of US-Japan 
military ties.
358
 It reiterated its position on Taiwan’s independence by defining it as 
“a grave threat to China’s sovereignty and territory” and as a threat to peace and 
stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. China 
criticized the US policies because although the United States had stated it would 
adhere to the “one China” policy, it continued to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan 
and strengthen military ties with it.
359
   
The most significant event in 2008 influencing international relations was the 
US mortgage crisis. Therefore, the 2008 White Paper on China’s National Defense360 
placed more emphasis on economic integration between China and the rest of the 
world than previous documents had and stated that the success of China’s economy 
played a crucial role in making China an important member of the international 
system.
361
 It underlined that US mortgage crisis had a “snowball impact” on 
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international finance. In this regard, China once again underlined the 
interconnectedness of opportunities and risks in the global economy. The document 
underlined that China could neither develop in isolation from the rest of the world 
nor could the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China. Taking economic 
interconnectedness as its starting point, China stressed that it would pursue a path of 
peaceful development, carrying out reforms, modernization and opening-up 
strategies.
362
 As before, China stated that it would follow an independent foreign 
policy and a national defense policy based on protecting its territory and its people 
and building a harmonious world with other states. 
On the international security situation, the document first stressed the 
increased momentum of “economic globalization and multipolarization”. It defined 
industrialization and informationization as the major forces of economic 
globalization, economic interdependence and interaction among states. The 
document noted that “the rise and decline of international strategic forces 
accelerated” and the major powers continued to both cooperate and check one 
another’s power.  Regarding the balance of power dynamics, China pointed out “the 
rise of a group of new states among the developing states”, which implied the rise of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (known as BRICS). Because of this 
change, China predicted profound readjustments, such as multipolarization, in the 
international system. In addition, the document highlighted the increase of common 
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interests in the field of security, which enhanced the prospects of international 
cooperation.  
Despite the emphasis on the positive dynamics of the international security 
environment, China also underlined multiple difficulties and challenges, stating that 
the struggle to dominate strategic resources and locations increased with 
hegemonism and power politics. In the 2008 document, China reiterated the 
increasing influence of military security elements in international relations due to 
international competition in comprehensive national power based on 
informationization and the RMA. The document underlined how, influenced by the 
US National Missile Defense system, strategic nuclear forces, military astronautics, 
missile defense systems and global and battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance 
gained strategic priority in “some” powers’ (implying the United States) efforts to 
strengthen their military capacities.  
In this framework, it highlighted how “some” developing countries (implying 
North Korea and Iran) were making efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and increase 
their military power. In the final analysis, China warned against the emerging specter 
of a regional arms race and defined such tendencies as a serious threat to 
international peace, arms control and non-proliferation regime. Moreover, it 
emphasized that international uncertainties and destabilizing factors had had a 
negative impact on China’s national security and development. It pointed again to the 
United States’ arms sales to Taiwan, citing them as a threat to China’s national 
security and regional stability. In the end, China reiterated that it would adhere to the 
New Security Concept and continued to pledge that it would “never seek hegemony 
and engage in military expansion, no matter how developed it becomes”. 
 
134 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyzed the impact of the US war on terror on China’s security 
understanding. For this purpose, it initially focused on the evolution of China’s 
security understanding by primarily looking at China’s white papers on its national 
defense from 1998 to 2008.  It underlined that China’s security understanding has 
centered on three major issues: preserving China’s national integrity and domestic 
stability, sustaining its economic development, and gaining a prestigious 
international status.  In this regard, it underscored that China pursued an international 
strategy based on safeguarding a peaceful international environment so that it could 
improve its national economic, political, social and military fields. In China’s 
security understanding the idea that the state of the international environment was 
connected to the future of China prevailed. Therefore, the chapter emphasized that 
the evolution of China’s security understanding relied on the international 
environment as much as it did on national conditions. In this regard, it concluded that 
China’s security understanding was comprised of its evaluations of international 
events in terms of their implications on China’s political unity, economic 
development and global status.  
In this regard, the chapter maintained that the US primacy as the most 
significant factor in shaping China’s security understanding and evaluations of 
international relations. It discussed US primacy as the underlying cause of China’s 
insecurities, that failed to preserve its national unity, lagging behind in economic 
development and being prevented from gaining great power status.  In this context, 
the chapter evaluated that the introduction of the New Security Concept as an attempt 
to promote an international order that would rely on principles in line with China’s 
security interests.  The international order that China promoted as an alternative to 
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the US-led order relied on the principles of a very ‘thick’ conceptualization of 
sovereignty. That is, as defined by China, all states were equal regardless of their size 
of their power and no state by no means should intervene in other’s domestic affairs, 
violate its territorial integrity and engage in aggression. Also, China advocated that 
in case of the breach of international peace, the decision to intervene should be taken 
under the authority of the UN and its Security Council. In this regard, it was 
concluded that China introduced and promoted the New Security Concept as a part of 
its strategy to contain the United States by delegitimizing its practices that in China’s 
view violated the principles of the concept. It discussed the US military cooperation 
with Taiwan and Japan, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the May 1999 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the US criticisms on China’s human 
rights records and its stance on China’s membership in the World Trade 
Organization as cases in which China’s perception of the United States as hegemon 
was instantiated and China denounced the United States for acting as an hegemon.   
Having explained China’s security understanding, the chapter explained 
China’s reaction to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which were the most significant 
part of the US war on terror conducted under the Bush administration. It underlined 
that China’s approach to counterterrorism was shaped in accordance with its security 
understanding, which demanded the US fight against terrorist networks to be 
conducted under the authority of the UN and its Security Council. Agreeing on the 
legitimacy of the war on Afghanistan, China supported the UN Security Council 
resolution authorizing the war and did not oppose the United States’ decision to 
operate war with a coalition of the willing states. The Chapter underlined that the 
betterment of the relations with the United States influenced China’s evaluation of 
international relations and its position vis-à-vis the United States positively. China 
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considered its great power status was respected and recognized by the United States; 
thereby, international relations got closer towards multipolarity. 
Looking at China’s reaction to the Iraq War, it was argued that the US 
decision to wage a preemptive war on Iraq without waiting for a UN Security 
Council resolution revived China’s fears about the United States. It was stated that 
China considered the Iraq war as an unnecessary and illegitimate war and it 
evaluated the war as part of the US strategy to preserve its primacy and hinder the 
rise of great powers, thereby, prevent multipolarization of the international structure. 
It maintained that the war increased China’s sense of being contained militarily, 
politically and economically by the United States. From the United States’ disregard 
of other powers’ concerns before waging the war, its bypass the UN Security Council 
to the expected results of the war, every step of the war was considered as a direct 
threat to China’s great power status and related interests. It was underpinned that as a 
response to these developments, China’s stance against hegemonism and power 
politics intensified and the country showed its dissatisfaction with the US-led global 
order, calling for a democratized, fair and rational new order.  
However, the Chapter maintained that China’s complaints and dissatisfaction 
with the US-led order decreased when the United States cooperated or consulted with 
China and thus changed its evaluations of the international security environment. The 
Chapter showed that improved relations with the United States after the 9/11 attacks, 
the responsible stakeholder speech or the financial crisis of 2008 led China to focus 
on cooperation in the international security environment. Although China never gave 
up its demand for a multipolar order, changes in China’s evaluation of international 
security environment and the United States showed that China’s major concern has 
not been mainly US preponderance. China’s major concerns under unipolarity have 
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been the United States’ self-interested and unilateral practices, which meant the US 
disregard for the UN Security Council and China’s great power status and interests. 
The UN Security Council in which great power assumed special roles and 
responsibilities regarding the international system represented China’s ideal 
international order was represented. Therefore, it can be suggested that if the United 
States acts within the framework of the UN Security Council then China’s perception 
of threat regarding its status might decrease. The decreased perception of threat is 
expected to result in decreased demands for democratized and fair international 
relations. China might put less interest in pursuing costly strategies of balancing the 
United States because unipolarity with multilateralism in practice means 
multipolarity for China.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RUSSIA’S SECURITY UNDERSTANDING AND  
THE US WAR ON TERROR 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of the US war on terror 
on Russia’s security understanding. For this purpose, the initial part of the Chapter 
discusses the formation of Russia’s security understanding by analyzing the Russian 
Federation’s national security and foreign and military policy documents since 1993, 
when the Russian Federation published its first national security document. Looking 
at these documents, it shows how Russia’s security objectives, interests and 
vulnerabilities are intertwined with its perception of its status vis-à-vis the United 
States. The Chapter underlines that similar to China, Russia’s national security 
strategy relies on preserving Russia’s national integrity, recovering its economic 
development and regaining its great power status in international relations. It shows 
that since the end of the Cold War, how certain security practices of the United 
States such as encouraging NATO enlargement, the Kosovo operation, and 
undermining of the arms control regime pose threats to Russia’s great power status. 
Later, the Chapter focuses on Russia’s reaction to the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars, as major phases of the US war on terror. It underlines that Russia’s reaction to 
Afghanistan differs from its reaction to the Iraq War. The Chapter maintains that the 
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Iraq war enhanced Russia’s insecurities and its perception of the United States as a 
hegemonic state. The Chapter underscores that Russia is disturbed by US 
unilateralism, which in Russia’s view took place when the United States bypassed 
the UN Security Council and disregarded Russia’s status and interests as a great 
power. The Chapter maintains that the Iraq war revived Russia’s insecurities 
originating from losing its superpower status vis-à-vis the United States. Finally, the 
Chapter concludes that while the US cooperation and multilateralism in the 
Afghanistan war had a positive impact on Russia’s evaluation of the state of 
international relations, US unilateralism in the Iraq War had the opposite effect on 
Russia and enhanced its perception of threat from US primacy. It points out that 
although Russia’s relations with the United States got better in the wake of the Iraq 
war, Russia’s experience suggests that international institutions or other states cannot 
hinder the United States from acting unilaterally. In other words, Russia learned that 
multilateralism in a unipolar world is a temporary state at the discretion of the United 
States. Therefore, although it seems that Russia will accommodate US 
multilateralism in the near future, it is likely that Russia might take steps in realizing 
multilateral international relations by forming a multipolar structure. 
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5.2. Russia’s Security Understanding after the End of the Cold War 
 
 
5.2.1. Formation of Russian Foreign Policy:  
Interests, Vulnerabilities and the US 
 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States remained the sole superpower 
and its grand strategy was designed to preserve its dominant position in the system.  
Russia, on the other hand, lost its superpower position and started the new era with a 
multifaceted domestic crisis. Struggling to accommodate the rapid and dramatic 
changes in the domestic and international realms, Russia sought to form a new 
foreign policy that would help to recover its domestic weaknesses and its 
international status. Under the pressure of economic, political, and social domestic 
problems, Russia’s foreign policy mainly concentrated on foreign economic relations 
with the West.
363
  
Considering economic recovery as the most significant factor in Russia’s 
overall improvement, Russia started to prioritize political and economic integration 
with the West, particularly the United States. The first post-Soviet Russian Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev became the founder of Russia’s Western-oriented strategy and 
stressed that in the new era, Russia would define its foreign policy based on national 
interest rather than international class interests.
364
 He talked of Russia as a ‘normal 
great power’ and stated that Russia’s national interest lied in cooperation with the 
West, not in confrontation.
365
 He classified the developed Western countries as 
Russia’s natural allies and argued that Russia should integrate into the ranks of other 
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nations by adopting the same system of principles such as individual rights, a free 
market economy and democracy.
366
 
These objectives led Russia to dedicate special attention to its relations with 
the United States in the new era because Russian foreign policymakers saw the 
United States as a point of reference on the road to democracy and a free market 
economy.
367
 In the article entitled ‘A Transformed Russia in a Transformed World’, 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev defined the Cold War era as an artificially developed 
confrontation with the United States and stated that he did not see any reason that 
would prevent both states from developing fruitful relations in the future.
368
 The 
Foreign Minister showed his determination to build better relations with the United 
States in the post-Cold War era stating that Russia did not believe the idea that the 
United States would dictate its will on Russia as the sole superpower. He criticized 
such thinking arguing that it would lead to the recurrence of old stereotypes. Kozyrev 
stated that Russia did not threaten anyone and believed that no developed democratic 
civil society could pose a threat to Russia.
369
  
In the early 1990s, as the Foreign Minister Kozyrev argued Russia remained a 
‘normal great power’370 and that it perceived a benign international environment that 
would allow Moscow to concentrate on its domestic agenda. Kozyrev gave priority 
to Russia’s participation in the International Monterey Fund, the World Bank and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which later became the World Trade 
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Organization and establishing close relations with the G-7 and then the European 
Community.
371
 Russia’s search for integration to the international organizations was 
part of Moscow’s search for economic help from the Western institutions and 
showed its willingness to be an open market economy and a democratic state. The 
linkage between Russian integration strategy and its domestic recovery plans showed 
the ‘domestic’ orientation of Russia’s foreign policy.372 
However, in 1991, Russian foreign policy became subject to very severe 
criticism in domestic politics because Russia acted together with the West against the 
Serbs after the collapse of Yugoslavia.
373
 Russia’s clear position in the UN Security 
Council on reinforcing the arms embargo against Yugoslavia, its support for the 
deployment for peacekeeping forces in Croatia, its open criticisms against Serbian 
attacks on Croatia and finally the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in mid-
February 1992 increased domestic criticism against President Yeltsin and Russian 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
374
 Critics argued that Russia had betrayed its Slavic 
bothers and its geopolitical interests for the sake of a Western oriented foreign policy 
understanding.
375
 
This process triggered a debate on Russia’s national interests and its foreign 
policy orientation.  According to Andranik Migranyan, who is an influential foreign 
policy thinker, the foreign policy strategy designed to follow the West disregarded 
Russia’s national interests and formulated its foreign policy aims and national 
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interests distinctly.
376
 Similarly, Alexei Arbatov, another major foreign policy 
scholar who supported Kozyrev together with Migranyan until the split over foreign 
policy, criticized Kozyrev’s foreign policy for having four major deficiencies. 
According to Arbatov, Kozyrev’s foreign policy did not define national interests and 
priorities and failed to recognize that Russia’s priority was to build its relations with 
the republics of the former Soviet Union, and not with the West or the United States. 
He argued that Kozyrev’s foreign policy created the impression that Russia 
constantly gave unilateral concessions to the West without any tangible political and 
security gains. Moreover, he argued that Kozyrev’s foreign policy approach did not 
really rely on substantial support from the domestic constituency.
377
 
As the criticisms against Russian pro-Western foreign policy increased, 
Russian foreign policymakers gave in to those who underlined that Russia has been a 
great power and an independent actor in international relations.  By the end of 1993, 
the dominant voice in Russian foreign policy became those who argued that Russia 
should act according to its interests.
378
 The first Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation was written under the influence of this group and the document 
underlined that it was vital that Russia’s foreign policy be guided by fundamental 
interests not by ideological stances.
379
 According to the document, the essence of 
Russian foreign policy was determined by the following priorities:  
 the use of political means to ensure Russia’s security in all 
dimensions, including sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, 
strengthening of stability along the Russian borders, in the regions 
closest to home and in the world as a whole;  
                                                 
376
 Cited in Ambrosio, "The Non-Material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the 
Transformation of Russian Security Policy," 270. 
377
 Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign-Policy Alternatives," 19-26. 
378
 Margot Light, "In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology," The 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19, no. 3 (2003): 45. 
379
 Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shakleina, Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and 
Realities (New York: CEU Press, 2005), 31. 
144 
 
 protection of the rights, dignity and well-being of the Russian 
citizens; ensuring favorable  external conditions for strengthening 
democratic reforms by promoting civil society;  
 mobilizing the financial and technological support to build an 
efficient market economy, developing  Russian manufacturers’ 
competitiveness and securing their interests in the world markets by 
assisting the resolution of internal social problems; 
 building relations with the CIS states and other countries of the near 
abroad on an equal basis, and maintaining the strategic course toward 
partnership and allied relations with states that helped Russia solve its 
problems; 
 securing its role as a great power within the global balance of 
influence, in such multilateral processes as regulation of the global 
economy and international affairs.
380
 
 
Having defined its priorities, the document provided the assessment of post 
Cold War international relations and discussed Russia’s place in a changing world. 
The document underlined that the end of the Cold War would not in itself bring 
about stabilization of the world in which Russia still saw its military and status as 
important factors both resolving and escalating the conflict.  The interaction of the 
conditions created after the dissolution of the bipolar order and the newly emerging 
power centers were defined as the most significant condition that would shape the 
post-Cold War order. As argued in the document, the leading powers or groups of 
powers would tend to rearrange the political structure of global affairs and make 
efforts to secure their own sphere of influence even by means of using power. Russia 
underlined regional integration similar to Europe and argued that this regional 
integration would create ‘polycentrism’ of world politics (the US, Western Europe, 
Japan, and states claiming the roles of regional leaders). This ‘polycentrism’ was 
expected to create a struggle with the present order as the United States had 
ambitions to maintain its predominance.
381
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In addition to forecasting an international order based on power competition, 
the document also underlined the fact that the end of the Cold War brought about the 
end of ideological struggles and created new opportunities for constructive relations 
at the global level. It signified the importance of international cooperation within the 
UN and other organizations. Russia argued that protection of Russia’s interests 
through economic, diplomatic, military and other means would constitute the 
foundation of its foreign policy and it would pursue equal partnership with its 
neighbors and the leading democratic and economically developed nations. 
According to the document, the basic condition for partnership was defined as the 
promotion of its interests not its ideology.  
The international environment was defined with elements of conflict and 
cooperation and Russia argued that its geopolitical situation dictated the need to 
conduct an active, pragmatic, and balanced policy in many areas. Russia underlined 
that its revival depended on the success of its ability to answer intermingled 
problems in national and international spheres.  First and foremost, the document 
stated that the crisis in the former republics of the USSR posed security problems 
due to their direct impact on Russia’s security. Referring to the Central Asian states’ 
rapprochement with Turkey, Russia stated that some states were seeking to rely on 
the nations close to them in ethno-social, religious, economic respects, including 
those states that historically competed with Russia for influence in the region. In 
order to deal with this geopolitical environment, Russia declared its intention to 
assert the principles of international law such as respect for minority rights and 
establishing neighborly relations through persuasion or even power in extreme cases. 
Russia also argued that Eastern and Central European states were searching for a new 
place in international relations and were attempting to draw the West into Russia’s 
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spheres by striving to be members of the Western institutions like NATO. Russia 
pointed out the importance of continuation of their relations with Russia for their 
recovery from economic and social crisis. 
In addition to the ‘near abroad,’ Russia underlined that its relations with the 
United States would remain at the top of Russia’s foreign policy due to the status and 
weight of the United States.
382
 It was argued that development of full-fledged 
relations with the United States would help Russia facilitate the creation of a 
favorable environment necessary for conducting internal economic reforms. The 
document mentioned both sides’ intention to enhance cooperation. However, it also 
warned against the domestic tendencies in the United States favoring isolationism 
and attempting to preserve the unilateral advantages in the process of disarmament 
such as having the ABM treaty revised on their terms. Russia declared its intention to 
promote steady relations with the United States, with a view to strategic partnership 
and eventually to an alliance. Russia also openly stated its decision to oppose the 
United States relapsing into a policy of imperial ambitions or its attempt to become 
the ‘sole superpower’. Russia underlined that there were no antagonistic 
disagreements in bilateral relations and despite the presence of controversies, they 
would not lead to a confrontation as both sides’ long term national interests dictated 
such a “realist course of policy”.383  
Russia gave importance to economic cooperation with the United States as it 
would help the successful implementation of reforms and promote favorable 
economic conditions for Russia’s foreign trade without getting involved in trade and 
economic war with the world’s leading economic centers. Russia also asked for US 
support at international negotiations on the USSR’s foreign debts, on the elimination 
                                                 
382
 Melville and Shakleina, Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, 27. 
383
 Melville and Shakleina, Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, 27.  
147 
 
of discriminatory restrictions on Russia, and requested US cooperation in scientific 
and technological spheres. In addition to this, Russia stated that it would make efforts 
to develop a joint strategy to open up its markets and would strive to seek the US 
administration’s support for Russia within the G-7 group. 
In addition to its expectations from bilateral relations in the field of economy, 
Russia stated the importance of bilateral relations in the sphere of security. Russia 
emphasized the importance of cooperation at the level of military planning and 
military construction. Also, it stated that Russia was ready to resolve problems such 
as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and to join peacekeeping 
operations in an integrated effort with the United States.  In addition, Russia declared 
that its top priority was to acknowledge that Russia was the engine for market reform 
and the guarantor of democratization within the post-Soviet space. Therefore, the 
United States should see Russia as the main actor in the region while actively 
involved in resolving conflicts and protecting human rights in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and Baltic states. 
Being prudent on the political implication of the relations with the United 
States, Russia stated that it was important that the expansion of bilateral interaction 
and development of partnership should not undermine Russia’s independent role. 
The document underlined that Russia’s interests must be protected and its priorities 
taken into account in bilateral relations. Escaping from direct reference to relations 
with the United States, Russia noted that it did not regard any state a priori as hostile 
or friendly; instead; it underlined that it would establish relations with nations whose 
cooperation with Russia might be instrumental in resolving Russia’s problems and 
developing Russia’s long-term interests.384 Russia made it clear that its cooperation 
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was permanent as long as it served its interests and international status. Russia also 
answered to domestic criticisms on its cooperation with the United States by stating 
that its cooperation could not be characterized as ‘payment’ for economic help.385 
Overall, as revealed in the Foreign Policy Concept of 1993, Russia’s 
vulnerabilities stemmed from its declined international status and the huge power gap 
with the United States, which at the same time played a definitive role in shaping its 
foreign policy priorities and principles in the post-Cold War era. Russia saw 
cooperation with the West and good relations with the United States as a part of its 
strategy to overcome its vulnerabilities and revive its domestic and international 
position. However, Russia’s need for international cooperation did not undermine its 
demands to be respected as an equal partner whose concerns and interests  should be 
taken into account in international affairs, especially regarding the ‘near abroad.’ 
NATO enlargement, the Kosovo and Chechnya wars became crucial reference points 
for Russia to test its new partners on whether they would take into account Russia’s 
concerns and interests. 
 
 
5.2.2. NATO Enlargement 
 
NATO’s decision to expand the organization towards the former Soviet area 
has been a significant issue in Russia’s bilateral relations with the United States. In 
the 1997 Military doctrine, Russia identified “the expansion of military blocs and 
alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military 
security” amongst “the basic existing and potential sources of military danger.”386 
NATO expansion was perceived as the exploitation of Russia’s weakness and 
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concessions for the interests of the West.
387
 Also, Russia opposed NATO 
enlargement based on the arguments that it would damage Russia’s economic, 
political, and military interests and would isolate Russia by forming a European 
defense organization without Moscow.
388
 Despite Russia’s opposition and the lively 
political and academic debates on the implications of NATO’s enlargement for the 
region, the decision for NATO enlargement was declared in January 1994 at the 
Brussels Summit.
389
 This decision was supported by the idea that NATO 
enlargement would promote stability and democracy in East and Central Europe.
390
   
Seeing that it would not be able prevent NATO’s enlargement, Russia 
focused on brokering a special agreement that would be commensurate with its great 
power status and would provide it with privileged consultation rights in NATO’s 
future actions in its regions.
391
 Russia had already started to negotiate for a special 
status with NATO when a crisis erupted after NATO’s threat to use force against the 
Serbs to protect Bosnia.
392
 Assuming its national interest coincided with the Serbs, 
Russia had strived to prevent NATO action and played a significant role in 
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convincing the Serbs to withdraw their weapons away from Sarajevo, which was 
declared a safe area by the UN. However, Russia’s efforts only delayed NATO’s 
operation against the Serbs until July 1995. The fact that NATO members did not 
give an advance warning to Russia caused the NATO members to think that Russia 
would break off its relations with NATO. However, Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev stated that Russia was interested in developing serious relations with NATO 
so that surprises and unilateral measures, especially military ones, could be ruled out 
in those zones where NATO and Russia would have to cooperate closely.
393
  
After a long diplomatic processes, NATO and Russia agreed on the 
Individual Partnership Programme within the Partnership for Peace, known as the 
‘16+1’ formula, in May 1995. In the 16+1 formula, Russia was promised greater and 
more embedded consultation rights with NATO and its members. More significantly, 
NATO members took a political decision not to proceed with enlargement until the 
Russian parliamentary and presidential elections, which were scheduled for 
December 1995 and June 1996.
394
 In the wake of these elections, in 1996, Yevgeny 
Primakov, who was known as a foreign policy hawk, replaced Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev.  
This change brought about significant implications for Russian foreign policy 
because Primakov’s dominance in Russian foreign policy-making consolidated the 
positions of those who advocated an independent foreign policy commensurate with 
Russia’s great power status.395 Primakov’s foreign policy followed three main 
principles: to pursue Russia’s national interests, to restore Russia’s position as a great 
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power and to promote a multipolar system.
396
 In line with these principles, Primakov 
argued for the need to develop a more equal relationship with the United States in 
which Russia’s interests would be respected and the United States would be 
constrained from acting unilaterally.
397
 Not surprisingly, Primakov’s policy demands 
toward NATO reflected these principles. 
Along these lines, Primakov made three demands that would protect Russia’s 
interests and present Russia’s compromise to NATO enlargement.398 First, NATO 
should not install nuclear weapons or support infrastructure on the territory of the 
new members. Second, the eastward movement of NATO military infrastructure 
should be kept at a minimum, or preferably should not take place at all. Third, Russia 
demanded that NATO should rule out an enlargement policy towards the Baltic 
States or any other former Soviet countries. NATO responded to Russia’s demands 
and made the political pledge that NATO would not change its nuclear posture and 
assured that it did not have the intention, plan, or reason to deploy nuclear weapons 
on the territory of new members.
399
 With this assurance, Russia-NATO relations 
found a political ground to institutionalize their relations with the ‘Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation’. 
The fact that the Founding Act did not grant a veto right to Russia led the 
Russian government to be severely criticized.
400
 Critics stated that the West treated 
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Russia as a defeated power and shown its place by not granting it a veto power over 
NATO’s decision and convicting Russia to follow the decisions taken without its 
consent, as it was the case with the G-7 and EU. It was argued that the Russia-NATO 
Council did not provide an effective mechanism for European security. It was argued 
that the Founding Act and its mechanisms created a false image that Russia’s 
interests and concerns had been respected along with Russia’s great power status. 
Russia’s governmental perception of the Founding Act was positive.401 
Russia considered the signature of the Act provided it with a moral ground for 
defending its interests and showed that NATO respected Russia’s rational security 
concerns. Besides, in Russia’s view the Founding Act provided a structure for 
cooperation by establishing a permanent council for discussion of the problems on 
the basis of consensus. In the agreement, both sides agreed to respect the primary 
responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining peace and security, to 
refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and against any other state, 
its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner 
inconsistent with the UN Charter. Therefore, even though Russia did not get a veto 
right gave it a sense of control over NATO’s use of force as a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council with a veto right.
402
  
In the wake of the NATO enlargement process, in 1997, Russia publicized its 
first National Security Concept where it formulated the most important guidelines, 
principles constituting the foundation of the Russian Federation’s national 
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security.
403
 The document stated the main goals of the Russian Federation were to 
consolidate Russia’s position as a great power and one of the influential centers of 
the emergent multipolar world. In the document defined  international developments 
that had a direct and negative impact on Russia’s national security. These threats 
were the lack of progress in developing a universal and comprehensive security 
model for Europe, NATO’s eastward expansion, and the lack of effectiveness in the 
existing peacekeeping and security mechanisms.  
In spite of these negative developments, Russia’s evaluation of its 
international situation in the 1997 document was not pessimistic because of the 
development of new relations with major powers. A peaceful and cooperative foreign 
policy line with major powers like the United States, European Union, China, Japan 
and India was crucial for Russia’s domestic recovery. For this purpose, Russia 
regarded the absence of an immediate military threat as an opportunity so that it 
could redistribute its resources to deal with the domestic problems. However, 
although Russia regarded the situation as an opportunity, the document put emphasis 
on the principle of equality and national interest in cooperation with the major 
powers. As the agreement with NATO did not harm Russia’s sense of equality and 
preserved its interests, Russia’s evaluation of international affairs focused on 
preservation of peaceful international relations for improving its domestic conditions. 
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5.2.3. The Kosovo and Chechnya Wars and  
Their Impact on Russia’s Millennium Doctrines  
 
In 1999, when NATO made an operation on Kosovo without the 
authorization of the UN, Russia accused NATO of violating the conditions of the 
Founding Act. Russia argued that in the Founding Act both sides pledged to respect 
the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining peace and 
security and refraining from the threat or use of force against each other and against 
any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any 
manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. Russia claimed that this  pledge was 
broken by the NATO operation and led Russia to lose its sense of control over 
NATO’s use of force as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a veto 
right. The unsanctioned Kosovo operation showed that partnership with NATO had a 
different meaning for either side and the Founding Act did not grant any right to 
Russia to influence the decisions of the Alliance.
404
  
After the operation, NATO-Russia relations were severely damaged. Russia 
broke up its relations with NATO, suspended its participation in the Founding Act 
and Partnership for Peace, withdrew its military mission from Brussels, ended the 
talks on the establishment of a NATO military mission in Moscow and demanded 
that the NATO information representative leave Moscow.
405
 Moreover, Russia’s 
perception of the United States and NATO was reshaped as it was in the Cold War 
and brought the United States and NATO back to Russia’s security agenda. Since 
then, Russia’s relations with the United States and NATO carried the baggage of the 
Kosovo experience. 
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NATO’s use of force without the authorization of the UN Security Council 
had significant implications for Russia’s evaluation of the post Cold War 
international structure. In the post bipolar structure, Russia supported multilateral 
and multipolar international relations and promoted an increased role for the UN and 
its Security Council. It also argued for an increased role for the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than a NATO-centric European 
security system.
406
 As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a 
member of the OSCE, Russia regarded these organizations as a platform where it 
could assert its influence on decision-making as a great power. With the 
unauthorized Kosovo operation, Russia felt that NATO did not only ignore the UN 
as an international organization but also disregarded its own status and interests as a 
great power. It also showed that the international security structure that Russia 
envisioned to be multilateral and multipolar in the post Cold War era would not be 
realized soon. 
NATO’s military operation on Kosovo made Russia’s international and 
domestic weaknesses more noticeable. Russia regarded Kosovo as a domestic affair 
of Yugoslavia and argued that the use of force for humanitarian reasons would set a 
dangerous precedent in international affairs. Russia, as China did, defined the use of 
force for humanitarian reasons as a violation of international law and the principles 
of sovereignty, non-intervention and equality in international relations.
407
 Russia 
focused on the separatist nature of the conflict rather than its human aspect because 
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Russia’s interpretations of the situation in Kosovo were heavily influenced by the 
situation in Chechnya.
408
  
The roots of the Russia-Chechen conflict dates back to 1991 when Chechen 
leader Dzhokav Dudayev declared independence from the Russian Federation. The 
Russian military conducted air and ground operations on Chechnya and barely 
achieved preventing Chechen independence. In Chechnya, Russia’s excessive use of 
force against its own citizens and territory and the human rights violations in the 
massive military operations became subject to international criticism.
409
 Kozyrev, 
then Russian foreign minister, later admitted the disastrous consequence of the 
military operation on Chechnya and acknowledged that the Russian government was 
not prepared to deal with this situation.
410
 The experience of military and political 
weakness in dealing with Chechnya pushed the new Prime Minister Putin to take a 
harsher stance on Chechen forces who raided Dagestan in late 1999. 
In late 1999, Russia again started a large-scale military operation on Chechen 
forces. Putin advocated his stance against the Chechen forces by stating that Chechen 
forces were not self-taught fighters but well trained international saboteurs who had 
far-reaching plans including igniting political tensions and destabilizing Russia.
411
 In 
addition, in defense of his policies Putin put forward that Chechens were not only 
separatists but also extremists and international terrorists who aimed to seize hold of 
the Caucasus and establish a caliphate.
412
 Despite Russia’s explanations, its massive 
military operation on Chechnya again received a large amount of criticism from the 
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West, including the United States. These criticisms increased Russia’s concerns over 
NATO’s enlargement into the area which Russia called the ‘near abroad’ and its out 
of area operations for humanitarian reasons.
413
 
Given the international context and its domestic vulnerabilities, Russia’s 
political and military establishment feared that Kosovo might be a model for NATO 
intervention in the conflicts within the former Soviet territory or even Russia itself.
414
 
In this case, Russia feared that its massive military operation on Chechnya could be 
used as an excuse for an intervention into Russia.
415
 Under such circumstances, in the 
face of NATO’s state of the art military capabilities and the operational power of its 
air and land forces, Russia’s conventional military power might not be enough to 
protect Russia’s territorial integrity.416 In this sense, the Kosovo operation created 
self-awareness in Russia regarding the gap between its diplomatic and military 
capabilities and its claim to be a great power in the post Cold War era. 
The impact of the Kosovo operation has been so profound on Russia that for 
the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russian strategists started to make war 
scenarios featuring a NATO invasion.
417
 More significantly, seen in the same light, 
Kosovo and Chechnya changed Russia’s threat perception and triggered Russia to 
revise its National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine. 
These documents reflected significant changes in Russia’s threat assessment and its 
perception of international relations since the Kosovo operation.  
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5.3. Russia’s Evaluation of International Relations  
 
Russia’s evaluation of international relations changed with the 2000 National 
Security Concept document. While in a 1997 document the world was 'characterized 
by more pronounced tendencies leading to the formation of a multi-polar world', in 
the 2000 document, the situation in the world was defined by the presence of ‘two 
mutually exclusive trends’ and a ‘dynamic transformation of system of international 
relations’.418 In the first trend, Russia underlined the presence of a significant number 
of states with their strengthened economic and political positions and their 
integrative approaches for the multilateral management of international processes. 
On the other hand, the second trend was characterized by ‘the attempts to create an 
international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries 
in the international community under the US leadership.’ In addition, it was argued 
that this structure was designed for ‘unilateral solutions (including military force) to 
key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of 
international law.’ 419  
Referring to the Kosovo case, the document emphasized that the second trend 
based on domination of the international system under the leadership of the United 
States became more evident in the international system at the beginning of the 
twentieth-first century.
420
 While mentioning the presence of new challenges and 
threats in the new era, the document specifically underlined the growing trend 
towards the establishment of a unipolar structure under the economic and power 
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domination of the United States. Reflecting its uneasiness with the NATO 
operations, the document offered the argument that the fact that the principal 
international security problems were being placed on western institutions and forums 
of limited composition weakened the role of the UN Security Council. Criticizing the 
military methods used in Kosovo, Russia argued that the use of force by bypassing 
the existing international legal mechanisms would not remove the deep socio-
economic, inter-ethnic and other contradictions causing conflicts; on the contrary, 
they would only undermine the foundation of law and order. Furthermore, Russia 
warned against the use of the unilateral strategy because it could destabilize the 
international situation and provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate 
contradictions, national and religious strife.
 421
 
In the National Security Concept document, Russia argued that the 
establishment of a unipolar structure, the increasing trend of unilateralism and the 
use of force in international relations posed a threat to international order. Against 
this unipolar order, Russia advocated multipolarity. As it stated in the Foreign Policy 
Concept, Russia believed that the multipolar structure would really reflect the 
diversity of interests and the structure of current international relations. The use of 
mechanisms of collective resolution of significant international problems, the 
prioritization of international law and the democratization of international relations 
were characterized as the mechanisms. It was argued that these mechanisms would 
guarantee respect for mutual interests and would lead to multipolarity as the most 
effective and reliable international power configuration. Believing in the strength of 
multipolarity, Russia stated that it would ‘facilitate the formation of an ideology of 
establishing a multipolar world.’ 
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5.4. Russia’s Threat Definition 
 
Russia’s security documents did not designate a specific state or group of 
states as an adversary. Rather Russia referred to international situations, tendencies, 
and events that it considered threats to its security.  Following this principle, the 
2000 National Security Concept pointed out the presence of attempts by a group of 
states to ‘weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways’ such 
as to ignore Russia’s interests when solving major issues of international relations, 
including conflict situations.’422 In Russia’s view, these attempts were planned to 
hinder Russia’s rise as an influential power center in the multipolar world and 
prevent it from exercising its national interests by weakening its position in Europe, 
the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Asia Pacific.  
In addition to perception of threat concerning its international status, Russia 
listed eight fundamental threats in the international sphere. According to the 
document,  
 Desire of some states and international associations to diminish the 
role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above 
all the UN and the OSCE; 
 the danger of a weakening of Russia’s political and economic and 
military influence in the world; 
 the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all 
NATO’s eastward expansion; 
 the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military 
presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders; 
 proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles; 
 the weakening of integration processes in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States; 
 outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the 
Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states 
and 
 territorial claims on Russia 
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were regarded as the international factors bearing threats to Russia’s security.423 
In conformity with the National Security Concept, Russia’s Military Doctrine 
also included a list of factors that played a destabilizing factor in Russia’s military-
political situation.
424
 According to the National Security Concept,  
 weakening of the existing mechanism for safeguarding international 
security (primarily the United Nations and the OSCE); 
 the utilization of military force as a means of humanitarian 
intervention without authorization by the UN Security Council;  
 circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of 
international law for that purpose; 
 the violation of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of 
arms limitation and disarmament; 
 the utilization of technologies and utilization of means of information 
for aggressive purposes; 
 the activities of extremist nationalists, religious, separatist, and 
terrorist movements, organizations and structures;  
 the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and weapons 
and drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities 
 
were regarded as factors threatening Russia’s military-political situation.  
Besides these destabilizing factors, Russia’s Military Doctrine gave a specific 
list of international threats for Russia’s security. According to the list, external 
threats to Russia’s security are as follows: 
 territorial claims against the Russian Federation and interference in 
the Russian Federation’s internal affairs 
 attempts to ignore Russia’s interest in resolving international security 
problems and to oppose its rise as one of the influential centers in a 
multipolar world 
 the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian 
Federation’s state borders and the borders of its allies 
 the creation of groups of forces leading to violation of existing 
balance of forces, adjacent to Russian borders and the borders of its 
allies or on the seas adjoining their territories 
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 expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the 
Russian Federation’s military security 
 the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on 
the territory of friendly states close to the Russian Federation 
 the creation, equipping and training on the other states’ territories of 
armed formations and groups with a view to transferring them for 
operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies 
 attacks (armed provocations) on Russian Federation military 
installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on 
installations and facilities on the Russian Federation’s state border, 
the border of its allies or the high seas 
 undermining the arms-control agreements 
 dissemination of hostile information damaging the military security of 
the Russian Federation and its allies 
 discrimination and suppression of the rights, freedoms and interests of 
Russian citizens in the foreign states and  
 international terrorism. 
 
Moreover, all of these official documents made specific references to the 
threat of terrorism as both a domestic and international threat against the security of 
Russia. Terrorism was defined as a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity and 
domestic stability. In these documents, the federal government was given full 
authority to deal with terrorism irrespective of where acts of terrorism damaging to 
the Russian Federation were conceived or carried out. The Foreign Policy Concept 
stated that it was the duty of every state to protect its citizens against terrorist 
encroachments, to prevent any activity on its territory aimed at organizing such acts 
against its citizens and interests of other countries and not to provide asylum to 
terrorists. In other words, Russia called states for having “responsible sovereignty, 
“as the US did in its US counterterrorism strategy after September 11. The National 
Security Concept and Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation underlined the 
transnational character of the terrorist threat. Moreover, the documents stated that 
terrorism in a transnational nature has been posing a threat to Russia’ security as well 
as international stability and for this reason, Russia called for international 
cooperation with increased effectiveness and urgent action.  
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To sum up, the documents show that the Kosovo operation profoundly 
influenced Russia’s evaluation of international relations and its position in the new 
system. In this new framework, although Russia did not specifically mention a name 
of an adversary, the most significant threats were related to US dominance and 
projection of its power in the international realm. The fact that the humanitarian 
aspect of the Chechnya issue, which was defined as a separatist and terrorist threat, 
captured attention from the United States and the West increased Russia’s 
sensitivities regarding humanitarian intervention. As the threat of intervention was 
accompanied with the weakness of its conventional and nuclear capabilities, Russia’s 
insecurities increased.  Russia evaluated NATO’s enlargement, its military 
operations without authorization of the UN Security Council, the US decision to 
withdraw from the ABM treaty and build a National Missile Defense system as 
examples of US unilateralism and the search for hegemony in the post-Cold War era. 
As a descendant superpower with a claim to recover and ascend to the status of a 
great power in a multipolar world, Russia evaluated these policies as part of a bigger 
strategy that aimed to hinder Russia’s rise as a great power in the new era.  
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5.5. Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy Strategy 
 
Russia stated that in the new international structure, it would draw upon “a 
realist strategy” was based on the “observance of a reasonable balance between its 
objectives and possibilities for attaining its foreign policy objectives.”425 As stated in 
its Foreign Policy Concept, Russia would use its politico-diplomatic, military, 
economic, financial and cultural means to solve foreign policy issues. Foreign Policy 
Concept stated that it would concentrate on foreign policy issues if they had real 
significance for Russia’s national interests and would contribute to Russia’s power 
position in the international arena. Russia stated that in diversity and complexity of 
the international crisis, it would evaluate these crises in accordance with Russia’s 
foreign policy priorities. These were defined as the creation of favorable 
international conditions for protecting Russia’s territorial integrity, economic 
recovery and assuring the rise of Russia as a great power in the multipolar world.   
Russia declared that forming a new international order based on the principles 
of justice, mutual respect and mutually advantageous cooperation and consolidating 
the role of the UN and its Security Council were its foreign policy priorities. Second, 
Russia called for the decrease of the role of power in international relations and 
declared its intention to comply with its commitment on arms reduction.  In line with 
this principle, Russia criticized the use of force in violation of the UN Charter and 
the introduction of concepts like “humanitarian intervention” and “limited 
sovereignty” to justify unilateral use of force. Instead, Russia called for a strict 
observance of the norms of international law under the authority of the UN. Third, 
Russia focused on international economic relations with the aim of creating favorable 
external conditions for the development of its economy and assuring its integration in 
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the world economic system. Protection of the rights of Russian citizens and 
compatriots abroad became another priority for Russian foreign policy. In addition, 
Russia defined communication with the international community about its position 
on major international problems and form a positive perception of Russia abroad as a 
foreign policy priority. 
In addition to these, Russia has given specific attention to developing its 
regional relations. Priority was given to improvement of relations with member states 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which Russia called the ‘near 
abroad’. Russia emphasized that it attached a special importance to relations with the 
CIS and the development of cooperation in military-political and security areas, 
especially in combating terrorism and extremism in the region.  Russia also stated 
that it would dedicate serious emphasis to developing economic cooperation with the 
CIS including creation of a free trade zone and the joint and rational use of natural 
resources. 
Regarding its relations with European states, Russia emphasized that it was 
its traditional foreign policy interest to develop good relations with European states.  
Moscow especially pointed out that the main aim of the Russian foreign policy in 
Europe was to promote the creation of a stable and democratic system of European 
security and cooperation. Since Russia found NATO an exclusionary organization 
creating new division lines in Europe, it declared its interest in creating the 
development of a multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.  Referring to NATO’s enlargement and its Kosovo operation, 
Russia stated that it would reject the restrictions on the functions of the OSCE in the 
post-Soviet space and the Balkans.  
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On relations with NATO, Russia stated that it was open to constructive 
interaction with NATO within the framework of the Founding Act and highlighted 
that the intensity of cooperation with NATO would depend on its compliance with 
the key clauses of the agreement. These clauses were on the non-use or threat of 
force, non-deployment of conventional armed forces and nuclear weapons and their 
delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members, as Primakov had demanded 
earlier. It was stated that Russia retained its negative attitude towards NATO 
expansion. Moreover, the document maintained that NATO’s political and military 
guidelines did not coincide with the interests of Russia and occasionally directly 
contradicted them. The main concern in this regard was NATO’s new strategic 
concept, which did not exclude the use of force in the out-of-area of the Washington 
Treaty without UN Security Council authorization. The document emphasized that 
the continuity of Russia’s relations with NATO was possible only if it was based on 
due respect for the interests of both sides and an unconditional fulfillment of 
obligations assumed.  
Regarding its relations with the United States, Russia declared its intention to 
make efforts to overcome the present problems in bilateral relations and maintain, 
then, the ten-year old infrastructure of bilateral cooperation.  Russia stated that 
despite the presence of serious, in some cases, fundamental differences, the Russian-
American interaction was the necessary condition for the betterment of the 
international situation and the achievement of global strategic stability.  Russia 
underlined mutual interest in disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction as well as prevention and settlement of more dangerous 
regional conflicts. 
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Finally, Russia emphasized that it would develop its relations with states in 
the Asia-Pacific region and would participate in regional organizations like the 
Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Five, in whose 
foundation Russia played an active role with China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and 
Tajikistan (which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Russia 
stated that it would develop further relations with states including India, Pakistan, 
and Iran. In addition, Russia underlined the protracted conflict in Afghanistan as a 
threat to its national security and the security of the southern CIS’s borders.  In the 
face of a terrorist and extremist threat, as Russia then defined it as such, it declared 
its intention to support consistent effort for achieving a long lasting and a fair 
political settlement in Afghanistan and interdicting the exportation of terrorism and 
extremism from there. 
Consequently, after losing its superpower status, Russia started to redefine its 
foreign policy principles. Its declined power status and the huge power gap with the 
United States became the major factors that shaped the process of forming grand 
strategy and the contours of its foreign policy.  Since the end of the Cold War, Russia 
engaged in international problems and crises in which it tested its power position. At 
the end, Russia was not able to protect its interests as easily as it did as a superpower. 
Having recognized international constraints in a unipolar world and its own restricted 
capacity, Moscow aimed to regain its status as a great power in international 
relations and facilitate the establishment of a multipolar world system to protect its 
interests. However, the recognition of the fact that its capabilities were not 
commensurate with these interrelated purposes led Russia to focus on its internal 
situation and it designed a foreign policy strategy that mainly focused on bolstering 
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its internal development, which would enhance its international power position in 
turn.  
As Russia’s territorial integrity and economic development became 
indivisible parts of its international relations, creating the international conditions 
that would protect its territorial integrity and economic recovery became Russia’s 
primary foreign policy objectives. In order to ensure a peaceful international 
environment and escape from confrontation with dominant powers, Moscow adopted 
a strategy of taking international problems to the UN Security Council. While 
showing its opposition to unilateralism, it paid attention to refraining from state-to-
state direct confrontation. This strategy of non-confrontation especially became a 
part of Russia-US relations. Seeing good relations with the United States as the 
foundation of a peaceful international relations and its internal recovery, Russia 
refrained from following a confrontational strategy against the United States as 
China did. The strategy of non-confrontation, especially with the United States 
became a fundamental foreign policy principle in Russian foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era and shaped Russia’s reaction to the US war on terror. 
 
 
5.6. Russia’s Approach and Reaction to the US War on Terror 
 
 
5.6.1. Russia’s Approach to the US war on Afghanistan 
 
The threat of transnational terrorism was already on the security agenda of 
the Russian Federation due to the ongoing conflict with Chechnya.  Russia defined 
the war in Chechnya as a war on international terrorism and stated that with its 
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transnational nature Chechen terrorism threatened international stability.
426
 The Bush 
administration did not agree with Russia’s claims about the transnational nature of 
the terrorist threat. On the contrary, the US administration evaluated the war in 
Chechnya as “a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia 
and of America's interest in their independence”427 not as a threat of international 
terrorism. However, after the September 11 attacks carried the threat of terrorism to 
the top of the US security agenda, terrorism became the common strategic interest in 
US-Russia bilateral relations. 
In 2000, Russia had already defined Afghanistan as a real threat to its security 
and to the security of the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States because Afghanistan exported terrorism and extremism by supporting 
Chechen fighters. Russia’s earlier calls for international cooperation for fighting 
against terrorism originating from Afghanistan were answered by the United States 
after September 11, 2001. Russia immediately declared its support for the United 
States and promised cooperation on several issues. According to this, Russia would 
share intelligence with the United States, open its airspace for flights providing 
humanitarian aid, cooperate with Russia’s Central Asian allies to provide similar 
kind of airspace access to US flights, participate in international search and rescue 
efforts, and increase its direct humanitarian aid and military assistance to the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
428
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 Considering its sensitivities on the presence of US troops in its 
neighborhood, Russia’s support to the United States and NATO presence in Central 
Asia showed that Russia followed a pragmatic approach under the circumstances.
429
 
On September 20, 2001, President Bush gave an ultimatum to Afghanistan to hand 
over the leaders of Al Qaeda. In this sense, the US decision to start a military 
operation on Afghanistan was clear.  The United States gave another ultimatum to 
the world with his “you are either with us or against us” speech. The costs of non-
cooperation would be high while the benefits of cooperation also appeared to be 
high.  
These benefits can be highlighted as the following; first, cooperation with the 
United States was in conformity with Russia’s interests, as good relations would 
allow Russia to pursue its development strategy in a non-confrontational 
international environment. Second, the United States would clean Afghanistan from 
the terrorists who had connection with Chechen forces, which would help Russia 
protect its territorial integrity.
430
 In addition, the US success in Afghanistan would 
provide Russia with a stable regional environment and strengthen its position in the 
region. Third, Russia’s alignment with the United States was expected to enhance its 
integration with the West in economic and political terms. Another benefit that 
Russia expected from its integration with the West was to enhance Moscow’s 
reputation as a responsible great power, which would provide Russia an elevation in 
its international status since the end of the Cold War.
431
 It was also expected that the 
betterment of relations with the United States was to bring a spillover impact on 
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contentious issues like NATO enlargement, the ABM Treaty, and Russia’s war on 
terror in Chechnya.  
Russia’s cooperative strategy was in conformity with its security interests and 
the principles that it advocated for the conduct of international relations. As many 
states in the world, Russia also perceived the US war on Afghanistan as a legitimate 
action in defense of its security against terrorism. As a state that long before argued 
for the necessity of international cooperation and a multilateral solution to the threat 
of international terrorism, it was clear that Russia would support a multilateral 
solution to international terrorism. In this sense, the US decision to reestablish its 
relations with major powers including Russia and China and to fight against the 
common threat of international terrorism created an image of the United States 
pursuing multilateral politics.
432
 The Russian and American Presidents declared that 
they were achieving a new strategic relationship and the era when the United States 
and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat had ended.
433
 They stated 
that both states were partners and they would cooperate to advance stability, security, 
and economic integration. They declared their determination to act collectively to 
counter global challenges and help bring about resolution of regional conflicts in 
cooperation.  
Cooperation against the terrorist threat in Afghanistan and US multilateralism 
during the process enhanced Russia’s interests and its self-image as a great power. 
Because the United States took Russia’s interests and concerns into account and the 
betterment of relations with the United States was considered as the start of a new era 
in bilateral relations, 
 Russia’s evaluation of the international situation was 
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influenced positively. Under the influence of good relations with the United States,  
Russia’s handling of issues such as  NATO enlargement and the ABM treaty, were 
which were previously defined as fundamental threats to Russia’s security, changed. 
 
 
5.6.2. NATO Enlargement after 9/11 
 
Russia’s cooperation with the US against terrorism also affected its 
relationship with NATO. On September 12, 2001, when NATO members invoked 
the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty against the threat of terrorism, NATO’s 
character as an international defense organization changed into a collective security 
organization.
434
 As NATO’s call for a unified approach against terrorism coincided 
with Russia’s political interests on the issue, Russia did not oppose NATO’s decision 
to activate Article 5. On the same day of NATO’s declaration, the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council declared that they were united in their anger and 
indignation at the barbaric attacks on the United States and underlined the need for 
comprehensive and coordinated action to respond to the common threat of 
terrorism.
435
 This rapprochement was followed by the creation of the NATO-Russia 
Council in 2002.
436
 The Council defined Russia’s status as an equal partner in 
security issues of common interest.  Although Russia was not given a right to veto as 
was the case in the Founding Act of 1997, the Council was declared as a mechanism 
for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action. It 
was declared that the Council would work on the principle of consensus and 
continuous political dialogue in security issues. 
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Russia evaluated the creation of the new NATO-Russia Council as a good 
example of the change in the security environment and argued that the Council 
underscored Russia’s importance in responding to contemporary threats.437 In this 
political atmosphere, Russia prioritized the fight against terrorism and downgraded 
its tone of criticism in two issues of contention against the United States. After the 
September 11 attacks, NATO’s enlargement gained more forceful US support 
because the solidarity that NATO members showed reminded the Bush 
administration and NATO members of the importance of having stable and strong 
partners who could contribute to common goals.
438
 Russia reacted to the strong 
momentum behind enlargement with a balanced strategy that showed its 
prioritization of its relations with the United States despite its opposition to 
enlargement.
439
 President Putin argued that NATO’s enlargement was a mistake 
given Russia posed no threat to the applicant states.
440
 Also, he emphasized that 
NATO enlargement would not be a “tragedy” but it would neither improve the 
security of the new members or the organization itself.
441
 President Putin stated that 
Russia might reconsider its opposition to enlargement if NATO became more of a 
political than military organization.
 442
 Furthermore, to everyone’s surprise, President 
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Putin declared that Russia might consider itself to be included in NATO as a second-
best option, after the first option of seeing NATO disappear.  
 
 
5.6.3. The ABM Treaty after 9/11 
 
Recognizing the fact that NATO enlargement was an irreversible process, 
Russia did not risk its political reputation as it did in Kosovo. Instead, it proceeded 
pragmatically by accommodating to the situation and prioritizing its relations with 
the United States over NATO enlargement. Russia followed the same strategy on US 
unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Foreign Minister Ivanov bluntly stated 
that evaluating possible consequences for Russia’s foreign policy and the situation in 
the world as a whole, Russia’s relations with the United States was of utmost 
significance.
443
 He pointed out that the risk of sliding into confrontation with the 
United States was avoided during the complex period of negotiations on the ABM 
Treaty. Ivanov emphasized that the protection of the constructive air of partnership 
enabled Russia to continue joint efforts in the fight against terrorism beyond 
Afghanistan. 
Russia’s adoption of a ‘realistic’ and pragmatic course in its relations with the 
United States and its alliance in the war on terror prepared ground for Russia’s 
negotiation with the United States and promoted its interests in the end. Despite the 
US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia and the United States drew up a 
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), which provided a prospect of 
reducing strategic offensive potentials by almost two-thirds.
444
 In addition, the 
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United States supported G-7 states contributing $20 billion over ten years to 
nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet republics.
445
  
 
 
5.7. Russia and the Iraq War 
 
In the ‘axis of evil’ speech, Bush had identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as 
regimes that posed a threat to US and global security.
446
 In late 2002, the Bush 
administration focused on Iraq as the most serious threat to its security and President 
Bush took the issue to the international platform in his address to the United Nations 
General Assembly. President Bush gave the message that the United States was 
prepared to act militarily against Iraq without the United Nations if the Iraqi leader 
Saddam Hussein would fail to honor previous commitments to disarm and allow 
inspectors inside Iraq.
447
  
Russian leadership regarded making such a “black list” of states as a remnant 
of Cold War thinking, which caused tension in international relations and was not 
helpful in bringing solutions to the problems.
448
 Iraq was a significant country for 
Russia both due to Iraq’s eight billion dollar debt to Russia and the seizure of Iraqi 
oil resources could harm Russia’s economic stability. Moreover, Russia was 
estimating that the war would be counterproductive, as the occupation would trigger 
severe reaction from the Islamic community. As a state with a large Muslim 
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population, the likelihood of a strong reaction from Muslims increased Russia’s 
concerns regarding the Iraq war. 
Moreover, Russia opposed a US declaration to act unilaterally and 
preemptively against Iraq based on international law. President Putin stated that the 
use of force in international relations was legal if taken by the international 
community within the UN framework and by a decision of the UN Security Council. 
Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov repeatedly declared Russia’s opposition to 
unilateral use of force against Iraq as such action would violate international law and 
undermine the authority of the UN Security Council.
449
 Instead of unilateralism, 
Russia underlined the need for international cooperation in Iraq and demanded UN 
inspectors to restart their work. It also suggested that the use of force should be 
considered as an option only if prohibited weapons were found during the 
inspections.
450
 
On November 8, 2002, the United States succeeded to pass UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 after severe diplomatic negotiations especially with France, 
Germany, China and Russia.
451
 In this resolution, the parties agreed that Iraq was in 
material breach of its disarmament obligations and decided to give Baghdad a final 
opportunity to meet these obligations through an enhanced inspections regime. The 
resolution called upon Iraq to provide a currently accurate, full, and complete 
declaration of all of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and 
missiles. It was also stated that in the event of Iraq’s further material breach the 
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Council would reconvene and assess the situation, which would bring serious 
consequences for Iraq.  
Despite its rigorous message to Iraq, a joint statement by China, France, and 
Russia made it clear that “serious consequences” did not mean that the UN Security 
Council authorized the use of force against Iraq.
452
 These states declared that 
Resolution 1441 excluded “any automaticity in the use of force” and clearly showed 
that the United States needed to pass a second resolution if it was to declare war on 
Iraq. In compliance with the resolutions, the inspections were made and the 
inspectors could not find evidence indicating that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction. However, the United States disregarded the reports stating that they were 
‘falsified’.453 
In search of a second resolution, in February 2003, US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell gave a presentation to the UN and argued that Saddam Hussein hid 
weapons of mass destruction, defied the terms of previous international agreements, 
and certainly had connection with Al Qaeda terrorists.
454
 Powell stated that due to its 
nexus with terrorists, Iraq became an imminent threat for US security in the post-
September 11 world. Based on the evidence he presented, Powell called upon the 
international community to act against the present threat so as to avoid confronting 
an even more frightening future. The United States made diplomatic efforts to 
convince the UN Security Council for a second resolution authorizing the use of 
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force against Iraq. On March 5, Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Russia 
declared that they would block any resolution authorizing the use of force.
455
  
Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov also repeated Russia’s position on the use of 
force against Iraq individually and declared that the report to the UN Security 
Council reflected substantial progress in Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 1441.456 
Based on the report, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that Russia opposed any 
new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq and favored a long term monitoring 
service to make sure that Iraq would not rebuild weapons of mass destruction even 
after the completion of international inspections. The Russian Foreign Ministry also 
stated that the consequences of a possible US military action against Iraq would be 
very negative and would endanger international stability resulting in the following 
consequences: an upsurge of radicalism, economic destabilization, and threatening 
the cohesion of the anti-terrorist coalition.
457
 
On 17 March 2003, President Bush addressed the nation and gave a 48-hour 
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq and the United States started 
military conflict upon their refusal to comply with the ultimatum.
458
 President Bush 
declared that as some permanent members of the Security Council publicly 
announced that they would veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. 
He evaluated these statements as an indication of that the UN Security Council could 
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not live up to its responsibilities. Therefore, the United States declared that it would 
use its ‘sovereign authority’ to use force for its national security. 
Russian President Putin expressed his regret for the ultimatum on the use of 
military force against Iraq.
459
 Breaking his silence for weeks on the Iraq subject after 
the ultimatum, President Putin said that any development would be a mistake, which 
would bring the toughest consequences, leading to victims and destabilization of the 
international situation as a whole.
460
 Russia emphasized that the US military 
operation was to be carried out in defiance of international public opinion, 
international principles and standards of international law and the UN Charter.
461
 
Moreover, Putin defined the war as “unjustifiable and unnecessary” because 
Iraq did not pose a threat to any state due to its military and economic weakness after 
decades of blockades.
462
 Russia regarded the US war on Iraq as a serious violation of 
international law and accused the United States of harming the authority of the UN 
Security Council. Putin warned that the war was an attempt to replace international 
law with the ‘the law of the fist.’463 Putin described international relations under “the 
fist-law” as one in which the powerful were always right, were entitled to do 
anything and were not restricted by anything in the choice of means to achieve its 
aims. The implications of this approach, as Putin stated, would bring about the 
violation of the basic principles of international law, the principle of inviolability of 
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state sovereignty and worse, not a single country in the world would feel itself secure 
again. For these reasons, Putin insisted that military operations should be stopped 
without any delay and the UN Security Council should be given the primary role for 
this purpose. 
To sum up, Russia opposed the US war on Iraq in principle and wanted to 
deal with the crisis within the framework of the UN Security Council. Moscow put a 
lot of diplomatic effort behind preventing the war but as it was the case in Kosovo, 
Russia’s efforts failed. However, this time Russia was together with other major 
powers including France, Germany and China. As Russia let the European partners 
of the United States lead the process as China had, it shared the burden of opposing 
the United States and divided the cost of opposition. Due to Russia’s choice for 
collective opposition, Russia-US relations did not suffer from severe damage in the 
wake of the war. The pursuit of collective opposition strategy showed that the Putin 
administration preserved its fundamental foreign policy principle and refrained from 
direct confrontation with the United States. 
 
 
5.8. The Impact of the Iraq War on US-Russia Relations 
 
Russia’s opposition to the Iraq war created a tension in bilateral relations and 
this tension was intensified by a series of events. To begin with, a week later after the 
start of the war, the United States accused Russia of providing Iraq with war 
equipment in violation of UN sanctions and claimed that US forces were facing 
weapons provided by Russia.
464
 According to US claims, in violation of UN 
sanctions, Russia supplied anti-tank missiles, devices for jamming satellite guidance 
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signals and night-vision goggles. Russian leadership denied US claims and stated 
that US claims were investigated and were determined to be baseless.
465
 The Russian 
administration underlined that Russia has strictly fulfilled its international obligations 
and had not supplied any equipment, including military, to Iraq in violation of the 
sanctions regimes.
466
 Though it did not convince the US side, Russian leadership 
argued that they did not rule out the possibility that Russian equipment might have 
been sent via persons interested in creating a political scandal because all of the 
former Soviet republics and the Middle Eastern customers possessed Russian 
equipment. 
In addition to US claims on equipment supply to Iraq, a few days later 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that he had given the order to Russian 
fighter planes to track an American U-2 plane flying near Russia’s southern 
borders.
467
 Georgian and US authorities stated that they coordinated the flights for 
gathering data for counterterrorism purposes. Russian officials replied that it was not 
possible to detect terrorists from U-2 planes but the true purpose was to gather 
information about strategically important locations and objectives within Russia. The 
Russian Foreign Ministry defined the U-2 incident as a “return to Cold War 
practices.” 
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On March 28, 2003, Putin stated that the Iraq war was surpassing the 
boundaries of a local conflict.
 468
 He defined the situation as “the most significant 
crisis since the end of the Cold War” because the war threatened global stability by 
undermining the foundations of international law.
 
Although Russia strongly criticized 
the U.S. for its use of force on Iraq, Russian leadership emphasized that its 
disagreement with the U.S. would not damage the ties between the two countries 
because the character of partnership with the U.S. gave Russia a basis to continue an 
open dialogue with the United States.
469
 Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov also 
underlined that despite the differences over Iraq, the U.S. and Russia remained 
partners, not adversaries.
470
 The Russian Foreign Minister added that Russia and the 
U.S. were partners in war against terrorism and Russia acted together with France 
and Germany in order to warn their partners against making a mistake. Russia’s 
decision to oppose but not to confront the U.S. on the Iraq war clearly showed that 
“America is more important than Iraq” for Russia, as Putin had said.471  
President Putin made a more conciliatory declaration on April 3, 2003 and 
stated that Russia consistently called for a peaceful settlement of the Iraqi problem; 
however, given the situation, for political and economic reasons, Russia was not 
interested in seeing a US defeat in Iraq.
472
 He added that Russia was interested in 
bringing the matter back to a UN platform for the benefit of the parties involved. On 
April 6, the Russian embassy convoy leaving Iraq was caught in the crossfire while 
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US forces attacked Iraqi troops.
473
 As a result of the attack, several Russian 
diplomats were injured. After the attack, Colin Powell contacted his counterpart and 
expressed his deepest regrets.
474
 The issue was discussed during the visit of US 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to Moscow “in a calm and non-
emotional manner” and both sides agreed to continue political dialogue despite 
differences over Iraq.
475
 
Repairing the bilateral relationship was also important for the Bush 
administration. It was widely quoted in spring 2003 that National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice said that she would follow "Punish France, ignore Germany and 
forgive Russia," as a strategy for dealing with European allies who did not back the 
United States over the Iraq War.
476
 As the military conflict in the Iraq war ended, the 
new issue appeared on the US agenda was the reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S. stated 
that the best way other states could contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction would be by 
forgiving Iraq’s debts.477 As Iraq had $100 billion in debt, $8 billion of which was 
owed to Russia for weapons purchased during the Iran-Iraq war, US demands for 
forgiving Iraq’s debts were not welcomed. When the question was posed to Russian 
President Putin, he replied by asking why Iraq should not pay back its loans while 
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Russia was still paying back old Soviet debts.
478
 However, Putin stated that he was 
willing to discuss the matter at the meeting of the Paris Club.
479
 
While Iraq’s debt was being discussed, President Bush announced that he 
wanted a new UN Security Council resolution to lift sanctions against Iraq as a move 
to facilitate the sale of Iraqi oil and finance reconstruction.
480
 The meaning of this 
new resolution would be the end of the Oil for Food regime in favor of open 
competition for oil contracts. As a beneficiary of the Oil for Food regime, Russia 
would be disadvantaged in the new competitive regime and lose its established 
advantages in Iraq. The US demand for a new Security Council Resolution provided 
Russia with political leverage over the discussions of Iraq’s debt and Russia’s 
participation in the reconstruction of Iraq.
481
 
Russia and the U.S. made progress in bilateral relations while negotiations 
proceeded on Iraq’s debt and reconstruction. Soon after the negotiations, the U.S. 
included three Chechen groups in the State Department’s list of terrorist 
organizations, which was welcomed by the Russian side.
482
 The US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell took steps to convince Russia about the new UN Security Council 
resolution and paid a visit to Moscow. After his visit, Powell stated that the U.S. 
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would consider suspending sanctions rather than lifting them and added that he was 
sure that the new Iraqi government would take into account its obligations to the 
Russian Federation.
483
 
Just a week later, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1483 with the 
votes of five permanent members.
484
 The resolution affirmed that the United States 
and the United Kingdom were occupying powers, which implied that the US and UK 
occupied Iraq without UN authorization.
485
 The resolution removed all trade 
sanctions with the exception of those related to weapons. The resolution expanded 
the Oil for Food regime for six more months and called for the UN and the 
occupying authority along with the Iraqi representatives to review and fulfill 
previously approved important contracts. Also, in line with the demands of Russia, 
France and Germany, the resolution acknowledged the role of the UN in the 
reconstruction of Iraq. The six-month delay and the decision to leave the debt issue 
to a further date meant Russia’s participation in Iraq’s reconstruction as opposed to 
the US decision that previously had been taken to bar Russia, Germany, and France 
from reconstruction of Iraq.
486
 In July 2003, the Paris Club rescheduled Iraq’s debts 
and in December 2003, Russia decided to forgive about two-thirds of Iraq’s $8 
billion debt, in exchange for the Iraqi Governing Council’s signal that Moscow could 
revive its oil contracts that had been in place under Saddam Hussein.
487
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On his visit to St. Petersburg, President Bush expressed his appreciation for 
Russia’s agreement for the new resolution and stated that this experience made 
bilateral relations stronger, not weaker.
488
 President Bush added that the United 
States and Russia would show the world that friends could disagree, move beyond 
disagreement and work in a very constructive way to maintain peace. President Bush 
also expressed US commitment regarding missile defense cooperation, abrogation of 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and assistance for WTO membership.
489
   
Speaking in the same tone, President Putin also stated that they were aware of 
questions on whether relations between the two states would withstand the test of 
time and they reiterated their resolve to continue their strategic partnership for the 
benefit of both nations and the entire world. He emphasized that the fundamentals 
between Russia and the United States turned out to be stronger than the forces and 
events that tested it. In addition to the decision for strengthening their bilateral 
cooperation in the economy, the Presidents agreed to continue their efforts to 
enhance international stability, fight against terrorism, and ensure better strategic 
stability. Although there was little success in realizing President Bush’s 
commitments, Russia’s objective of preserving relations with the United States was 
achieved and bilateral relations were restored. Support from the United States to 
Russia after the Beslan hostage crisis, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of 
hostages due to Russia’s use of gas, showed that US-Russia cooperation on the war 
on terror remained intact. 
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5.8.1. The Impact of the Iraq War on  
Russia’s Perception of International Relations 
 
After losing its superpower status, Russia had wanted a multipolar world 
against the establishment of a unipolar structure and strategy of unilateralism.
490
 
Russia presented itself as a leading country with the capacity to influence the 
formation of the new world order and declared its determination to take an active 
part in achieving a multipolar world that would reflect diversity of interests. Along 
these lines, Russia considered respect for mutual interests as the foundation of a 
stable world order. When the United States called for leaving past differences behind 
and reestablishing its relations with the major powers against the threat of terrorism, 
major powers including Russia got the impression that the United States would 
conduct the war on terror within a multilateralist approach.
491
 Therefore, in Russia’s 
view, cooperation of the United States with major powers on Afghanistan was the 
practice of US multilateralism in the unipolar world.  
The cost of non-cooperation, common interests, and the just cause of war and 
international support to the US war on Afghanistan have facilitated major powers’ 
cooperation with the United States and created a political atmosphere for US 
multilateralism. Like in China’s case, in Russia’s case too, the cause of the United 
States was justified, the risk of non-cooperation was high and common interests were 
abundant. The common threat of terrorism came from Afghanistan united both 
Russia and the United States, and triggered the foundation of better relations between 
                                                 
490
 "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)". 
491
 "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on 
Counterterrorism Cooperation," (May 24, 2002). 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/dfe9a9a6bb8e0d4443256bc300520
1fb?OpenDocument (accessed 02/01/2012). Stewart M. Powell, "War Warms Hopes for Bush-Putin 
Summit / Russia, US in Best Alliance since Wwii," Hearst News (November 11, 2001). 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-11-11/news/17625379_1_bushes-texas-russian-president-vladimir-
putin-personal-diplomacy (accessed 02/01/2012). 
188 
 
the two states. US multilateralism in the war on Afghanistan had contributed to 
Russia’s perception of international relations as more democratic and its self-image 
as a great power. 
However, Russia’s perception of multilateral international relations was 
harmed by the US decision to act unilaterally against Iraq without the UN Security 
Council authorization. In Russia’s view, since the end of the Cold War, the UN 
Security Council has the central role in the formation of a multilateral international 
order as it reflected the distribution of power in the emerging multipolar world.
492
 
Russia believed that international security matters should be managed by the 
collective leadership of the permanent members of the Security Council with their 
veto rights. The Security Council was founded to provide joint solutions for complex 
security issues and prevent problems between major powers due to clashes of 
interests through their veto power. The fact that the United States acted against three 
of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, China, and Russia) 
and Germany, and bypassed the Security Council to avoid being vetoed was 
perceived as a major violation.  
US disregard for other major powers’ interest brought the call for 
multipolarity and democratization of international relations back to Russian 
leadership’s political discourse. On May 2003, together with his Chinese counterpart 
Hu Jintao, Putin advocated establishing a multipolar, just, and democratic 
international order based on accepted international norms and called for solving the 
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Iraq crisis within the framework of the UN.
493
 Both states delivered a ‘Joint 
Statement on the International Order of the 21
st
 Century’ in 2005 and argued that 
despite the presence of unilateralism and power politics, a multipolar world was 
irreversible.
494
 In this joint statement, both powers underlined the importance of the 
multilateral approach to counterterrorism and warned against double standards and 
the use of counterterrorism as a pretext for other purposes. 
Russia’s perception that the United States was using counterterrorism as a 
pretext for the seizure of Iraq’s oil reserves and the US criticisms on Russia’s 
counterterrorism strategy on different grounds caused Moscow to reevaluate the US 
war on terror. Russia took political steps to remind the U.S. that its interests in the 
near abroad, which it defined as its natural sphere of influence, should not be 
understated. Russia had supported the US military presence on the condition and 
with expectation that US military bases would be shut down as soon as the war in 
Afghanistan was won.
495
 As the US presence took longer, Russia, acting together 
with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, called for the closure 
of US military bases in Central Asia in 2005.
496
 Russia’s support to the SCO 
declaration that demanded the US-led anti-terrorist coalition to set a deadline for the 
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temporary use of military bases in the region was a diplomatic move showing 
Russia’s uneasiness about the presence of the United States in its region.497 Russia’s 
agreement with Kyrgyzstan to double the number of its troops at the airbase at Kant 
was also a move to indicate its presence and influence in the region as a great power. 
In 2007, Putin delivered a speech at an international conference on 
international security in Munich where he strongly criticized the existing structure of 
the international system.
498
 The President opposed the definition of the current 
international system as unipolar because the world was not under the authority of one 
sovereign or master. Unipolarity, he stated, was neither acceptable nor possible in 
today’s world because the military, economic, and political resources of one power 
would not suffice. After opposing the definition of the world as unipolar, Putin 
characterized the international system as unilateral and containing illegitimate 
actions that have not brought any solutions but instead created tragedies. 
Furthermore, alluding to the US use of force in Iraq, Putin pointed out the “hyper” 
use of military force in international relations plunged the world into an abyss of 
permanent conflicts.  
Moreover, Putin stated that the U.S. has overstepped its national boundaries 
everywhere and has been imposing its economic, political, cultural policies on other 
nations. He criticized the U.S. for disregarding the basic principles of international 
law and he argued that it became impossible to find a political solution to problems 
because they were solved according to US political expediency, based on the current 
political climate. Criticizing US dominance, Russia emphasized that no one felt safe 
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under the current state of global security because no one could depend upon the 
protection of international law anymore. He further argued that US dominance 
inevitably encouraged a number of states to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  
After making remarkably powerful statements, Putin called for thinking about the 
structure of global security in the decisive moment that states reached. On the new 
structure of international relations, underlining the increasing economic power of 
Russia, Brazil, India and China, the BRIC countries, Putin emphasized that the 
economic potential of the new power centers would inevitably convert their 
economic power into political influence and would strengthen multipolarity.  
The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation also reflected 
Putin’s criticisms on the state of international relations.499 According to the 
document, unilateral strategy led to destabilization of the international situation, 
created tensions through an arms race, intensified interstate differences, triggered 
ethnic and religious strife, and endangered the security of other states by fueling 
tensions in inter-civilizational relations. The document repeated the former 
documents’ emphasis on the role of the UN as a mechanism of multilateralism and 
the development of a new international structure. Russia underlined the adequacy of 
Article 51 and stated that it was not subject to revision for the use of force in self-
defense in the face of existing threats to peace and security such as international 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The document 
explicitly stated that Russia was interested in US actions to be based on the 
principles and norms of international law as written in the UN Charter. 
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Although the document underlined Russia’s substantial role in the 
development of a new architecture of international relations and argued that the 
differences between Russia’s domestic and external means for ensuring its national 
interest and security were gradually disappearing, the document did not mention 
Russia’s aim to advance the establishment of a multipolar world as it did in previous 
documents. Multipolarity was referred to only once in the document and it has been 
defined as an emerging development in international relations that should not be 
addressed exclusively within the framework of Russia-US relations.  
The absence of an official call for multipolarity and democratic international 
relations in the document can be considered as a result of Russia’s non-
confrontational strategy with the United States. Implying its relations with the United 
States, the document also openly stated that Russia would not get involved in a costly 
confrontation that would be destructive for its economy and internal development. 
Russia underlined the vast opportunities of having stable bilateral relations with the 
United States and pointed out the importance of its bilateral relations for global 
stability and for its security.  Despite differences, Russia’s call for the development 
of a joint culture for resolving differences through pragmatism and respect for 
mutual interests and its intention to transform Russian-US relations into strategic 
partnership showed its intentions to smooth its relations with the United States. The 
pursuit of a non-confrontational strategy and Russian pragmatism in international 
affairs have been an implication of Russian foreign policy that served as a major 
asset for its steady national development and its status in global affairs. 
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5.9. Conclusion 
 
Having ceased to be one of the superpowers, Russia suffered a sudden status 
decline by the end of the Cold War. While undergoing economic and political 
transformation, Russia needed to reposition its status in the new international 
structure, which required redefinition of its grand strategy and formulation of the 
basic principles of its foreign policy. In the new era, the protection of its territorial 
integrity, assuring its internal development, especially economic recovery and revival 
of its great power status in the international arena became the foundation of its grand 
strategy. As these three factors were interdependent, their realization was also 
dependent on the state of international relations. In other words, Russia’s success in 
protecting its territorial integrity, its economic recovery, and its revival as a great 
power depended on not only Russia’s domestic performance but also international 
factors that mainly defined how the United States exerted its predominant power in 
international relations and on its relations with Russia. Having recognized this fact, 
Russia developed the foreign policy principle of avoiding direct confrontation with 
the United States on international matters. Despite Russia’s engagement in 
international crises like the Kosovo operation and NATO enlargement, it preferred to 
express its opposition through diplomatic means rather than using Cold War-like 
military language. The decline of status from being one of the superpowers to a 
‘normal’ power in international relations had a remarkable effect on Russia’s foreign 
policy strategy. In a unipolar world, Russia’s foreign policy was designed to preserve 
peaceful international relations for its internal development. To achieve this goal, 
Russia pursued a pragmatic foreign policy, and established good relations with the 
U.S. In this context, Russia’s foreign policy has been one of the major instruments 
for its national development and of increasing its status in the system. 
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The US war on terror provided Russia with a great opportunity to develop 
better relations with the United States. The US approach to the threat of terrorism as 
a matter of international cooperation, its search for support from the other major 
powers in the system, and the tragedy of the September 11 attack, and the connection 
of Russia’s own terrorism with Afghanistan eased Russia-US cooperation in the 
earlier stages of the US war on terror. International cooperation against the threat of 
terrorism became a matter of mutual interest between Russia and the United States.  
Also, this cooperation was triggered by the calculation that Russia would be worse 
off if it was excluded from the US global campaign against terrorism which was 
going to take place in Russia’s neighborhood. By taking an active part in the US war 
on terror, Russia had an opportunity to act together with the US-led coalition and 
escaped international isolation, as was the case in former international problems. 
The war on Afghanistan and the US-led global campaign on the terrorist 
threat were in conformity with Russia’s conditions for cooperation. It was developed 
on the basis of equality, mutual respect for interests and mutual benefit. These 
conditions of international cooperation were the definition of multilateralism, which 
Russia regarded as the foundation of a multipolar world. Since the end of the bipolar 
world, Russia declared its intention to make an active effort for the development of a 
multipolar system reflecting the diversity of interests in international relations. The 
period with the US war on terror and the United States’ ostensible multilateralism 
strengthened Russia’s perception of itself as a great power even if the structure was 
not going towards multipolarity.  
Russia regarded the UN and its Security Council as the most crucial 
mechanism where a diversity of interests were represented. For this reason, like 
China, it supported the UN as the backbone of international relations as it fit the 
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requirements of the emerging multipolar system at best. Therefore, Russia evaluated 
bypassing the UN and its Security Council not only as a threat to the current world 
order but also to its status as a great power and to the emerging multipolar system. A 
decade after the Kosovo war, the US unilateral and preemptive war on Iraq revived 
Russia’s criticism of US predominance. Russia saw the war on Iraq as part of a 
deliberate US effort to weaken the UN, to lower the role of sovereign states as a 
fundamental element of international relations and to divide states with different 
rights and responsibilities so that it could preserve its dominant position in world 
affairs.  
By the end of the Iraq War, despite its strong opposition together with other 
major powers, Russia found a way to settle its relations with the United States as it 
did after the Kosovo War. In this sense, the Iraq War did not change the main 
principle of Russia’s foreign policy on preserving the peacefulness of its 
international relations. However, the war changed Russia’s expectation that US 
multilateralism would remain a part of international relations and multilateralism 
would enhance the emergence of the multipolar world. Contrary to Russia’s 
expectations, the turn of US politics from multilateralism to unilateralism after the 
Iraq war taught Russia the lesson that multilateralism in a unipolar world would 
always be at the discretion of the United States and long-lasting multilateralism 
could be guaranteed only in a multipolar system. Therefore, Russia’s call for 
multipolarity increased as its desire to be one of the poles. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
BALANCING IN A UNIPOLAR STRUCTURE: 
THE REALIST LITERATURE 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
 
Before employing a constructivist analysis to the prospects of balancing 
under unipolarity, this Chapter aims to analyze how arguments on balancing in a 
unipolar structure have evolved in the Realist literature. Since the end of the Cold 
War, Realist scholars have debated balancing against the U.S. The literature on 
balancing against the United States has predicated on either balance of power or 
balance of threat theory. For this reason, the Chapter begins with a brief overview of 
both theories’ major assumptions. Second, it focuses on prominent Realist scholars’ 
works who have written on balancing and unipolarity to show how they treat both 
concepts since the advent of the unipolar era. Looking at the flow of the arguments in 
the studies under review, it categorizes the evolution of the debate on balancing 
under unipolarity into four stages as follows: (i) the denial of unipolarity with the 
predictions of multipolarity; (ii) the acceptance of unipolarity as a temporary 
condition and questioning its stability and durability; (iii) the ‘great puzzle’ and soft 
balancing as a middle ground approach between balance of power and balance of 
threat; and (iv) the recognition of unipolarity as a distinct structural configuration. 
The chapter draws several conclusions from this analysis. First, it concludes that in 
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twenty-two years, scholars have eventually recognized unipolarity as a distinct 
distribution of power that might create different outcomes than what might be 
expected under bipolarity and multipolarity. Second, despite recognizing its 
distinctiveness, similar to the previous scholarship on polarity, these analyses 
focused on the material structure of international politics and discussed durability 
and stability of unipolarity in relation to material conditions. Third, the absence of 
hard balancing under unipolarity has pushed scholars to lean towards soft balancing 
and balance of threat arguments by incorporating ‘social’ variables rather than 
balance of power arguments with the ‘material’ factors.  
 
 
6.2. An Overview on the Foundations of Balancing:  
Balance of Power and Balance of Threat Theories 
 
 
6.2.1. Balance of Power Theory 
 
Balance of power theory has been the bedrock of Realist theory.
500
 According 
to Waltz, “if there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, 
balance of power theory is it”.501 The theory is predicated on the notion that states 
are unitary actors and seek to survive in the anarchic international system. States 
seek power, in whose absence they can lose their security and risk their survival. 
Hence, the anarchic structure of the international system compels states to maximize 
their power and the competition for power is an intrinsic part of international 
relations under anarchy. States strive to increase their relative gains. Under these 
systemic constraints, a state that attains hegemony will gain security for itself but 
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will threaten the security of others. Therefore, the theory predicts that if/when a state 
or a coalition of states becomes dominant in the system, others will pursue balancing 
strategies. In a competitive system, faced with the risk of domination and 
elimination, weaker states can use external resources and combine their forces with 
others’ to form balancing coalitions. These states can also rely on their internal 
resources by strengthening their economic, military and political power resources. 
Using external or internal, or both, balancing strategies, states endeavor to establish 
balance of power and countervail the hegemonic state or coalition in the system. 
Thus, it is predicted by Realist scholars that states will engage in balancing behavior. 
States will have a strong tendency to establish balance of power, and if disturbed, 
they will restore it. As Waltz says, “balances of power recurrently form.”502 Briefly, 
the Realist theory predicts that balancing of hegemonic power is inevitable, as the 
lesser states will always be insecure by the accumulation of power in one hand under 
anarchy. 
 
 
6.2.2. Balance of Threat Theory 
 
Stephen Walt challenges the main assumption of balance of power theory, 
which proposes that states form alliances to balance in order to avoid domination by 
stronger powers.
503
  Opposing the definition of balancing behavior solely in terms of 
power, Walt suggests that it is more accurate to say that balancing behavior is formed 
as a response to threatening power. Although Walt accepts the distribution of power 
as an extremely important factor in defining threat, he also includes a variety of 
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factors such as geographic proximity, offensive power and perceived intentions.
504
 
For Walt, “states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance 
against them.”505 According to Walt, even states with modest capability can be the 
object of balancing if they are perceived as aggressive. Walt underscores that 
perceptions of intent play a very crucial role in the formation of balancing behavior. 
The more a state is perceived as expansionist or aggressive, the more likely others 
will balance it. Hence, “intentions, not power, are crucial.”506 The implication of 
balance of threat theory is that whether or not states will balance against a dominant 
state depends on the behavior of the strong state. If a dominant state demonstrates 
restraint and benevolence in its behavior, it is not perceived as aggressive or 
expansionist.
507 
Thereby, a dominant state can prevent the formation of balancing 
following a prudent foreign policy. In other words, balancing is not inevitable under 
anarchy on the condition that weaker actors perceive the power of hegemonic power 
as benign. In the following section, the Chapter will indicate how the debate on 
balancing under unipolarity in the Realist has evolved from balance of power theory 
to balance of threat theory.  
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6.3. The Evolution of Balancing Debate in Realist Literature  
in the “Unipolar Age”  
 
 
6.3.1. The First Stage:  
Dominance of Balance of Power Thinking and  
Denial of Unipolarity with Predictions of Multipolarity 
 
The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union brought a major question about 
the future structure of the international system. As balancing has been a major 
subject for balance of power theory, it responded to the radical change in 
international relations. One of the most influential attempts in this regard was John 
Mearsheimer’s article entitled “Back to the Future.” In his 1990 article, John 
Mearsheimer argued that the bipolar structure would be replaced by a multipolar 
structure. He predicted that the prospects for major crisis, even war in Europe, were 
becoming increasingly likely.
508
 According to his predictions, Europe without 
superpowers would be more prone to violence and it would be “back to the future” in 
the next decades. Mearsheimer argued that the departure of superpowers from 
Europe would transform Europe from a bipolar to multipolar system in which 
Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and despite its decline the Soviet Union, would play 
a major role. This multi-power system, as he reasoned, would suffer from the 
problems common to all multipolar systems and would be prone to instability. This 
was because, in multipolar systems, the high number of actors increase the 
possibilities of conflict due to miscalculations of relative power and made deterrence 
more difficult.
509
  
In his discussion of the future of the international structure and prospects of 
peace and war, Mearsheimer discussed the virtues of bipolarity over multipolarity 
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because these were “two principal arrangements of power possible among states.”510 
Although Mearsheimer mentioned hegemony in a footnote as the third possible 
distribution, he did not see hegemony as relevant in discussions of the post-Cold War 
international system.
511
 He stated that hegemonic systems were defined by the 
presence of only one major power. Under hegemony, he argued the less powerful 
states could not challenge the major power and would act in accordance with its 
dictates. Therefore, he suggested every state in the system would strive for 
hegemony because no challenger could pose a serious threat to a hegemon. In other 
words, a hegemon was rewarded by abundant security. Although it was desirable for 
states to be a hegemon, Mearsheimer noted that hegemony was rarely achieved in the 
system because power was usually evenly distributed among the states that had 
strong incentives to balance an aspiring hegemon. He considered hegemony a part of 
the European state system and argued that as it has never characterized the European 
state system since the seventeenth century, “there is no prospect of hegemony in the 
foreseeable future”.512 He concluded that hegemony was not relevant to assessing the 
prospects for peace in Europe. Therefore, he excluded the United States’ primacy 
from the discussions of hegemony.
513
 
Kenneth Waltz wrote an article on “The Emerging Structure of International 
Politics” in 1993.514 In this article, Waltz argued that international order operated 
within the same fundamental power patterns and defined the decline of the Soviet 
Union as a part of “the drama of the modern history”, which consisted of the rise and 
fall of great powers for more than three hundred years.
515
 In his evaluation of the 
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effect of Russia’s decline on the structure of international politics, he stated that 
bipolarity endured, but in an altered state. Bipolarity continued because militarily 
Russia could take care of itself and no other great powers have yet emerged.
516
 
Furthermore, although Waltz stated that bipolarity endured, he noted that some of the 
implications of bipolarity, such as balancing, have changed because in the absence of 
Soviet power, the United States has remained unchecked by any other country or 
coalition of countries.
517
  
Based on the overwhelming power position of the United States, he reiterated 
that balance of power was a recurring, not a particular or ephemeral condition, and 
predicted that other states would act, alone or in concert, would bring American 
power into balance. The most powerful candidates for balancing were Japan and 
Germany, both of which were eventually expected to stop being a “structural 
anomaly”.518 According to Waltz, Germany and Japan would grow accustomed to 
their great power roles because they had to coexist and interact with other great 
powers. In this regard, China would push Japan and Russia would make Germany be 
‘normal’ great powers. Similar to Mearsheimer, Waltz also predicted a multipolar 
system because “even if the powerful state’s intentions are wholly benign, less 
powerful states will, from their different historical experiences, geographic locations, 
and economic interests, interpret events differently and often prefer different 
policies.”519 Therefore, based on the expectations of balance of power theory with 
respect to hegemony, Waltz concluded that the US preponderant power would lead to 
balance. Waltz further stated that balancing against the U.S. was in fact already 
taking place. Overall, it was a common expectation that US dominance would not 
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last long because other states would eventually counterbalance against the United 
States.  
 
 
6.3.2. The Second Stage:  
Accepting Unipolarity as a Temporary Condition and  
Discussions on its Stability and Durability  
 
In contrast to Waltz and Mearsheimer who refrained from classifying the 
international system as unipolar, Christopher Layne stated that with the demise of the 
Soviet Union, the international system was transformed from bipolarity to 
unipolarity.
520
 In his 1993 article entitled “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great 
Powers Will Rise,” Layne defined a unipolar system as “one in which a single power 
is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to 
preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it.”521 The 
article criticized US post-Cold War strategy based on perpetuating unipolarity and 
warned policymakers that the “unipolar moment” was an “illusion.”522 Based on 
neorealist theory, Layne argued that “the ‘unipolar moment’ was just a geopolitical 
interlude that will give way to multipolarity between 2000-2010.”523 Building on the 
Realist premise that states balance against hegemons, he predicted that even if the 
United States sought to perpetuate its preeminence by benevolence rather than 
coercion, it would be balanced. 
Like other Realist scholars, Layne argued that systemic pressure would impel 
eligible states, such as Japan, to become great powers and balance against the U.S. 
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He argued that unipolar systems contained seeds of their own destruction because 
hegemons’ preponderant power created conditions for the emergence of new great 
powers whose entry into the system would erode the most powerful states’ 
preeminence and relative power. Unbalanced distribution of capabilities in a unipolar 
system was a systemic condition that would impel states to balance the U.S. As the 
security dilemma was dominant in a unipolar system, what worried others would be 
the hegemon’s power, not its intentions.524 Security would be scarce for other states 
under unipolarity. Others would not share U.S. self-perception as a benign hegemon. 
This difference of perception on US hegemony would trigger balancing.
525
 Hence, he 
asserted that balancing could not be prevented by the ‘benign’ power as balance of 
threat theory foresaw. Arguing that unipolarity would not be durable, he called for a 
new grand strategy that was founded on managing the transition period from 
unipolarity to multipolarity and advancing American interests in the multipolar world 
as an offshore balancer.
526
  
Similarly, in a 1997 article, Kenneth Waltz has stated that even though it did 
not appear so quickly “multipolarity is developing before our eyes: to all but the 
myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in 
accordance with the balancing imperative.”527 He underscored that according to 
structural theory, unipolarity was the least stable of international configurations 
because neither the dominant power could behave with moderation, restraint, and 
forbearance nor could the other countries agree with the dominant power who thinks 
of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world.
528
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Hence, Waltz argued that the preponderant power of the United States would be 
balanced because it would always be a potential danger to others. The powerful state, 
he argued, would sometimes act in ways that “appear” arbitrary and high handed to 
others who would be uncomfortable due to the unfair treatment that they “believed” 
they were receiving.
529
 As implied in this statement, Waltz also implicitly assumed 
that perceptions regarding the intentions of the dominant state would play a 
significant role in triggering other states’ intention to balance against the United 
States. Hence, Waltz concluded that the unipolar system would not be durable. 
Later in 2000, in his seminal article entitled “Structural Realism after the 
Cold War,” Waltz contributed to the discussion on unipolarity and balancing and 
repeated that balancing would take place “not today but tomorrow.”530 He repeated 
key propositions of Realist theory: international relations reflected the distribution of 
capabilities; balance of power recurred; and disrupted balance would be restored. 
Remembering the key propositions of balance of power theory, he reiterated that 
balancing was inevitable in the system. In the article, Waltz accepted that “upon the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the international political system became unipolar”.531 
Yet, he argued that “in the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least 
durable of international configurations.”532 According to Waltz, there were two basic 
reasons. One was the dominant power would weaken in the long run because it took 
on too many overseas tasks. Second, the preponderant power of the dominant state 
would worry weaker states about their future even though the dominant state 
behaved with moderation and restraint. Hence, states would follow internal balancing 
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or external balancing strategies, or both, “to bring international distribution of power 
into balance”.533 
In the article, Waltz elaborated on potential candidates for becoming great 
powers that would restore balance of power. According to Waltz, the European 
Union or Germany-led coalition, China, Japan and Russia were the most powerful 
candidates. The prospect of the EU to emerge as a balancer depended on achieving 
unity on foreign and military policy, which “has less hope of doing so now.”534 On 
Japan and Germany, Waltz expected them to respond to structural imperatives rather 
than resisting them. He argued that “the all-but-inevitable movement from 
unipolarity to multipolarity is taking place not in Europe but in Asia.”535 He 
considered China a major candidate for balancing due to its steady rising power on 
the condition that it remained politically united and competent. He argued China’s 
military and economic capability would cause Japan to be a ‘normal’ great power 
rather than a “structural anomaly.”536  
Moreover, while on the one hand he argued inevitability for balancing in the 
unipolar system, on other hand he said “balancing, of course, is not universal and 
omnipresent” because a dominant power could suppress balancing or governments 
might or might not decide to balance.
537
 In the final parts of the article, he 
emphasized conditions that could trigger and facilitate balancing against the United 
States. According to Waltz, the United States failed to learn from history and it has 
repeated past mistakes by extending its influence over what used to be entrusted to 
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the defeated powers.
538
 He argued that although China and Russia have many areas 
of conflict, the United States’ policies would push them together, which might 
trigger a balancing coalition. He stated alienating Russia by expanding NATO and 
alienating China by telling its leaders how to rule their country were policies that 
“only an overwhelmingly powerful country could afford, and only a foolish one be 
tempted, to follow. The United States cannot prevent a new balance of power from 
forming. It can hasten its coming as it has been earnestly doing.”539 It should be 
noted that agreeing that US practices could trigger or facilitate the fastening of 
balancing Waltz also used threat perception as an auxiliary variable to predict 
balancing against the United States. Also, correcting his earlier estimations about 
multipolarity, he said that “though it may be emerging slowly in our perspective, in 
historical perspectives, it will come in the blink of an eye.”540 Finally, both Layne 
and Waltz claimed that the United States would be balanced due to the balance of 
power dynamics in international relations regardless of its practices or perceptions of 
others. 
Nevertheless, scholars with balance of threat leanings argued that unipolarity 
was a durable configuration of power if the United States did not threaten other 
states’ security. To begin with, Michael Mastanduno’s article entitled “Preserving the 
Unipolar Moment” discussed US grand strategy after the Cold War in the light of 
balance of power and balance of threat theories.
541
 In the article, Mastanduno 
focused on the implications of a unipolar structure on the behavior of the state 
situated at the top of the international hierarchy rather than focusing on great powers’ 
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behaviors against the dominant state in the unipolar system.
542
 He maintained that the 
United States’ behavior was not consistent with expectations of balance of power 
theory, according to which the best strategy for the United States was to accept 
inevitability of multipolarity and to be an offshore balancer.
543
 Instead of preparing 
for multipolarity by disentangling itself from its Cold War commitments, 
Mastanduno argued that the United States acted against the expectations of balance 
of power theory. The United States’ engagement in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the 
Middle East, the United States’ efforts to integrate China and Russia into the present 
order and its enduring relations with Japan and Germany were contrary to the 
expectations of the balance of power theory. 
In his analysis of post-Cold War US foreign policy, in line with balance of 
threat theory, Mastanduno suggested that the U.S. should rely on multilateralism in 
international affairs in order to maintain its predominant position and prevent 
balancing. Mastanduno argued that because the policy of multilateralism would 
convince other states that their preferences also mattered and would reassure them 
that the U.S. would not coerce or dictate its wishes on the others, other states would 
not tend to balance against the U.S.
544
 However, the intention of potential challengers 
would be dependent on whether the U.S. would follow policies of accommodation 
and reassurance.
545
 In other words, the behavior of the U.S. would be defined by the 
intentions of potential challengers, who might be either status quo or revisionist 
powers. According to these assumptions, the U.S. might follow policies of 
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accommodation and reassurance towards status quo powers while a policy of 
coercion, even military action, against revisionist states that were committed to upset 
the existing international order.
546
 He also mentioned undecided states towards which 
the United States was expected to pursue a policy of engagement and integration.
547
 
In his evaluation of the status of potential challengers, Mastanduno stated that 
in the current international system, the U.S. was not challenged by any state or 
coalition of states with the intention to balance the United States and destabilize the 
current order.
548
 Instead, he put forward that there were two groups of potential 
challengers. In one group, there was Japan and Germany, who were satisfied with the 
international situation and followed a pro status quo foreign policy behavior. In the 
other group, there was Russia and China who “sit on the fence, with foreign policy 
intentions and aspirations more uncertain.”549 Based on the categorization and 
expectations, he concluded that Japan and Germany would continue to support the 
current order. On Russia, he stated that although Moscow has pursued coercive and 
interventionist policies, especially in the near abroad and wanted to influence the 
Balkans and the Persian Gulf, this must be considered a search for “prestige and an 
effort to restore its great power status as a regional power.” Hence, Russia’s behavior 
should not be considered a balancing strategy. Similarly, China’s rapid growth, 
international discontent and history of humiliation made it a likely candidate for 
being a revisionist state. Mastanduno characterized China as a state with “the 
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potential for a destabilizing combination of capabilities and intentions.”550 Yet, he 
has argued that China’s “revisionist challenge is not inevitable” because it wanted to 
be a responsible great power and has not tried to organize a balancing coalition 
against the United States.   
Based on the analysis, Mastanduno argued that since the post-Cold War era, 
US security strategy has confirmed the predictions of balance of threat theory. The 
United States has reassured Japan and Germany with security arrangements and 
convinced them to remain status quo powers without their own military capabilities. 
Towards “undecided powers,” he argued the United States reacted cautiously and 
encouraged Russia and China to be part of the existing international order. He 
emphasized that the United States did not take advantage of Russia’s lost prestige, its 
economic and political instability, and its internal security problems. Mastanduno 
stated that the United States’ policy towards Chechnya, Russia’s acceptance to attend 
G7 summits, and its support to Russia’s access to IMF loans were proof of the US 
strategy to steer Russia away from being a revisionist power. The only issue that was 
not wholly compatible with the strategy as Mastanduno stated was the expansion of 
NATO, which could have been made “Russia-friendly” with better political 
formulas.
551
 
As Mastanduno argued, the US strategy towards China was compatible with 
the balance of threat theory since the U.S. stressed an engagement and integration 
rather than containment under the Clinton administration. He quoted Clinton 
administration’s Assistant Defense Secretary Nye who has said “it is wrong to 
portray China as an enemy. Nor is there reason to believe China must be an enemy in 
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the future…. A containment strategy would be difficult to reverse. Enmity would 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy”.552 Hence, the U.S. has focused on strategies that 
would facilitate China’s integration into the system and turn it into a status quo 
power. Mastanduno emphasized that the key element of the US approach has been 
closer defense and security cooperation with China. The granting of most-favored-
nation status despite China’s bad human rights record, China’s participation in the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and its participation in high-level international 
dialogues were considered proof of the US engagement strategy. 
As opposed to Layne, Mastanduno suggested that the U.S. should pursue 
engagement strategy rather than being an offshore balancer while expecting 
multipolarity. He concluded that “whether or not the transition to a new international 
order will be prolonged will depend on, at least in part, on the skill and 
resourcefulness of US foreign policy officials.”553 The United States must constrain 
itself although it was not constrained by other great powers in order to escape from 
the temptations of power. In order to prolong the “unipolar moment,” it should not 
pursue unilateral strategy, dictate its policies, preach its virtues or impose its 
values.
554
 Mastanduno highlighted multilateralism as a key element for the United 
States while exercising its power with legitimacy. He stated that multilateral decision 
making processes were “key instruments of statecraft-indeed, of realpolitik-for a 
dominant state that is seeking, in a unipolar setting, to convince other states to 
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cooperate with it rather than to balance against it.”555 Therefore, Mastanduno 
conditioned balancing on perceptions of others about the US and US practices and 
interactions with others. 
In 1999, Wohlforth also challenged what he has called “the emerging 
conventional wisdom” that ‘unipolarity is an ‘illusion,’ a ‘moment,’ that ‘will not last 
long,’ or is already ‘giving way to multipolarity.’556 In his discussion on “stability of 
a unipolar world,” he advanced three propositions undermining “the conventional 
wisdom” that defined unipolarity as unstable and conflict-prone distribution of 
power. Accordingly, the system was certainly unipolar. This was because the United 
States enjoyed a large margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or 
even, all other great powers combined. In addition, the leading position of the United 
States relied on the decisive preponderance of power in all the underlying 
components of power including economic, military, technological and 
geopolitical.
557
 
Second, he argued that the current unipolar system was peaceful because the 
raw power advantage of the United States removed two significant sources of 
conflict seen in the previous systems: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the 
international system and uncertainty in balance of power politics among the major 
states. The fact that no other state could prevail over the United States in a war and 
could risk being the prime enemy of the United States increased the probability of a 
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peaceful system. Also, he underlined that according to balance of power theory 
“smaller is better,”558 hence, he concluded “one pole is the best” because unipolarity 
minimized uncertainty.
559
 According to Wohlforth, unipolarity “is the least war 
prone of all structures.”560 Third, he put forward that the current state of unipolarity 
was also durable. He stated “it is already a decade old, if Washington plays its cards 
right, it may last as long as bipolarity.”561 Also, Wohlforth underlined that the United 
States was an offshore power separated by two oceans from other major powers, 
which helped Washington to retain its superiority over the others. According to 
Wohlforth, neither of the candidate balancers that were Japan, China, Germany and 
Russia had the same geographical advantage as the U.S. had. Therefore, the United 
States’ position as the unipole was strengthened due to its geography. He suggested 
that these continental powers had to counterbalance each other before they created a 
balance against the United States.  
Wohlforth highlighted that the distribution of capabilities was unprecedented 
and “we are living the modern world’s first unipolar system,” hence, unipolarity was 
not a “moment” but “a deeply embedded material condition” with a “potential to last 
for many decades.”562 He criticized scholars who hastened to declare the demise of 
unipolarity by conflating the power trends with existing relationships.
563
 Hence, as he 
put it, this conflation led scholars to suggest policymakers to get prepared for 
multipolarity. Instead, he argues, scholars should focus on understanding unipolarity 
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“right” and “should do more to advertise the attractions of unipolarity”564 because it 
was prone to peace and “it will last several more decades at least.”565 On balancing, 
different from other scholars, Wohlforth put forward that united Europe, rising Japan 
or China may not be the chief engines of the end of unipolarity as it was not the rise 
of a great power that ended bipolarity.
566
 As Wohlforth put it “the current 
concentration of power in the United States is unprecedentedly clear and 
comprehensive, states are likely to share the expectation that counterbalancing will 
be a costly and doomed venture.”567 Therefore, Wohlforth concluded that unipolarity 
should be promoted as a stable and durable structure because it promised stability if 
it endured.  
 
 
6.3.3. The Third Stage: The ‘Great Puzzle’ and Soft Balancing 
as a Middle Ground between Balance of Power and 
Balance of Threat Arguments 
 
Despite predictions and expectations since the end of the Cold War, there was 
little or no empirical evidence of balancing against the United States. The absence of 
balancing became a ‘great puzzle’ to be explained by Realists who were ‘waiting for 
balancing’ and have been asking “why the world is not pushing back.”568 Soft 
balancing arguments emerged as a response to the perplexing situation regarding the 
absence of balancing against the United States because both balance of power theory 
and balance of threat theory failed to explain why great powers did not pursue 
balancing strategy against the United States. It was obvious that the United States 
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was still the most powerful state in terms of capabilities and its unilateral preemptive 
military actions against states seeking weapons of mass destruction and supporting 
terrorism was not welcomed by other powers.
569
 Therefore, combining balance of 
power and balance of threat theories’ assumptions, soft balancing, scholars 
reconceptualized balancing. They argued that hard-balancing was not a viable option 
against the United States and great powers still needed to restrain the United States 
for non-existential threats; therefore, they pursued soft-balancing strategies that were 
missed by both balance of power and balance of threat theories. 
Therefore, referring to the puzzle, T.V. Paul pointed out the need for 
“broadening” the concept of balance of power.570 Paul argued that the traditional 
conception of balance of power failed to capture the security behavior of states fully 
because of its dichotomous approach to balancing.  According to this dichotomous 
approach, states either balanced or not and there were no in-between categories. 
Highlighting that dichotomous approach missed the in-between categories of states’ 
security behaviors, Paul argued that states pursued tacit and indirect means other than 
open arms buildup and alliance formation to balance a powerful state or one 
threatening their security.
571
 Hence, Paul proposed that instead of focusing on 
military buildup as balancing strategy, which limited the usefulness and flexibility of 
balance of power theory, the indirect methods that major powers used for 
constraining and checking the hegemon should be analyzed for better understanding 
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of balancing.
572
 He argued if the concept was broadened, it would be possible to 
detect balancing strategies used against the United States.  
In the age of US primacy, as Paul argued, soft balancing was a more 
attractive way to temper the aggressive behavior of the United States as compared to 
hard balancing.
573
 The conditions that encouraged soft balancing were categorized as 
follows: first, it was obviously a low-cost activity considering the huge power 
differential between the United States and other powers. Second, the United States 
did not pose a threat to the sovereign existence of major powers. There was no fear 
of being conquered by the hegemon. Third, the United States was the engine of 
economic globalization and preserving economic ties were crucial for emerging great 
powers. Fourth, the United States was a valuable asset as a security provider in 
Europe and Asia; therefore, strategies of free riding and buck-passing were 
applicable only if they had good relations with the United States. Fifth, it was 
difficult to transfer economic wealth into military capabilities. Last, the United States 
could easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts were not overt or they were 
not direct military challenges. According to the argument, being immune to the direct 
hegemonic threat, major powers preferred to maximize the benefits provided by the 
hegemon and minimize the risks by using soft balancing strategies.   
Soft balancing strategies are defined as follows: it involves tacit balancing 
short of formal alliances and occurs when states generally developed ententes or 
limited security understandings to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising 
                                                 
572
 He categorizes balancing as hard balancing, soft balancing and asymmetric balancing. According 
to this, hard balancing is defined as a strategy pursued by states under intense international 
competition. In pursuit of hard balancing, states adopt strategies to build up and renew their military 
capabilities as well as creating and maintaining formal alliances to match the capabilities of their 
adversaries. This definition refers to what Waltz respectively calls internal and external balancing. 
Paul, "Introduction," 3; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 47. 
573
 Paul, "Introduction," 16; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 55-59. 
217 
 
power.
574
 Limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in 
regional or international institutions were practices of soft balancing, which could be 
converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition was 
intense and the powerful state was threatening.
575
 In his 2005 article, Paul 
highlighted the limited, tacit, or indirect character of soft balancing strategies that 
were largely pursued through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining within 
international institutions short of formal bilateral and multilateral military 
alliances.
576
 Here, the emphasis was on the institutional and diplomatic strategies like 
diplomatic coalitions or ententes as forms of soft balancing to balance a powerful 
state or a rising or potentially threatening power.
577
 For instance, the veto power that 
the great powers hold in the UN Security Council was considered a pivotal tool for 
soft balancing strategy because UN approval was a central mechanism to grant 
legitimacy to US policies in the international sphere.  
According to Paul, in the post-September 11 era, the major powers became 
increasingly worried about US grand strategy as they perceived it as “offensive and 
quasi-imperial.”578 The adoption of preemptive and preventive war doctrine under 
the Bush administration, though directed against ‘rogue states,’ was considered a 
challenge to the norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty. As opposed to 
Afghanistan, which was regarded as a common problem and not even a legitimate 
government for all major powers, the major powers, like China, Russia, France, and 
Germany, did not support the US war on Iraq because of their concerns about US 
hegemony characterized with military adventurism and expansionism. Paul argued 
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that the major powers utilized soft balancing strategies in order to challenge the 
legitimacy of the US interventionist policies.
579
 Here, Paul argued that the great 
powers preferred to deny US legitimacy as a soft balancing strategy and by denying 
legitimacy, which worked as a facilitator, they aimed at affecting the success of the 
post-intervention peacekeeping and stabilization process. Despite the fact that soft 
balancing efforts through the UN Security Council failed, and the US invaded Iraq 
and toppled Saddam Hussein, according to Paul, it was the soft balancing strategies, 
which enabled the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the 
return of partial sovereignty to the Iraqi government, the end of occupation by the 
end of 2004, and free elections in January 2005.
580
 
However, Paul argued that if the US offensive extended to other states 
beyond Iraq and it did not agree with major powers on the future of Iraq, then major 
powers’ concerns would increase, which could result in the search for hard balancing 
strategies against the United States.  Hence, Paul concluded that hard balancing was 
“very much tied to the security and foreign policies of the hegemonic state. If the 
United States pursues its foreign policy in less threatening ways, it can avoid the rise 
of hard-balancing coalitions.”581 Therefore, in Paul’s view balancing against the 
United States was not an automatic process as balance of power theory suggested. If 
the United States abstained from challenging “sensitive areas” such as violation of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and the United States could restrain its power, 
then great powers would not consider balancing. Yet, if the United States pursued an 
“empire building” strategy, it would be perceived as a “revisionist” state altering 
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international order, which would trigger a hard-balancing coalition either formed 
regionally or globally.
582
 
Similar to Paul, Robert Pape discussed “soft balancing against the United 
States” and challenged the arguments that the raw power advantage over the major 
powers prevented them from balancing against the United States.
583
 In the article, 
Pape criticized the Bush administration’s national security strategy because 
aggressive unilateralism changed the long enjoyed reputation for benign intent and 
gave other major powers reason to be concerned about the intentions of the United 
States.
584
 According to Pape, the distinctiveness of the unipolar system stemmed 
from the fact that the system was defined by the only superpower that could not be 
balanced by any other single state in the system. However, he highlighted the fact 
that the unipolar system was a balance of power system; therefore, the unipolar 
leader was still subject to the possibility of balancing by most or all of the second 
ranked powers acting in concert.
585
 Pape noted that the perceived intentions of the 
leading state could incite the major powers to contain the leading state’s further 
expansion or even to seek a shift in distribution of power back toward 
multipolarity.
586
 
Pape argued that “in a unipolar system, states balance against threats, defined 
by the power and aggressive intentions of the revisionist state.”587 In addition to the 
significance of direct threats, he underlined the significance of indirect threats in 
shaping states’ balancing behavior because concerns over indirect threats were likely 
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to be greater in unipolar systems.
588
 A threat of indirect harm could occur when 
military actions of the leading power undermined the security of others, even if 
unintentionally, as the US war on terror reduced the security of some other states. In 
addition, an indirect threat could emerge if the leading state tended to be a global 
hegemon and became capable of harmful actions, like reinterpreting the rules of 
international relations in line with its own interest, exploiting international economic 
resources for relative gain, conquering states and imposing imperial rule on others.
589
 
In the process of evaluating indirect threats, as Pape argued, the major powers’ 
perception regarding the intentions of the leading state mattered and could lead great 
powers to oppose military actions by the leading state, even if they were not 
threatened directly.   
However, Pape underlined that “balancing against a sole superpower such as 
the United States will have a logic of its own, one perhaps not wholly unique, but 
one that is nonetheless distinctive to the condition of unipolarity.”590 According to 
this, the logic of balancing under unipolarity suggests external balancing as the only 
option because none of the major powers could balance the leading state by 
themselves.
591
 Yet, the risk against collective action was the coordination problem 
they might face in the process of balancing.
592
 Pape suggested that soft balancing 
was a viable strategy for the great powers to solve coordination problems because it 
helps the major powers in the process of converging expectations for collective 
action.
593
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According to Pape, balancing was simply about equalizing the capabilities in 
a competition between the strong and the weak.
594
  Balancing states took action in 
order to make it hard for a strong state to use its military advantage against the 
others, to deter the strong from attacking others and to decrease its prospects of 
success in war. Hence, the goal of hard balancing was to change balance of power in 
favor of the weak by contributing military capabilities through measures such as 
military buildup, forming alliances or transferring military technology to an ally. 
Similarly, Pape suggested that states could also seek to pursue soft balancing to 
equalize the odds because balancing involved the utilization of tools that made it 
hard for the superior state to use its military capabilities without directly confronting 
the unipole with one’s own forces.595 According to this, soft balancing could be made 
through mechanisms including territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic 
strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a hard balancing coalition.
596
 
As Pape states, “although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a 
real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state.”597 
Soft balancing should not be ignored as an ineffective strategy even though it 
might fail to stop the United States from conquering a ‘rogue’ state or from pursuing 
nuclear buildup.
598
 It could have significant long-term consequences for US security 
such as increasing military cost, inciting transfers of military technology or 
encouraging great powers to become ambitious actors. Most importantly, Pape 
warned balance of power theorists who tend to dismiss the importance of soft 
balancing by reminding them that it could eventually evolve into hard balancing.
599
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According to Pape, soft balancing against the United States started due to the Bush 
administration’s unilateralist security policies and arrogant use of force in the 
international arena.
600
 However, he has also underlined that “balancing against the 
superpower is not destiny” because great powers are “reacting to concerns over US 
intentions not US capabilities.”601 Hence, it was possible for the United States to 
mend fences if it changed the preemptive war doctrine, engaged in multilateral 
solutions for international security problems such as Iran’s nuclear program, and 
strengthened international institutions especially the UN Security Council. Briefly, 
Pape concluded that the United States should restore its image as “a benevolent 
superpower” in order to prevent both soft and hard balancing strategies to be pursued 
by the great powers in a unipolar age.
602
 Thereby, as Pape suggested, the United 
States could assure its position as the unipole. Soft balancing arguments combined 
the basic assumptions of Waltz’s balance of power theory and Walt’s balance of 
threat theory in order to explain great power behaviors under unipolarity and 
provided policy options for the unipole on how to prevent balancing against its 
primacy.
603
 
Finally, in 2006 Christopher Layne wrote an article entitled “The Unipolar 
Illusion Revisited” in which he accepted that “the Waltzians were wrong” in their 
expectations that following the end of Cold War, hard balancing against the United 
States would quickly form and would cause international distribution of power to 
revert to multipolarity.
604
 He argued that the Waltzians, including himself, failed to 
see that the second-tier major powers would face both pressure to align with the 
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United States and to balance against it. The Waltzians also failed to foresee all 
potential counterbalancers had internal problems constraining their capabilities. In 
addition, Layne stated that the Waltzians underestimated the geopolitical vacuum left 
by the demise of the Soviet Union, and there were no other capable states to fill that 
vacuum. Most significantly, he argued that the Waltzians did not understand that 
“balancing against an extant hegemon would be more difficult than countering a 
rising one”.605   
Therefore, in his article, although Layne agreed with soft balancing scholars 
that the balancing concept failed to explain states’ behaviors, he proposed an 
alternative concept of balancing, which he defined as “leash-slipping.”606 He argued 
that methods of balancing failed, especially soft balancing methods, and that these 
efforts failed to create new constellations of power in the system, did not mean that 
there has not been any attempt to balance against the U.S. Therefore, he argued that 
intentions driving states’ strategies and the outcomes of these policies should be 
considered differently. According to this, “leash-slipping” was a strategy of 
acquiring capabilities to act independent of the United States in the realm of security 
so that they could slip free of the hegemon’s leash-like grip and could gain the 
leverage needed to compel the United States to respect their security interests.
607
 
Layne distinguished leash-slipping strategy from hard balancing by arguing that 
states would adopt a leash-slipping strategy not because they feared a direct threat to 
their security but because they were concerned about the adverse effects of the 
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United States’ rise on their general position, both political and economic, in the 
international arena.
608
 
Leash-slipping strategy, he argued, was motivated by the concerns that the 
powerful state could cause in the future, not necessarily war. In this context, as 
examples of leash-slipping, he gave President Charles de Gaulle’s challenge to the 
United States in the early 1960s and the EU’s decision to develop European Security 
and Defense Policy in 1999. However, Layne failed to discuss how the United States 
failed its allies by its unilateral conduct of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and took 
decisions risking European security. Therefore, he did not discuss that France did not 
aim to balance the U.S. but the Soviets by developing independent capability from 
the U.S. Similarly, he did not consider the role of ethnic-violence that emerged after 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the Balkans in shaping the European leaders’ ideas 
to develop a competent force. In other words, he did not recognize that the ESDP did 
not aim to balance the United States. On the contrary, it aimed to utilize the EU in 
the military sphere so that it could prevent recurring ethnic-cleansing in its backyard 
without waiting for US support. 
609
   
Layne argued that successful leash-slipping strategies might result in the 
creation of new poles and restore multipolarity by bringing about the end of US 
unipolarity. Nevertheless, Layne’s argument was more in line with balance of threat 
arguments than balance of power arguments because leash-slipping strategies were 
the result of states’ perceptions of threats originating from the US power and 
practices. As Layne said, leash-slipping was not a traditional balancing strategy 
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applied to counter a direct existential threat from the United States but a “form of 
insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory 
and menacing fashion.”610 Therefore, although Layne followed balance of power 
reasoning in predicting that balance of power would form eventually,
611
 he claimed it 
would take place by 2030, his reasoning regarding leash-slipping went parallel with 
balance of threat theory. 
Accordingly, in his policy recommendations to the United States, Layne 
suggested that “to reduce the fear of US power, the United States must accept some 
reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar --and essentially 
unilateral-- offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great 
powers.”612 He further suggested that the United States must limit its “extravagant 
ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian 
ideology”613 as he claimed the United States did not need to be an extraregional 
hegemon to be secure. Therefore, similar to the soft-balancing arguments relying on 
balance of threat assumptions, Layne has suggested that the United States “must 
practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others 
by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy)”.614 Ironically, Layne’s 
suggestion of “military and ideological self-restraint” as the best grand strategy for 
the United States could be considered a step further from balance of threat arguments 
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to Wendtian constructivism which suggested “self-restraint” as an active cause of 
systemic change.
615
 
Finally, Stephen Walt contributed to the discussion on balancing against the 
United States in his 2005 book entitled Taming American Power in which he 
discussed global responses to US primacy. Walt argued that balancing against the 
United States has been muted because other states perceived US intentions as 
“comparatively benign, at least until recently.”616 Walt stated that other major powers 
have not seen the United States as an aggressive country seeking to conquer and 
dominate the large sections of the globe as the European Great Powers did in the 
zenith of their imperial time.
617
 On the contrary, Walt argued the United States acted 
as an ‘offshore balancer’ most of the time and interfered in Eurasian affairs with 
reluctance. For this reason, the United States had good relations with allies at Europe 
and Asia. Therefore, most states had little reason to believe that the United States 
might try to conquer them.  
However, Walt underlined that the Bush administration followed an assertive 
foreign policy by challenging international institutions and initiating the use of force 
in order to alter the status quo in its favor.
618
 Walt argued that great powers 
responded to the United States by soft balancing strategies instead of forming formal 
alliances. He underlined that as soft balancing strategies are sought to obtain better 
outcomes within the existing balance of power rather than seeking or expecting to 
change the overall distribution of capabilities, great powers will tend to pursue soft 
balancing strategies against the United States. He defined soft balancing in the 
current era of U.S. dominance as “the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in 
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order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences-outcomes that could not be 
gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support”.619  
In addition, Walt pointed that successful soft balancing was self-reinforcing.  
This meant that the more states that were worried about U.S. power and U.S. policy 
and the more obvious and deeply rooted their concerns were, the more willingness 
for soft balancing would be.
620
 Like Pape and Paul, Walt stated that soft balancing 
could prepare the ground for fundamental challenges to be formed against the United 
States. Therefore, Walt suggested that the United States should not act in a way to 
fuel global concerns about its power and should refrain from harming others’ 
interests.  He argued that if the United States continued to support perception that it 
was dangerous and need to be checked through concerted efforts, and if the number 
of soft-balancers increased, then there might be greater possibility of forming of hard 
or soft balancing coalitions. Walt said although the United States was still distance 
from a “tipping point,” it should not discount the possibility of a counterbalancing 
coalition entirely. As conclusion, Walt stated that the United States should pay more 
attention to others’ perception of its intentions.621 
 
 
6.3.4. The Fourth Stage: Recognizing Unipolarity as a 
Distinctive Structural Condition in “Twenty Years” 
 
Two decades later after the demise of the Soviet Union and the advent of 
unipolarity, Realist scholars began to examine the nature and implications of 
unipolarity as a “distinctive distribution of capabilities among states in the 
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contemporary global system”622 rather than discussing it as a “transitory”623 
condition. Based on the previous literature defining polarity,
624
 Realist scholars 
defined the term unipolarity as a system in which structure was characterized by the 
fact that only one state met the criteria of being a pole.
625
 Hence, unipole was a state, 
that commanded an especially large share of resources or capabilities and excelled on 
others in all the component elements of state capability.
626
 Having agreed on the 
distinctiveness of unipolarity, scholars started to question whether and in what ways 
unipolarity affected patterns of international relations to create outcomes that were 
different from those that might take place under the conditions of bipolarity or 
multipolarity.
627
 They underlined the need for revisiting questions about how 
international distribution of capabilities shaped, encouraged, and constrained states’ 
behavior. In addition, they highlighted the need for making sense of the new world 
by questioning how many traditional ideas about international politics could be 
carried over into the new world.
628
 In this framework, they underlined the need to 
“rethink conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance 
of power, the meaning of alliance partnerships, the logic of international economic 
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cooperation, the relationship between power and legitimacy and the behavior of 
satisfied and revisionist states.”629  
Discussions of how international distribution of power were likely to 
influence the behaviors of states primarily focused on questions like how the unipole 
state tended to behave, what the actions of the other states would be, and the 
characteristics of unipolarity.
630
 To begin with the question of how the unipole 
behaved, Realist scholars agreed that the unipole was least affected by structural 
constraints. It had greater freedom of action. Therefore, Realist scholars concurred 
that the unipole tended to manage and shape the international system along the lines 
of its own preferences.
631
 Challenging the assumption that the leading state in the 
international system was bound to be satisfied whereas rising or subordinate states 
tend to be revisionist,
632
 Robert Jervis argued that under unipolarity the leading state 
had powerful structural incentives to be revisionist.
633
 In Mastanduno’s expression, 
the unipole was a “both system maker and privilege taker” both in the fields of 
international security and economy.
634
 In security affairs, for instance, it had greater 
ability to choose among different alliance partners and it would not rely on a 
particular alliance network.
635
 Unipole state could endorse ad hoc “coalitions of the 
willing” with states that had ideological affinity or that demonstrate clear willingness 
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to follow its lead.
636
  In other words, as there was no power or counterbalancing 
coalition to check the power of the unipole, the unipole was free to engage or 
disengage in world affairs and to act as it suited according to its preferences. 
The discussion on the behavior of secondary states concentrated on the 
prospects of balancing against the unipole.  Realist scholars like Jervis, Walt, Posen, 
Brooks and Wohlforth put forward that unipole’s dominant power position created 
greater obstacles for secondary states therefore it was hard for them to form 
counterhegemonic balancing as prescribed by the balance of power theory.
637
  
However, Jervis noted that while balance of power reasoning suggested that states 
would form counterbalancing coalitions in the face of a “potential hegemon,” it did 
not mention what to expect under “established” unipolarity.638 Similarly, Brooks and 
Wohlforth has argued that once  a state attained dominance “it has passed a 
threshold, and the effect of increasing power is reversed: the stronger the leading 
state and the more entrenched its dominance, the more unlikely and thus less 
constraining are counterbalancing dynamics.”639 Agreeing with the balance of power 
theorists, Walt explained the difficulty in forming traditional counterbalancing 
coalitions by underlining the need for a larger coalition to balance the unipole, which 
entailed larger transaction costs and overwhelming problems of collective action.
640
  
Reinterpreting balance of threat theory under unipolarity, Walt argued that 
balancing against the unipole would be possible if members of the countervailing 
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coalition were clearly and equally threatened by the unipolar power.
641
 However, if 
the unipole was geographically distant from the potential balancers (and posed less 
threat to them) and if it was not perceived to have aggressive intentions (that was 
defined as absence of eagerness to conquer potential balancers), then the prospects of 
hard balancing coalitions were unlikely under unipolarity.
642
 Walt added that if states 
did not perceive an imminent threat from the unipole’s power, they would want to 
incur the costs of balancing such as military spending, loss of autonomy and 
punishment by the unipole.
643
 Therefore, they would not form a balancing coalition 
against the unipole. 
Similarly, in his discussion of balancing under unipolarity, Jervis highlighted 
that balance of power dynamics arose in the context of use, threat and fear of 
force.
644
 Therefore, he suggested, the incentives to balance against the unipole would 
be much less when candidate balancers did not have fear of invasion or intervention 
upon their sovereignty.
645
 According to Jervis, because “the leading states now 
[except Russia and China] form a security community,” the prospects of forming a 
counterbalancing coalition against the unipole state were less likely.
646
 Also, both 
Jervis and Walt agreed that as a unipole did not have omnipotent authority to affect 
the interests and preferences of others, lesser states might want to influence the 
unipole or constrain its behavior.
647
 In such circumstances, they argued states might 
engage in soft balancing strategies against the unipole because soft balancing 
strategies are the most viable options under power disparity and might obtain better 
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outcomes under certain conditions.
648  
Both Walt and Jervis accepted that soft 
balancing efforts, even if they failed, were significant because they showed the 
unipole that others were threatened by the unipole’s behavior and preferences.649 In 
this regard, they also agreed with earlier soft balancing scholars who argued that 
balancing has a changed role under unipolarity and soft strategies were directed to 
the specific policies of the unipole rather than the overall distribution of power in the 
system.
650
    
On the durability of unipolarity, Realist scholars concurred that the duration 
of unipolarity would primarily depend on developments in the capabilities and 
behaviors of the unipole and other major powers.
651
 Although they acknowledged 
that the evolution of relative capabilities could play a significant role in defining how 
long unipolarity might last. Realist scholars argued once unipolarity was established, 
it was the behavior of the unipole that mattered the most under unipolarity.
652
 A 
unipole’s behaviors could be reinforcing or self-defeating. The unipole’s behaviors 
might convince the others that its power was benign and it would not threaten others’ 
interests. Or, it could do otherwise.  In this regard, Jervis and Walt specifically 
underlined the significance of attraction and persuasion in preserving the unipole’s 
primacy.
653
 Jervis argued that the distribution of soft power
654
 correlated with the 
distribution of material power and the unipole should benefit from its primacy in 
                                                 
648
 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104. 
649
 Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 208. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104. 
650
 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104. 
651
 Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic 
Consequences," 21-23. 
652
 Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic 
Consequences," 23. 
653
 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 120. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 211. 
654
 Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153-171. Nye, The Paradox of 
American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: 
The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Joseph S. Nye, 
"Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
616, no. 1 (2008): 94-109. Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," Foreign 
Affairs 88, no. 4 (2009): 160-163. 
233 
 
both promoting benign power perception and increasing its legitimacy and credibility 
while shaping the future of international relations.
 655
  
Linking how other states would behave against the unipole with how other 
states would perceive the behaviors of the unipole, these scholars implied that how 
other states would perceive the characteristics of unipolarity was crucial in terms of 
defining terms of balancing and the durability of unipolarity. On the characteristics 
of unipolarity, it was accepted that specific characteristics and dynamics of a 
unipolar system were by definition dependent on who the unipole was and how it 
behaved. In this context, it was argued that domestic characteristics of the unipole 
state such as its regime type or the characteristics of its political leaders also mattered 
more in unipolar systems than in others.
656
 Hence, they underlined that under 
unipolarity, the line between domestic and foreign policy was blurred as the 
unipole’s behavior in both spheres would eventually have system-wide implications. 
Jervis pointed out the link between the characteristics of the unipole and unipolarity 
by asking, “How might the system function if the unipole were Nazi Germany, 
Stalin’s USSR or (Brezhnev’s), or a traditional autocracy? Or if it were the United 
States in a different era? There would surely be major differences.”657 Challenging 
the major structural Realist claim that any unipole would behave as the United States 
has done, Jervis underscored the fact that regime and leadership characteristics were 
crucial under unipolarity more than in other structures because of the weakness of 
external restraints.
658
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In this regard, the characteristics of current unipolarity were defined by the 
characteristics and the behaviors of the United States. One significant implication of 
this relationship was that the behavior of the unipole was equally important, if not 
more important than, the structural factors to incite balancing behavior from the 
others. The United States might use its primacy to dampen security competition by 
reassuring other states and it could reduce and remove conditions of military rivalry 
and war or it might pursue revisionist policies that would increase competition by 
heightening the insecurity of others and prompt conditions of individual or collective 
balancing against its primacy.
659
 Jervis stated that balance of power dynamics arise in 
the context of use, threat, and fear of force and as major powers formed a “security 
community,” except Russia and China, they did not fear that the United States would 
invade or greatly diminish their sovereignty.
660
 In the final analysis, under 
unipolarity, it was the behavior of the unipole, not its power, which played a 
significant role in defining the threat perceptions and the feeling of in/security. 
Therefore, there became a common understanding that under unipolarity, great 
powers’ tendencies to balance would be shaped not by material structural imperatives 
but by social factors such as threat perception and sense of insecurity. 
Finally, based on these assumptions that durability of the unipolar system 
relied on the behavior of the unipole, Realist scholars concurred that the durability of 
the current unipolar system would be based on the behavior of the United States.
661
  
The absence of balancing and the behavior of the secondary states under the US 
unipolarity were explained by a combination of balance of power and balance of 
threat arguments. Due to the power disparity, secondary states would be less willing 
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to form a counterbalancing power against the United States unless they perceived an 
existential threat from the United States.
662
 However, Realist scholars noted that 
although the second-tier states had disagreements with the United States, they did not 
perceive an existential threat from the United States. On the contrary, the second-tier 
states still perceived the United States as a benign unipole because it provided system 
wide benefits by fighting against common threats like transnational terrorism, acting 
like a regional and global balancer, and regulating the global economic system.
663
 In 
other words, despite its revisionist policies, the rising powers enjoyed the status quo 
guaranteed by the United States.
664
 Therefore, as long as the United States could 
manage its perception as the benign unipole, it would be less likely that it would face 
attempts of hard balancing. Yet, the second-tier states might consult soft balancing 
strategies in order to change or restrain the United States’ behavior, which was not 
regarded as challenging the United States’ predominant structural position.  
 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyzed how unipolarity and balancing were treated in the 
Realist literature since the end of the Cold War. It emphasized that Realist scholars 
discussed unipolarity and balancing with reference to two bedrock Realist theories: 
balance of power and balance of threat. Looking at the arguments since the end of 
the Cold War, it concluded that the Realist literature’s arguments regarding 
unipolarity and expectations regarding balancing have evolved in parallel with the 
absence of balancing against the United States. Therefore, in order to show how the 
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Realist literature responded to the end of bipolarity, it categorized arguments on 
unipolarity and balancing into four stages. In stage one, the Chapter showed that 
prominent Realist scholars Waltz and Mearsheimer did not recognize unipolarity as a 
distinct distribution of power and expected the emergence of multipolar structure 
soon after the demise of the Soviet Union.  
In the second stage, the emergence of a new discussion on stability and 
durability of the unipolar system was discussed by Realist scholars. Scholars of 
balance of power like Waltz and Layne acknowledged unipolarity as an “illusion” or 
a temporary state for international structure to be replaced with multipolarity under 
systemic constraints. Both scholars argued that even if the United States acted as a 
benign power the others would perceive threats from its practices and tend to balance 
against it. However, Waltz’s argument that U.S. practices could hasten balancing 
rested on threat perception as an auxiliary variable. Nevertheless, scholars with 
balance of threat approaches, such as Mastanduno and Wohlforth promoted the idea 
that unipolarity was a stable structure and the duration of unipolarity would be 
defined by the practices of the United States. They argued that if the United States 
pursued multilateralism and reassured others that it would not coerce or dictate its 
wishes on them, great powers would not attempt to balance against the United States 
as they perceived threat from the behaviors of the unipole. 
In the third stage, the Chapter argued that soft balancing emerged as a middle 
ground approach that reconciled balance of power and balance of threat arguments. 
Soft balancers reconceptualized balancing in the face of the ‘great puzzle’ about the 
absence of balancing against the United States.  According to this, they argued that 
great powers would not be able to balance US power by hard balancing strategies. 
However, they noted that great powers also did not need to balance US power in hard 
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balancing terms because they did not perceive an existential direct threat to their 
security. They argued that US unilateralism posed an indirect threat to great powers’ 
interests; therefore, they needed to check and balance US security practices not its 
power. In this regard, they argued through means of cutting diplomatic, economic, 
and military support to US practices, great powers pursued strategies of soft 
balancing against the United States and aimed to decrease the legitimacy of the 
United States as the unipole, as well as its practices. Soft-balancing scholars 
suggested that the United States should refrain from challenging other powers’ 
security interests and pursue multilateralism not to be perceived as a revisionist 
power who wanted to alter the international order. They concluded that if the United 
States could avoid being perceived as a revisionist power, it could prevent formation 
of balancing coalitions against its primacy.   
In the fourth stage, the debate was centered more on the distinctive character 
of unipolarity and its implications for international relations. Realist scholars under 
review in this section underlined the need for rethinking conventional concepts and 
understandings such as balance of power and great power behavior because they 
assumed states, including the unipole itself, were expected to behave differently 
under unipolarity. The general theoretical discussion on unipolarity was made with 
reference to current unipolarity because they argued it was hard to generalize about 
current unipolarity without considering the identity, preferences and behavior of the 
United States as the unipole. They defined unipolarity as the structure in which the 
unipole was constrained by structural imperatives the least. Therefore, they 
suggested that the characteristics of unipolarity were closely linked to the identity, 
preferences and practices of the unipole. In other words, they agreed that the United 
States and its practices had a major impact on how unipolarity would be defined. In 
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this context, these scholars supported earlier scholars who argued that great powers’ 
tendency to balance against the United States would be shaped by how great powers 
perceived the United States’ practices. If the unipole pursued revisionist strategies 
contradicting security interests of other great powers, then they would perceive 
threats and have an increased sense of structural insecurity. Therefore, if great 
powers perceived threats from US practices, they would pursue balancing strategies 
against the revisionist unipole. However, as Realist scholars argued, since the 
unipole had primacy in the “command of commons,”665 rather than hard balancing 
strategies, soft strategies were a more viable option for great powers. Accordingly, 
the arguments of the fourth stage also lined with balance of threat arguments rather 
than balance of power arguments as states were expected to behave differently under 
unipolarity than other distributions of power. 
As a result, it is possible to draw several major conclusions from Realist 
scholars’ discussion on balancing and unipolarity. First, it is possible to argue that 
Realist arguments leaned more towards balance of threat theory rather than balance 
of power as unipolarity endured and became accepted as a distinctive configuration 
of power. Second, Realist scholars all discussed balancing under unipolarity with 
reference to the identity and practices of the unipole, not only with reference to the 
distribution of power. Third, as balance of threat arguments prevailed in balancing 
under unipolarity, threat perception became the major explanatory variable rather 
than being an auxiliary one and it replaced the distribution of power. Fourth, in 
addition to the use of social variables
666
 like identity and threat perceptions, some 
Realist scholars also used concepts like security communities and soft power to 
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explain why some states would not balance against the United States. Fifth, some 
also suggested that the United States’ practices defined characteristics of unipolarity 
but they did not discuss how these practices influenced the social structure of 
unipolarity even though they implied that the United States could turn the 
international structure into either a competitive or cooperative one by changing 
others’ perception about its legitimacy. Therefore, based on these conclusions, the 
following chapter is going to focus on the analysis of balancing under constructivism 
as it promises a better explanation for balancing and offers a framework to discuss 
China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the United States. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
BALANCING AND UNIPOLARITY UNDER CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the evolution of discussions 
about unipolarity in the Realist literature and expectations about balancing, and 
related these discussions with balance of power and balance of threat theories. 
Relating the concepts of hard balancing with balance of power theory and soft 
balancing with balance of threat theory, it showed that soft-balancing arguments 
gained more credibility in time because of the absence of hard balancing. 
Nevertheless, the most significant conclusion that the previous chapter brought to the 
fore was the tendency of Realist scholars, who often rely on social rather than 
material variables, to empower their arguments on balancing under unipolarity. 
Alternatively, this chapter aims to provide a constructivist
667
 reading on unipolarity 
and balancing and to analyze the potential for Chinese and Russian balancing against 
the United States within this framework. 
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For this purpose, this chapter begins by looking at the conceptualization of 
structure in Wendtian constructivism and highlights that Wendtian constructivism 
recognizes two kinds of structures: macro- and micro-level structures. It further 
argues that balancing is a multiply realizable outcome that might be produced under 
self-help cultures that might be present both at macro and micro-level structures. 
Second, it discusses balancing at the macro structural level and argues that balancing 
is an outcome of the distribution of ideas rather than distribution of capabilities. 
Third, it analyzes balancing at the micro-structural level and argues that the 
construction process of self-help understanding provides a deeper understanding 
about states’ tendency to balance against threat. Fourth, it discusses unipolarity under 
constructivism and proceeds to further elaborate upon the social structure of 
unipolarity at the macro-structural level and China’s and Russia’s tendencies to 
balance against the United States. It develops the argument that under unipolarity 
rivalry is defined in terms of having self-regarding conceptions of status among the 
leading powers under discussion and concludes that status-competition might tend to 
generate tendencies to balance against the United States.  In addition, it focuses on 
how self-regarding conceptualizations of status have been produced and instantiated 
in the interactions of the United States, China and Russia at micro-structural level 
and how balancing is made possible under micro-social structures. Finally, the 
chapter concludes that if shared knowledge about micro-social structures between the 
United States, China, and Russia do not change, China and Russia will tend to 
engage balancing strategies against the United States.   
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7.2. Constructivism and Structure 
 
Constructivist theory is a ‘theory of interaction’ about the power of practices 
to produce and reproduce social structures.
668
 Wendt’s theoretical approach is widely 
acknowledged by his conceptualization of structure as a social phenomenon rather 
than a material one as compared to Waltz’s conception of structure. His focus on 
culture as a social structure is considered the most significant value-added to 
constructivism. However, the distinctiveness of Wendt’s conceptualization of 
structure also stems from his recognition of the “duality of structure” as macro- and 
micro-level structures.
669
 According to this, macro structures are based on “collective 
knowledge” that is defined as “knowledge structures held by groups which generate 
macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time.”670 In Wendt’s theorizing 
macro structure corresponds to the culture of anarchy, which can have a Hobbesian, 
Lockean, or Kantian logic.   
Wendt defines the micro-structural (interaction) level as a distinct level of 
analysis.
671
 Rather than abolishing the interaction level to escape reductionism as is 
done in Waltzian systemic theorizing, Wendt considers the interaction level of 
analysis significant. Wendt states that as collective knowledge cannot exist or can 
have an effect apart from the beliefs of actors interacting at the micro-level, macro-
structures cannot exist or can have an effect different from actors’ interactions at the 
micro-level.
672
 In Wendt’s words, “macro structures need micro-structural 
foundations” as “macro-level structures are only produced and reproduced by 
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practices and interaction structures at the micro level.”673 Therefore, micro-structural 
foundations “should be part of systemic theorizing.”674 Asking “how a theory of 
international politics could explain a systemic tendency like balancing without being 
able to explain foreign policy behavior at all,” Wendt points out that interaction level 
has an “inherently systemic dimension.”675 Therefore, he argues that the micro-
structural level of analysis should be part of systemic analysis of international 
relations because it is also “useful for explaining why one world happens rather than 
another.”676 
Micro-structures are based on “common knowledge” that is defined as 
“actor’s beliefs about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences and beliefs as 
well as about states of the external world.”677  It should be noted that these beliefs do 
not need to be true but just believed to be true. Common knowledge requires each 
actor to believe that others believe in the same knowledge to be common and it exists 
at the interaction level.
678
  For instance, specific cultural forms such as norms, rules, 
institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws are made of common 
knowledge. As Wendt argues, common knowledge is analytically neutral between 
conflict and cooperation; hence, it is not solely relevant to explaining cooperative 
relations.
679
  In contrast to macro-structural analysis, micro-structures reflect the 
world from the agents’ perspective. As Wendt states there are “as many micro-
structures in the state system as there are interaction complexes among states.”680 
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Although interaction level micro-level structural theories explicate outcomes by 
reference to the relationships between a system’s parts, micro-structural analyses are 
not reducible to the actor’s attributes because what matters is how actors interact.681  
Nevertheless, as a system-theorist, Wendt prioritizes macro-level social 
structural analysis due to his research interest and defines macro-structure as “an end 
in itself because of multiple realizability.”682 Multiple realizability means that the 
same outcome can be realized under various conditions.
683
 The same outcome can be 
explained by brining too many different micro-structural level combinations 
together; however, as Wendt argues, doing so may result in not only supply of 
irrelevant details but also loss of  some causal mechanisms that only exist in a macro-
level, even if they depend on instantiations at the micro-level for their operation.
 684
  
In order to analyze macro-level social regularities in international relations, Wendt 
prefers to focus on macro-level social structures and the ‘multiply realizabilities’ 
under these structures.  Despite his preference of macro- over micro-structure, Wendt 
accepts that both structural levels of analyses provide different contributions to the 
understanding of international relations. According to Wendt, “each logic of anarchy 
is multiply realizable”685 and the same outcome can be reached through different 
causes. Based on this assumption, for instance, Wendt defines balancing as a 
multiply realizable tendency, whose realizability depends on characteristics of a 
given anarchy. Looking at macro-level social structural changes, Wendt predicts 
probable tendencies such as war, power politics or balancing for states. Therefore, I 
will start with looking at balancing as “multiply realizable” tendency under three 
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cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures, at the macro-
structural level and illustrate that balancing is a multiply realizable outcome if there 
is a self-help culture. 
 
 
7.3. Constructivism, Macro-Structure and Balance of Power 
 
Constructivism shares the following core Realist assumptions: international 
politics is anarchic; states cannot be certain about others’ intentions; they wish to 
survive and are rational.
686
 In addition, it shares the importance of systemic or third 
image theorizing while accepting states as the units of analysis.  However, as a 
structural theory of the international system, constructivism challenges the basic 
assumptions of Waltz’s balance of power theory that structure is defined by the 
distribution of material capabilities and state action is influenced by structure 
(anarchy and the distribution of power). It rather argues that the structure is made of 
social relationships and state action is not solely influenced by structure (anarchy and 
the distribution of power) but the process (interaction and learning) and 
institutions.
687
 In other words, according to constructivists, structure is defined by 
“the distribution of ideas”688 rather than only by the distribution of power.  
Distribution of ideas, which are shared by the actors, makes up the part of 
social structure known as culture.
689
 Constructivism argues that the shared ideas or 
culture is the social structure of a system. Wendt argues that the most important 
structures in which states are embedded are social structures, not material ones, 
because ideas determine the meaning and content of power, interests, and the 
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strategies by which states pursue their interests. Without shared meanings, “anarchic 
systems cannot have a structure or logic”690 and “anarchy is nothing and nothings 
cannot be structures.”691 Therefore, anarchy must have a culture or “logic”692 to be 
able to explain states’ behaviors. Without logic, anarchy cannot have a “causal 
power”693 on its own to explain states’ foreign policy posture.  
Wendt suggests that anarchy can have at least three cultures with distinct 
logics, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, based on what kind of roles- respectively 
enemy, rival, and friend- dominate the system.
694
 Role structure is central for any 
cultural form because each role implies a distinct posture or orientation of the self 
toward the other with respect to the use of violence.
695
  Enemies act as threatening 
adversaries that have no limits in their violence against each other; rivals are 
competitors who are willing to use violence to advance their interests but refrain 
from killing each other; and friends are allies who do not consider the use of violence 
a legitimate way to solve their disputes toward each other but use against a common 
threat.
696
 Therefore, three different logics of anarchy imply different foreign policy 
posture and behavior.
697
 Challenging Waltz’s assumption of anarchy which has the 
only one logic, which is self-help, Wendt offers that balancing as a product of  power 
politics is not “infinitely realizable”698 because the social structure of anarchy might 
generate conditions preventing or enhancing the possibilities of such tendencies. 
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Therefore, in the following section, balancing will be discussed in relation to the 
three cultures of anarchy.
699
 
 
 
7.3.1. The Hobbesian Culture and Balancing  
 
The role relationship governing the relationship of the self and the other with 
respect to use of violence in Hobbesian culture is enmity.
700
 In this culture, enemies 
are constituted by representations of the other as an actor, who does not recognize the 
right of self to exist as an independent entity and who will use limitless violence 
toward self. In other words, in Hobbesian culture, where the principle is based on 
“kill or be killed,” states’ survival (sovereignty) is always at risk. Under the pressure 
of ‘to be killed,’ as Wendt argues, states respond to enemies by acting like deep 
revisionists themselves because they will try to destroy the enemy or conquer them. 
They will be making decisions for the short-term assuming the worst-case. Negative 
possibilities, rather than probabilities, will dominate their thinking and there will be a 
reduced likelihood for reciprocating any cooperative moves made by the enemy. 
Also, relative military capabilities will be central and military power plays the key 
role in assuring survival. Since the enemy’s revisionist intentions are “known” to the 
state, looking at the enemy’s capabilities, it makes predictions about its enemy’s 
behavior such as when it is going to be ready to attack. Therefore, the state, even if it 
has status quo interests, will start to arm itself as the threat of enemy forces it to 
behave “as if” it is a revisionist state.701 Finally, under the Hobbesian culture, if 
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states are actually in a state of war, they have no limits on violence because self-
restraint will create disadvantage against the enemy. 
Compared to Waltz’s self-help, as Wendt suggests, the logic of Hobbesian 
anarchy operates on  the “true” self-help system702 in which actors cannot count on 
each other, survival depends solely on one’s military power and the increases in 
one’s military power is against the other’s security. States have to seek power for 
their security. In the Hobbesian culture, security is definitely competitive, a zero-sum 
affair and security dilemmas are acute. One tendency that this structure generates for 
states is endemic warfare. In other words, as Waltz states, war may “at any moment 
occur.”703 However, only those who are adapted to warfare can survive while those 
who are militarily too weak to compete get eliminated within the system. The 
territories and capabilities of the weak will be owned by the strong, there will be a 
tendency toward a concentration of power, or may be a tendency toward empire-
building. In such a system, balancing will be an option for the states that are 
“powerful enough to avoid elimination.”704 In order to escape elimination, states 
balance each other but balance of power is not sustainable for a long time because of 
the tendency toward power consolidation to be dominant in the long-run. Also, as the 
Hobbesian system tends to take all of its members into the conflict, neutrality, with 
the exception of geographical isolation, will not be an option for states. Alliances 
will form but they will not last long because states who are allies will distrust each 
other.
705
 Therefore, it is more preferable that states rely on their own capabilities, 
which Waltz defines as internal balancing,
706
 rather than relying on others.  
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In sum, in Hobbesian culture, states do not only have a shared understanding 
of other states who are enemies, who threaten their life and liberty but also of how to 
deal with enemies such as waging war, communicating threat, arranging surrenders, 
and balance of power. Therefore, power politics or realpolitik behaviors are results 
of the social structure defined by relations of enmity. It is the Hobbesian culture that 
generates practices of power politics. As Wendt argues, “power politics and self-help 
are not just behavioral regularities but shared understandings about ‘how things are 
done.’”707 Therefore, as opposed to Waltz’s materialist explanation, Wendt explains 
balancing as a practice of power politics by reference to perception of self and other 
and in a fundamentally social sense.
708
   
 
 
7.3.2. The Lockean Culture and Balancing  
 
The role structure of the Lockean culture is rivalry. Like in Hobbesian 
culture, rivals are constituted by the representations about self and other with respect 
to violence, but these representations are not as threatening as the ones in the 
Hobbesian culture.
709
 Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they 
recognize their sovereignty as a right and therefore they do not try to conquer or 
dominate each other. However, although rivals recognize each other’s right to live 
and to have ‘property,’ their relationship is free from the use of violence in disputes. 
In other words, Lockean culture is not free from conflicts, but just ‘deaths;’ 
therefore, territorial revisions can take place as long as they leave enough property to 
live to the defeated state. As Wendt states, as opposed to “the kill or be killed logic” 
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of the Hobbesian culture, the Lockean culture is governed by “the live and let live 
logic.”710  
The distinguishing feature of the Lockean culture is the right to 
sovereignty.
711
 According to Wendt, sovereignty is an intrinsic quality of states but it 
becomes a “right” when it is recognized by the other states. Emphasizing that rights 
are social capacities that are granted to actors by other actors’ permission to do 
certain things, Wendt argues that in international relations, the fact that a weak state 
can enjoy its sovereignty as a right shows that the constitutive feature of having a 
right as a  self-limitation.
712
 In other words, if the powerful states do not restrain 
themselves from using unlimited violence against the weak, or act as a “status quo” 
power, then it will not be possible for the weak to enjoy its sovereignty as a right. 
Therefore, sovereignty an institution that is shared by many states, which relies on 
the shared expectation that states will not end each others’ existence and 
independence. The implication of the right to sovereignty is that even though it is 
possible to use force against each other for the settlement of disputes, states are 
limited by the shared understanding that they will not ‘kill’ each other.   
Limits for the level of violence against rivals in the Lockean culture has 
significant implications for state’s foreign policies.713 According to Wendt, the most 
significant implication is that whatever conflicts states may have, they have to act in 
favor of the status quo, that is defined by respecting others’ sovereignty. The other 
implication is that the nature of rational behavior for rivals is different from that 
towards enemies. Rational behavior for enemies is to act on the basis of risk-
aversion, a short time horizon, and relative power. However, thanks to the institution 
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of sovereignty, security is less “scarce,” which makes risks fewer, future and 
absolute gains more important. States’ concerns for security are not eliminated under 
rivalry but the fact that “death” is not an option reduces anxiety about security. 
Therefore, rivals act on the principle of reciprocation. They may cooperate or fight. 
In this context, although relative military power is still important, the meaning of 
military power is different for rivals. In Hobbesian world, relative military capability 
dominates the thinking about security; however, in Lockean system it is not a priority 
because threats are not existential and allies can be more easily trusted when one 
does not have efficient capabilities. Finally, even if disputes among rivals may go to 
war, the role of enemy and rival make a big difference in terms of their behavior.  
According to these, there are four general tendencies that can be observed in 
international relations under Lockean anarchy.
714
 The first tendency is warfare, 
which is a simultaneously accepted and constrained norm of international relations. 
Wars are not for conquest but to restore the status quo. The second is the relatively 
stable membership within the system. The low death rate over time, provided by 
right to sovereignty, as Wendt argues, is “the strongest evidence for a structural 
difference between Lockean and Hobbesian anarchy.”715 In Lockean world, the weak 
are protected by the restraint of the strong, not by the survival of the fittest. In other 
words, the survival of the weak relies on social not material factors. The third is that 
neutrality and non-alignment is a recognized status as there is no threat of 
revisionism and states can solve their differences through non-violent means. 
The fourth tendency for states under the Lockean culture is to balance 
power.
716
 As opposed to Waltz’s argument that balancing is an effect of anarchy, 
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Wendt suggests under Lockean anarchy, balance of power is an effect of the mutual 
recognition of sovereignty.
717
 In Hobbesian anarchy, balancing is a survival strategy 
due to the lack of mutual recognition of sovereignty. Therefore, under Hobbesian 
anarchy, states have to maximize their power either on their own or by engaging in 
temporary alliances to balance the threat. However, in Lockean anarchy, as states 
think that others recognize their sovereignty, relative changes in distribution of 
power do not pose a threat to states’ survival,718 which decrease the pressure to 
balance and maximize one’s power against the other either by its own capabilities or 
through alliance formation. In this regard, reducing the tendency toward 
concentration of power, the institution of sovereignty “arrests”719 the need for 
balancing.  However, Wendt argues that balancing can become “a relatively stable 
source of order with respect to the many non-existential issues that may remain 
sources of violent conflict.” 720 In other words, in Lockean anarchy, as states do not 
need balancing as the “essential” means to guarantee their survival, balancing 
becomes a “ basis for order in the first place.”721 However, this is not to deny that 
balancing also provides guarantee against loss of sovereignty when states are 
threatened by unbalanced distribution of power.
722
 
According to Wendt, in Lockean system, most of the states comply with 
norms such as respecting others’ sovereignty and do not even consider the costs and 
benefits of violating such norms.
723
  This is because states consider norms as 
legitimate and identify themselves with them and voluntarily comply with the rules. 
Therefore, under Lockean anarchy, by accepting the institution of sovereignty, states 
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are pro status quo. As opposed to revisionist states that have the desire to conquer 
others, seize part of others’ territory, and or change the rules of the game in the 
Hobbesian order, the states of Lockean order have no interest in conquering other 
states, redrawing boundaries, or changing the rules of the international system.
724
 
However, it should be underlined that Lockean culture is only present among states 
that mutually recognize each other and only their relations are immune from the ‘kill 
or be killed logic.’ In other words, states follow pro status quo strategies towards the 
states they recognize as sovereigns. 
Therefore, it the institution of sovereignty that provides “the terms of 
individuality”725 to states. In another words, only those states whose sovereignty is 
recognized by others are entitled to have rights granted by the institution of 
sovereignty such as immunity from ‘being killed.’ States whose sovereignty is not 
recognized or challenged because they do not fulfill a certain ‘standard of 
civilization’726 can be exposed to violence because Lockean logic does not apply in 
their relations with states with sovereign rights. The standards that define what 
counts as a legitimate state have changed historically; however, in the contemporary 
world, being a “nation-state,”727 having the institutions of a “modern” state, being a 
“capitalist” and “democratic,” increasingly refraining from committing genocide, or 
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violating human rights can be considered a legitimate state type.
728
 The states whose 
sovereignty is not recognized or challenged due to their failure to fulfill  these 
‘standards’ might be considered  “outsiders” as opposed to those who internalize 
Lockean culture, develop a common social identity.
729
 This common identity, Wendt 
says, matters because it facilitates collective action against outsiders; when the group 
is threatened, members of the group act together to defend the group.
730
 Wendt notes 
that under Lockean culture, an act against the outsider and coming to each other’s aid 
is rudimentary because collective action takes place only when the actual survival of 
a member is endangered by a rouge state, for instance.
731
 The threat will manifest the 
collective identity of the group and lead to rudimentary balancing against the 
common threat; however, as Wendt notes, under Lockean anarchy, states are on their 
own for fights within their group as they are still rivals.  
Accordingly, individualizing states by defining the criterion of membership, 
Wendt underscores two significant conclusions;
732
 first, it is Lockean culture that 
constitutes the ‘self-help’ system not anarchy. Second, security is provided by mutual 
recognition not solely by national power. The principle of sovereignty constitutes 
self-help system by regulating states’ relations with the principle of limited use of 
violence and performs a passive form of “other-help” by restraining the powerful 
from eliminating the weak states.
733
 Thereby, the weak can sustain their presence and 
can be part of the self-help system. In this Lockean self-help system, states only need 
balancing against each other to solve non-existential threats and to solve ‘wrong-
doers’ against the order. Nevertheless, as Wendt points out, it is ironically the states 
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with the greatest national resources, known as great powers, which have the hardest 
time in internalizing the principle of sovereignty, attempt to violate small powers’ 
sovereignty.
734
 However, as Lockean culture also constitutes “other-help” systems, 
that is established among states that agreed on the standards of membership against 
the states acting against that order, both wrong-doers and outsiders might be 
balanced collectively.
735
  As a result, Lockean culture makes balancing a more 
feasible policy option for powerful states or the collective self when threatened by 
outsiders or order-breakers.  
Consequently, Wendt underlines that “anarchy portrayed by Waltz is actually 
a Lockean rather than Hobbesian system.”736 This is because Waltz’s analogy to 
markets presuppose institutions that guarantee actors do not kill each other, his 
emphasis on balancing, his observation that the death rate of modern states is low, 
and his assumption that states are security seekers rather than power seekers are all 
associated with a system in which self-restraint is dominant rather than ‘the war of 
all against all’ logic. The Lockean culture is taken for granted as “background 
knowledge”737 in Waltz’s theory and as Wendt says, this culture is “a condition of 
possibility for the truth of Neorealism.”738 Therefore, it is the culture of ‘self-help’ 
that puts balancing as a policy option to states’ decision tree not solely the 
distribution of powers.  
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7.3.3. The Kantian Culture and Balancing  
 
Friendship is a defining role structure of the Kantian culture.
739
 The role 
structure of friendship generates two expectations for states.  First, states will settle 
their disputes without war or the threat of war, which is the rule of non-violence. 
Second, states will fight as a team if the security of either is threatened by a third 
party, which is the rule of mutual aid. However, Wendt notes three points about the 
principles of friendship.
740
 First, these two rules are independent and equally 
necessary because friendship exists when states expect each other to observe both 
rules.  Second, friendship is concerned with national security only, and it does not 
need to extend to other issue areas. Third, most importantly, friendship is temporally 
open-ended, which differentiates friends from ‘allies’ whose relations are temporary 
and may eventually turn into a warlike situation.  
The two rules of friendship produce the macro-level logic and tendencies that 
are related with “pluralistic security communities” and “collective security.”741 In 
explaining how friendship creates a different logic between states, Wendt relies on 
the seminal work of Karl Deutsch and his associates on pluralistic security 
community.
742
 In their study, a pluralistic security community is defined as a system 
of states (states not having amalgamated their sovereignty and hence are pluralistic) 
in which “there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight 
each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways.”743 In 
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pluralistic security communities, it is the shared knowledge of the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts rather than a Leviathan that keeps states away from using force against 
one another.
744
 Although Wendt concurs that war is always a possibility between 
states in Kantian culture, the shared knowledge of friendship makes war an issue of 
probability, not possibility, because war is not considered a legitimate way of solving 
disputes.
745
 With the shared knowledge of friendship, the members of the pluralistic 
security community do not expect a threat to their survival from one another. Hence, 
security is not scarce; insecurity is not prevalent; and uncertainty is not dominant in 
the pluralistic security communities. In other words, it is not a self-help system. 
Therefore, the logic that generates tendency to balance is absent from the relations of 
the states in the pluralistic security communities.  
Moreover, as Wendt argues, in Kantian culture, the shared knowledge of 
friendship constitutes a collective security community or a team.
746
  In collective 
security communities, states do not support self-interested security policies because 
as the members of the group, they identify with each other, see each other’s security 
as being their own and develop collective definitions of self-interest. In other words, 
they develop a “collective identity” and thereby a “collective security” understanding 
as they identify their security with one another.
747
The difference between the 
pluralistic security communities and collective security community is, as Wendt puts 
it, the latter is more about how states with the shared knowledge of friendship tend to 
behave toward outsiders (that is defined as non-members or previous members who 
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have abandoned the norms of the group).
748
 In contrast to alliances formed under 
self-help systems on a temporary basis to ward off a specific threat,  in collective 
security systems, states make commitments for multilateral action for “non-specific 
threats,”749 “no matter by whom, when, or whether they might be threatened.”750 
Hence, in terms of balancing, members of collective security systems are always 
ready to balance against the future threats posed by outsiders.  
In this context, as the collective security system relies on the commitment 
that the members of the group will use their individual capabilities for one another, 
they do not tend to see the increments in capabilities of friends as a source of 
insecurity. On the contrary, they consider the rising power of the friend as an asset to 
both their individual and group’s security.751 As Wendt states, the shared knowledge 
of friendship changes the meaning of relative military power and the logic of 
relationships both amongst friends and friends and outsider.
752
 As opposed to the 
understanding that defines anything short of global membership as a balance of 
power system,  universal membership is not necessary for a Kantian culture as it may 
exist in the sub-regional context.
753
 The multiple reliability of Kantian culture makes 
balancing against outsiders a possibility.  Since balancing is a product of self-help 
that is either competitive as in Hobbesian culture or individualistic as in Lockean 
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culture,
754
 it is possible to see balancing tendencies in Kantian culture in relation to 
friends relationship with outsiders.  
To sum up, in light of systemic constructivist theory, this section of the 
Chapter discussed three different cultures of anarchy in relation to the concept of 
balancing and showed how Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian cultures make balancing 
a probability for states. It is shown that balancing is probable under each system. 
However, the probability of balancing is higher in Hobbesian culture because states’ 
relationships are governed by the role structure of enmity, which generates intense 
self-help dynamics. Under Hobbesian culture, although alliances are possible, they 
are not likely to last long as each state is enemy to one another. Therefore, they have 
to rely on mostly their own capabilities to balance the threat against their security. In 
Lockean culture, the probability of balancing is not as high as Hobbesian culture 
because of the shared knowledge of rivalry. Thanks to the institution of sovereignty 
and the established norms of conflict resolution, states do not fear losing their 
survival as they are able to solve disputes by other means. However, balancing is still 
a viable option against ‘wrong-doers,’ which are part of the system but had violated 
the sovereignty of others and most likely the great powers, or against the outsiders, 
which are not recognized as the part of the culture. Therefore, under Lockean 
anarchy both individual and collective balancing is probable. Under Kantian culture, 
as the role structure is friendship, states do not fear one another; they identify their 
individual security interests with one another and build collective identity. Hence, 
they do not consider balancing as an option with their relations with one another. 
However, if the Kantian culture is present at a regional level, then Kantian group of 
states acts collectively against the threat. Therefore, under Kantian culture, unless it 
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is universal, states only balance collectively as the threat is posed to all. This section 
of the Chapter was about how states’ tendency to balance change with reference to 
changes in the distribution of ideas, not distribution of power and it concluded that 
balancing is made probable when self-help logic is shared knowledge. Therefore, this 
discussion was at the macro-structural level and it did not discuss how self-help logic 
was produced and sustained. The next section of the Chapter will focus on how self-
help logic is produced and instantiated and made balancing possible at the micro 
structural level. It will relate micro structural discussion with the balance of threat 
theory.  The following section of the Chapter will maintain that constructivism sides 
with balance of threat theory rather than the balance of power in explaining 
balancing. However, it will argue that constructivism provides a deeper 
understanding on how threats and threat complexes are socially constructed than the 
balance of threat theory.   
 
 
7.4. Constructivism, Micro-Structure and Balance of Threat 
 
This section will focus on how constructivism explains the construction 
process of self-help logic and will relate constructivist logic with the balance of 
threat theory. Searching for “the Origins of Alliances,” Stephen Walt refined Waltz’s 
balance of power theory by arguing that states balance against power is “seriously 
flawed” because states balance against the most threatening power.755 According to 
Walt, the aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and aggressive/offensive 
intentions are the factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose.
756
 
States that combine aggregate power with geographic proximity, offensive military 
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power and offensive intentions pose the greatest threat and are perceived as the 
greatest threat. However, when considered individually, except states with 
aggressive/offensive intentions, Walt argued neither factors is sufficient to trigger 
balancing by themselves.
757
 As states with aggressive/expansionist intentions pose a 
certain threat, they, even those with modest power, provoke others to balance.
758
 
Therefore, it is the perception or presence of threat that determines states’ balancing 
tendencies.  
In addition to the sources of threat that generate balancing tendency, Walt 
discussed ideological solidarity as “at best a secondary explanation for alliances”.759 
Ideological solidarity exists between states sharing political, cultural or other traits 
and it “appears in the rhetoric of statesmen seeking to justify alignment with one side 
or opposition to another.”760 Walt explained “the logic behind” the “belief” that 
states with similar ideological traits are inclined to align with one other as such: First, 
aligning with similar states, one may consider itself as defending its own political 
principles. Walt argued, for statesmen who consider their own system as inherently 
good, protecting states with a similar system must be considered good as well. 
Second, he advances his argument stating that states with similar characteristics may 
fear each other less, because they will not imagine an inherently "good" attacking 
another “good” state. Third, such an alignment may enhance the legitimacy of a 
weak regime as it will demonstrate that it is part of “a large popular movement.” 
Fourth, the ideology itself may instruct its proponents to bring about alignment “as 
Marxism-Leninism explicitly does.”761 Acknowledging the importance of ideology in 
forming alliances, he also presumed a relationship between identity (individual or 
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collective) and threat perceptions of states; thereby, a relationship between identity 
and balancing tendencies of states.
762
  
As such, as Barnett argued, Walt’s balance of threat theory “fails to give 
ideational factors their proper due” because of its commitment to Realism and 
materialism.
763
 Nevertheless, in many constructivist scholars’ view, balance of threat 
theory is considered “one of the mainstream accounts most susceptible to a 
constructivist alternative”.764 Discussing degeneration of Realist theory, Legro and 
Moravcsik argue that even though Walt explicitly labels his theory as a progressive 
and parsimonious revision of Waltz’ theory,765 demonstrating that “perceived state 
intentions” as the primary purpose of alliances and treating ideology as an alternative 
explanation, Walt appropriates “nonrealist causal mechanisms” from constructivist 
theory.
766
 Similarly, Katzenstein states, “Walt’s threat theory is not a minor 
modification of Neorealism but a substantial departure from it” because the theory’s 
emphasis on threat perception shifts Walt’s analysis from material to ideational 
factors.
767
 In addition, Katzenstein also notes that Walt’s emphasis on aggressive 
intentions distance balance of threat theory from being a systemic theory.  
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Wendt’s primary focus was Waltz’s theory rather than Walt’s balance of 
threat theory. However, while arguing that Waltz’s structure by itself cannot explain 
states’ behavior and showing how three different cultures of anarchy make some 
state actions more or probable, Wendt describes each of these social structures as 
“threat complexes, in terms of which states define (some of their identities and 
interest).”768 According to Wendt, Waltz’s theory by itself cannot say “whether two 
states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other’s sovereignty, will have 
dynastic ties or status quo powers, and so on.”769 On the other hand, Walt’s theory 
can predict how states will act because it relies on the perception of threats that are 
“being socially constructed,”770 and has an implicit assumption about “the structure 
of identities and interests in the system.”771 Therefore, between balance of power and 
balance of threat theories, Wendt views the latter as more plausible. 
As discussed in the previous section, Wendt expects states to act differently 
towards one another under different “threat complexes.” According to this, while 
states tend to perceive more threat from one another’s aggregate power under “thick” 
and “deep”772 threat complexes and tend to make balancing behaviors probable, they 
might not perceive threat and balance under ‘thin’ threat complexes. In fact, while 
arguing states’ aggregate power cannot be a source of balancing by itself, Walt raises 
a similar point by stating that one’s aggregate power can be threatening as well as 
rewarding because “states with great power have the capacity either to punish 
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enemies or reward friends.”773 In constructivist reading, it can be argued that Walt 
concurs that states’ power has different meaning depending on the structure of 
identities and interests. 
To illustrate the constructivist argument, Hopf argues that the distribution of 
power in the wake of World War II fails to explain why European states did not 
balance against the United States but instead the Soviet Union.
774
 As Hopf argues, 
European powers would have balanced against the United States rather than the 
Soviet Union if it was the distribution of power that affected their balancing 
tendencies. Rather, the issue was not distribution of power for them but how 
threatening they came to understand Soviet military capabilities to be, along with 
geographical proximity while viewing US power as protective. Likewise, Wendt’s 
example of how five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening than five 
North Korean nuclear weapons because the British are friends but the North Koreans 
are not, shows that material sources only acquire meaning for states through the 
structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.
775
 Accordingly, 
following Wendt’s reasoning that “amity and enmity is a function of shared 
understanding,”776 we can deduce that threat perception is also a function of amity 
and enmity. 
The most promising link between Wendt’s constructivism and balance of 
threat is established in Wendt’s interaction level discussion regarding the 
construction of self-help, whose ‘depth’ and ‘thickness’ determines the actions of 
states in ‘threat complexes.’ Evidently, Wendt’s purpose for disentangling the 
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concept of self-help is to show that self-interested conceptions of security are not a 
constitutive part of anarchy, as Waltz claimed. However, while explaining how self-
help and competitive power politics are causally produced by processes of interaction 
between states, Wendt’s emphasis on the role of “predation”777 or aggressiveness as 
“the efficient cause generating a self-help system in conjunction with anarchy as a 
permissive cause” 778 illuminates the strong connection between Wendt’s 
constructivism and balance of threat theory.
 
 
In the analysis of the construction of a self-help system at the micro-structural 
level, Wendt relies on “first and second image determinants;” therefore, this analysis 
relies on states’ practices at the micro-structural level.779 It is the history of 
interaction/practices that constitutes meanings, identities and interests.
780
 As Wendt 
shortly states “history matters”781 as a world without history is a “world without 
shared ideas.”782 Therefore, it is a world without meaning, identities, and interests.  
According to Wendt, self-help is “one of various structures of identity and interest 
that may exist under anarchy.”783 It is an institution which causally arises out of 
states’ interaction.784 Deconstructing self-help as a process of identity-formation 
under anarchy, Wendt explains how self-regarding ideas about security are made 
possible by the interaction of states referring to “the key efficient cause- 
predation”.785 
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Wendt holds that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and 
then sustained in response to how actors are treated by significant others.
786
 In the 
process of identity formation under anarchy, Wendt assumes, states are concerned 
primarily with the preservation or “security” of the self.787 Also, the process of 
identity formation functions on “the principle of ‘reflected appraisals’ or ‘mirroring’ 
because actors tend to see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see or 
‘appraise’ them, in the mirror of others’ representations of the self”.788  In other 
words, according to Wendt, the identity formation process relies on how self 
“mirrors” itself in “the practices of significant others over time” as “the self is a 
reflection of an actor’s socialization.”789 According to this, for instance, if the other 
treats the self as if it were an enemy, then due to the mirror effect it would likely to 
internalize its role identity in relation to the other.
790
 Nevertheless, Wendt notes that 
“not all others are equally significant” and “power and dependency relations” may 
play a significant role in affecting the process of identity construction.
791
 
Emphasizing the crucial role of practices on identity formation, Wendt 
underscores the importance of the first encounter. This is because states cannot have 
conceptions of self and other, hence, security interests, apart from their “first 
encounter” with each other.792 Before the first encounter there are no shared ideas, 
meanings, identity and interests.
793
 The first encounter is crucial to Wendt’s 
theorizing because it explains how two actors- Ego and Alter- might behave in a 
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world devoid of shared ideas. Assuming that each actor wants to survive and has 
certain material capabilities but neither has any command of power, conquest, and 
glory and has no history of security or insecurity, Wendt argues that actors make 
decisions on the basis of “probabilities,” that are produced by interaction or actors’ 
practices, not on the basis of “the worst-case possibilities”.794 
In the first encounter, Ego makes gestures, such as laying down its arms or 
attacking so that Alter actor makes inferences or attribution about the signals
795
 and 
responds to Ego. In the process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes 
a “social act” and starts the process of creating intersubjective meanings.796 Each 
signal, gesture and interaction adds to the pool of knowledge about each other and 
reinforces particular concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the 
interaction.  More specifically, by treating the other as if it is supposed to respond a 
certain way, Alter and Ego eventually learn ideas that generate those responses and 
then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will then to reproduce them in 
their following interactions.
797
 Here, the logic is “self-fulfilling prophecy”798 and the 
mechanism at play is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors holding certain ideas 
about each other, while discouraging them from holding others. If these interactions 
were repeated long enough, these “reciprocal typifications” generate and instantiate 
relatively stable social concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake.
799
  
Hence, in the process of identity construction, Alter and Ego mutually adjust 
to representations of self and other conveyed in each other’s practices, their ideas 
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about who they are and what they want.
800
 In other words, both Ego and Alter are the 
objects of perceptions. As Wendt states, “Ego’s ideas about the Alter, right or wrong, 
are not passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego, but actively 
and constantly constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego.”801 Through its 
representational practices Ego says to Alter that ‘it is an X’ (hegemon, great power, 
balancer, rival) and I expect you to act like an X and I will act toward you as if you 
were an X. Therefore, in this extent who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who 
Ego thinks Alter is and the same applies to Ego. These active and constant 
perceptions about each other become meaningful or real when each makes practices 
to confirm them, as the construction process of self-help suggests. 
The model of identity formation described above applies to both competitive 
and cooperative institutions. As a social construction, self-help security systems, 
either competitive or individualistic, evolve from the cycles of interaction in which 
each actor acts on the basis that the other is a threat to the self and is creating 
expectations that the other should not be trusted.
802
  Wendt argues that competitive or 
egoistic identities are caused by such insecurity because assuming the other as 
threatening, the self ‘mirrors’ such behavior in its conception of the self’s 
relationship with that other.
803
 Wendt illustrates how egoist conceptions of security 
emerge at micro-structural level with an ego and Alter example. The key is how Ego 
and Alter represent themselves at the first encounter as this will determine the logic 
of their micro-structure. If Ego casts that Alter is taking advantage of Ego for its own 
needs and takes the role of egoist, then it will not take Alter’s security needs into 
account. If Alter recognizes Ego’s selfish perspective, then it will also adopt an 
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egoist identity because its security needs are not respected, recognized and met. 
Eventually, their relations turn into one of power politics. As Wendt states, the self-
fulfilling prophecy is that, thinking like ‘Realists’, states teach one another to act and 
be like one another.
804
 
In a further examination of how a system ends up with self-regarding 
identities, Wendt highlights the role of “predation” as the efficient cause generating a 
self-help system in conjunction with anarchy as a permissive cause.
805
 The 
aggressive behavior of predator, forces other states to engage in power politics 
because failure to do so may be costly in terms of their survival. Although the 
possibility of predation does not mean that it can happen anytime, once a predator 
emerges, it conditions the process of identity formation in a certain way. At this 
point, Wendt agrees with Realists that predation will force the Alter to respond in 
terms of power politics.
806
 However, in an anarchy of two, the effect of predation on 
the social structure is certain; it definitely changes the structure into a competitive 
self-help system. Yet, in an anarchy of many, if predation occurs right after the first 
encounter in the state of nature, it will force others with whom it contacts to defend 
themselves. Under such condition, defense will take place first individually and then 
collectively if the others also perceive a common threat.  
Therefore, predation may facilitate the formation of collective identity. Yet, if 
the structure of the world is defined by maximum insecurity in which potential allies 
distrust each other, then collective action against the predator will be a problem and 
the emergence of a defensive alliance will be seriously inhibited.
807
 Even if a 
coalition is established against a common threat, it will be more likely that an 
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alliance of insecure allies will dissolve once the predator is removed. Or, under the 
presence of a collective identity system in which states define security of the self 
with the other, the answer to the predator, even if it attacks only one member, will be 
collective.
808
 In this context, if the group achieves defeating the predator, then the 
collective identity of the group will be enhanced. Yet, if its predator is strong 
enough, then the predator and the collective will become two actors whose relations 
will be dominated by realpolitik dynamics.
809
  
In an anarchy of many, the timing of the emergence of predation to the 
history of identity-formation in the community is crucial because it affects whether 
predation will be balanced collectively or individually.
810
 In an anarchy of two or 
many, predation tends to generate “threat complexes” or structures of insecurity, that 
might be either competitive or individualistic. Although it depends on the timing of 
predation with respect to the social structure whether predator will face collective or 
individual balancing, it is certain that predation is punished and balanced by others in 
the system. Predation plays a key role in construction and perpetuation of security 
dilemmas, uncertainty, distrust, and the roles of enmity and rivalry. Also, it has a key 
role in construction of states’ identities and interests as self-regarding entities that 
perceive threat from one another. In other words, predation facilitates the social 
construction of threats and creates meanings that will shape the perceptions of states 
regarding one another. Predation triggers perceptions of threat, which leads to 
balancing at the micro-structural level.
811
 Consequently, in the discussion of the role 
that predation plays in the construction of a self-help system, Wendt develops a 
constructivist argument on behalf of balance of threat theory by arguing that states 
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balance against threat and not power. Also, discussing balancing as a tendency 
produced under different macro structures of anarchy and as a result of self-regarding 
practices of states at the micro-structure, Wendt’s theoretical approach shows that 
balancing is “multiply realizable.”812  
 
 
7.5. Constructivism and Unipolarity 
 
Wendt’s most significant move against Waltz’s theory is to say that 
international structure is a social rather than material phenomenon. Therefore, 
Wendt’s conception of structure relies on the distribution of ideas/interests while 
Waltz’s conception rests on the concept of distribution of power. Distribution of 
power refers to the extent to which material capabilities are concentrated in the 
system or the positioning of states with accumulation of power vis-à-vis each 
other.
813
 Furthermore, distribution of power refers to the concept of polarity in 
Waltz’s theory. The concept of polarity or distribution of power is central in Waltz’s 
theory as the theory is capable of making predictions about states’ tendency to 
balance by evaluating variations in polarity.
814
 As Wendt states, it is the only 
“dimension that constitutes variation in international structure and thereby generates 
varying outcomes”.815   
Therefore, as Wendt’s structure is social, it is not surprising that in his 
analysis distribution of power is not the central concept. Nevertheless, although 
Wendt’s theory has not elaborated on the concept of polarity, this does not mean that 
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constructivist theory denies the significance of distribution of power in international 
relations. In Wendt’s conceptualization, social structures include material 
resources.
816
 As expressed by Wendt, his argument is “not ideas are not all the way 
down” but the meaning of power is largely a function of ideas because material 
resources only acquire meaning through the structure of shared knowledge in which 
they exist.
817
 Wendt states that the distribution of power matters, but how it matters 
depends on the meaning it has for actors as he exemplifies “Bipolarity among friends 
is one thing, among enemies quite another.”818 As it is the social structure that 
constitutes identities and interests and defines expectations of behavior or constitutes 
threats, for Wendt, “material forces are secondary, significant insofar as they are 
constituted with particular meanings for actors.”819 
In contrast to Waltz’s emphasis on polarity as the material condition having a 
causal role explaining states’ behavior, for Wendt, “material polarity” matters to the 
extent that the knowledge structure indicates whether poles are friends, rivals or 
enemies.
820
 Wendt suggests that when Neorealists offer multipolarity as an 
explanation for war, it is necessary to inquire into the social practices that constitute 
the poles as enemies rather than friends.
821According to Wendt, Waltz’s structure 
presumes a Lockean social structure in which actors identify each other as rivals, the 
norm of sovereignty is shared knowledge and actors use limited violence against 
each other.
822
 Therefore, inquiring into these practices is significant because, as 
Wendt argues, it unleashes the social aspect of “ostensibly material” explanations 
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and shows the presupposed social structure that makes particular state action such as 
war or balancing possible.
823
  
In spite of the absence of a direct discussion of polarity in Wendt’s works, the 
discussions regarding distribution of power and “material polarity”824 imply that 
Wendt has a conception of ‘social polarity.’ It can be argued that Wendt’s conception 
of polarity relies on how states with aggregated power define their social identities 
vis-à-vis each other.825 In other words, polarity refers to the distribution of role 
positions in a social structure. If the states with great capabilities define the terms of 
their relations in conflictual terms, then social polarity exists. For instance, Wendt 
defined “the Cold War” itself “as a social structure in virtue of which the United 
States and the USSR had certain identities”826 and they carried out certain practices 
constructing polarity. It is for this reason that as opposed to neorealist analysis, for 
Wendt what is central is not the bipolar configuration of power but the ‘bipolar 
configuration of identities’ while discussing post-World War II international 
relations.   
It is for this reason that Wendt defines the end of the Cold War in 1989 as a 
structural change rather than the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
827
 On a 
social definition of structure, he says, “the concept of structural change refers to 
changes in cultures-like the end of the Cold War in 1989- and not to changes in 
material polarity-like the end of bipolarity in 1991.”828 According to Wendt, the Cold 
War was a “relatively stable cultural structure” that was in place because the United 
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States and the Soviets had a shared understanding that they were enemies, which 
helped to constitute their identities and interests in any given situation, that they in 
turn acted in a way to confirm to the other that they were a threat and reproduced the 
Cold War.
829
 This culture stopped existing when the Soviets under the leadership of 
Gorbachev critically self-reflected (that is also defined as reflexivity) on its role 
reproducing the Cold War.
830
 Therefore, defining structural change based on the 
distribution of capabilities or as a change of the number of poles from “bi-to multi- 
or unipolarity” is a “superficial definition of structural change”831 because such a 
definition neglects “the fact that Great Power behavior changed dramatically after 
1989 but not after 1991.”832 
Wendt states that constructivism is “compatible with changes in material 
power affecting social relations as long as those effects can be shown to presuppose 
still deeper social relations”.833 As Realist scholars, Wendt also accepts that the 
structure of international relations changed after the end of the Cold War and it 
became unipolar.
834
 However, although Wendt’s theoretical approach recognizes 
unipolarity as a material condition of international politics in the post Cold War era, 
constructivists do not elaborate on the logic and character of the international system 
that is organized around unipolarity. Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of discussion 
on logic of unipolarity in the constructivist literature, constructivism provides a 
guideline for how US security practices and its relations with significant others such 
as China and Russia are influencing the social structure of unipolarity. 
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7.5.1. Logic of Unipolarity and Balancing at Macro-Structural 
Level 
 
Unipolarity is a system in which there is only one state commanding large 
resources and excelling in all the components of state capability, such as population, 
territory, economic recourses, military power and organizational competence.
835
 
However, defining unipolarity as a distinctive distribution of power alone tells little 
about the character of the relations among states because in a unipolar system much 
is determined by the identity and practices of the unipole, which in turn constructs 
the social fabric of unipolarity.
836
 Therefore, from the constructivist theory’s 
perspective, the identity of the unipole and its practices are central for the discussion 
of unipolarity, including its logic. This point is also accepted by Realist scholars such 
as Jervis who stated that  
the strongest structuralist claim would be that any unipole would 
behave as the US has. This is unlikely. Clearly, the current world 
would be very different if it had been the US and Western Europe 
rather than the USSR that had collapsed. Indeed regime and 
leadership characteristics are likely to matter more in unipolarity than 
in other systems because of the weakness of external restraints.
837
  
 
Finnemore, a constructivist scholar, makes a similar argument that “one 
would expect a US unipolar system to look different from a Nazi unipolar system or 
a Soviet one” because each of these three powers would use their preponderant 
power for different purposes.
838
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In addition to the importance of a unipole’s identity in the discussion of the 
logic of unipolarity, the timing of a particular power’s preponderance also matters.839 
As Finnemore highlights, US unipolarity in the twenty-first century would look very 
different from the Roman world or the Holy Roman Empire.
840
 This is because of the 
fact that social structures of norms concerning sovereignty, self-determination, 
border-rigidity, intervention etc. have changed over time and created vastly different 
dynamics across time in terms of states’ expectations from another and states’ 
behaviors towards each other.
841
 The effect of the timing of unipolarity can be 
illustrated by restructuring Wendt’s example regarding the impact of culture on 
behavior and identity of material in two cultures.
842
 According to the example, in one 
culture, material dominance is recognized by subordinate states as constituting 
certain rights and responsibilities on the part of dominant states, and in the other 
example it does not. In this case, two unipole states engage in the same dominance 
behavior in the two cultures. They give military aid to weak states, forbid them from 
allying with other Great Powers, and intervene in their domestic politics and so on.  
In one system, the behavior of the unipole will be constituted and perceived as 
“interference,” in the other as “assistance,” in one as “illegitimate” in the other as 
“legitimate.”843 Therefore, in one system balancing will be an option while in the 
other bandwagoning. In other words, a culture in which the unipole inhabits is crucial 
as it defines meanings and the terms of legitimacy that other states will evaluate the 
unipole’s behavior.  
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Wendt describes Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures as three distinct 
cultures with distinct logics and tendencies and argues that “all three have been 
instantiated at different times and places in international history.”844 Yet, these three 
cultures also correspond to the past, the present and the future in his theorizing. 
Wendt deals with Hobbesian culture that existed in the past when “kill or be killed 
logic” was predominant as it was the case with the Huns against the Romans, the 
Mongols against medieval Europeans and Europeans against non-Europeans.
845
 
Hobbesian culture was “replaced” by Lockean culture. 846 The latter is defined as 
“the basis for what we today take to ‘commonsense’ about international politics” 
thanks to the role of structure of rivalry and the institution of sovereignty.
847
 Wendt 
not only characterizes the current international culture as a Lockean one but also 
argues that the structure defined by Waltz and other Realists “is a Lockean 
culture.”848 Kantian culture, on the other hand, represents the ‘ultimate and desired’ 
culture for the future because it will “broaden the limited identification in the 
Lockean culture into the fuller identification of the Kantian culture.”849 For Wendt, 
transformation of the Lockean culture into a Kantian culture will solve the problems 
faced due to the lack of collective identity in the international system today.
850
  
Although these three cultures correspond to different time periods in the 
history of the international system, Wendt’s conceptualization of structure as macro-
and micro- structures opens up the prospect for the coexistence of different logics at 
the same period. For instance, Wendt states that at least the last three hundred 
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centuries of the international system have been a Lockean one
851
 and treats the Cold 
War as a micro-culture that existed between the superpowers. Also, under the same 
Lockean culture, Wendt points to the presence of a Kantian culture saying that “the 
North Atlantic states and arguably many others, seem to go well beyond a Lockean 
culture.”852 Although Kantian culture is not ‘universal’, it should be recognized as it 
exists “within relatively autonomous regional sub-systems or security complexes.”853 
Therefore, he explains the coexistence of Kantian culture under the Lockean macro 
structure on the grounds that it is too “restrictive” to not classify one culture as it is 
just because it does not have “global membership.”854 
Hence, the macro structure of the current unipolarity is a Lockean one. As 
stated in the previous section, in the Lockean system, the dominant role structure is 
rivalry. Thanks to the institution of sovereignty, states have a ‘right’ to survive855 and 
do not expect to be killed by neither the unipole nor each other. Sovereignty as a 
right is crucial for Lockean culture because it rests on the fact that the powerful states 
grant the weaker states’ a right to be sovereigns by self-limiting their capacity to 
‘kill’ the weak. Under unipolarity, while the unipole has a capacity to “kill” weak 
states and establish its hegemony, it recognizes the rights of weaker states to survive. 
It restrains itself and usually acts as a ‘status quo’ power.856 Thereby, it becomes 
possible for the weak to enjoy their sovereignty as an intrinsic quality. The most 
significant implication for a unipole’s self-restraint for the weaker states is that 
security is less scarce for them because there is less risk of death if their sovereignty 
is recognized by the unipole.  
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The fact that it is hard to restrain the unipole from using violence, the 
unipole’s recognition of one’s sovereign rights is crucial. This recognition is the 
central mechanism that holds the unipole from violating one’s sovereignty. In other 
words, sovereignty is the mechanism of self- restraint for a unipole. For instance, 
Wendt asks why the United States does not conquer the Bahamas and suggests that 
the Bahamas Problem illustrates that the United States perceives the norms as 
legitimate. Therefore, the Bahamas, as a party to those norms, has a right to live and 
prosper and the U.S. would not even think of violation.
857
 As the Bahamas Problem 
suggests the United States’ respect for the institution of sovereignty does not stem 
from coercion or self-interest as there is no power to coerce the most powerful state 
if it wants to act on the basis of self-interest. The unipole has internalized respecting 
the norm of sovereignty as the legitimate form of behavior and its behaviors are 
heavily biased towards the status quo. Therefore, under Lockean culture, as the 
weaker states are not threatened by the practices or the intentions of the unipole, 
balancing is not likely to emerge as a tendency for the weak against the unipole.  
However, it should be noted that Lockean culture is not immune to disputes 
or the use of force. Although the unipole restrains itself from using unlimited 
violence against the weak or acts as a ‘status quo’ power, this can only create the 
expectation that the unipole will not end a state’s existence or independence. It does 
not mean that the unipole will not use force for the settlement of disputes. The 
unipole tends to use force against only some states that are not qualified as ‘proper’ 
or ‘acceptable’ sovereigns according to the unipole’s categorization. As stated in the 
section on Lockean culture, types of identities that are recognized as a legitimate 
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state have changed historically.
858
 Under unipolarity, the criteria which determine 
what type of identities will be recognized as legitimate are mostly being defined by 
the United States (and its friends) as was done by Christian European monarchies in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
859
 It would not be wrong to suggest that with 
the end of the Cold War, nation-states that are democratic, capitalist, modern, 
respectful human rights, are recognized as ‘desired’ members that are acceptable to 
the United States and the Western European international community.
860
  
In addition to these qualifications, the United States started to define 
sovereignty with responsibility in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
861
 
According to Nation Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003, “States that have 
sovereign rights also have sovereign responsibilities”.862 In its counterterrorism 
strategy documents, the Bush administration categorized states based on whether 
they fulfill their responsibilities fighting against terrorism or not. According to this, 
states that (i) brutalize their own people and squander their own national resources 
for the personal gain of the rulers; (ii) display no regard for international law, 
threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are 
party; (iii) are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other 
advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the 
aggressive designs of these regimes; (iv) sponsor terrorism around the globe; and (v) 
reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it 
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stands were defined as irresponsible or rogue states.
863
 In addition to rogue states, 
there are also “weak states” that lack the capacity to fulfill their sovereign 
responsibilities.
864
  These states, for instance, lack the legal framework, law 
enforcement, training, technical capabilities, intelligence, military capabilities for 
effective control over their territory. The third category is the “willing and able 
states”865 that fulfill their sovereign responsibilities and cooperate with the United 
States against terrorists. Among these states, there were old ‘friends’ like Western 
European states or China and Russia who were “recasting” their relations with the 
United States due to their cooperation on terror.
866
  
The implication of this categorization on the United States’ use of force 
became obvious when it waged war against Afghanistan and Iraq, which from the 
United States perspective willingly refrained from fulfilling their “sovereign 
responsibilities.”867 Therefore, it was not only US military capability that enabled 
war on Afghanistan and Iraq but also the categorization of these states as 
‘irresponsible sovereigns’ that made war possible against them.868 In fact, it should 
be reiterated that US use of force against both states did not ‘kill’ Afghanistan and 
Iraq in the sense that both preserved their borders and were being reconstituted under 
local governments. In other words, from a Wendtian perspective, the United States 
acted according to basic principle of the Lockean culture that was not to ‘kill’ others.  
The implication of the unipole’s categorization and its tendency towards the use of 
                                                 
863
 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), 18. 
864
 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), 21. 
865
 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), 21. 
866
 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), 20. 
867
 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), 6. 
868
 Pınar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the 
Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?," Third World Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2002): 55-80. Pınar 
Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, "Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security," in State 
Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects, ed. Daniel Lambach and 
Tobias Debiel(Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2007), 
7-26. 
282 
 
violence in terms of balancing is that as states that are categorized as ‘responsible 
sovereigns,’ either weak or able, are excluded from the unipole’s zone of violence, 
other states’ need for balancing against the United States is ‘arrested.’869 They do not 
need to fear the use of violence from the unipole because their survival is guaranteed 
by the unipole’s conceptualization of sovereignty.  
Nevertheless, it is not to deny that under Lockean unipolarity, balancing is 
still an option for states when they consider the unipole acting against the ‘order’ and  
is perceived as threatening it. As Wendt suggests, in Lockean culture, balancing is 
not the “essential” means to guarantee states’ survival but a “basis for order in the 
first place.”870 Under unipolarity, conventional balancing may not be an option for 
guaranteeing survival against the unipole, unless the threatened state or its allies have 
nuclear deterrence capacity because, as Walt suggests, the opportunities for 
conventional balancing are limited against the unipole’s preponderant power.871 
However, even though its preponderant power gives it larger room to act alone, the 
unipole exists in a social structure. In the current system, it exists in a Lockean 
culture and it is expected that the unipole act in terms of the established norms of 
Lockean culture. As Finnemore states, in contemporary international relations 
conformity with international norms and law is influential in determining which 
actors and actions are legitimate and the unipole needs legitimacy in the eyes of 
others.
872
 This is because the unipole needs to have a successful and stable order “to 
persist and prosper.”873 Therefore, if the norms that the unipole promotes contradict 
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existing norms or its practices are considered illegitimate and threatening in the 
existing social structure, then states may perceive threat to the order that they 
advocate and tend to balance against the unipole.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that states’ threat perception might be 
influenced by the preexisting micro-structures between the unipole and the 
significant others. For instance, if the unipole’s practices are evaluated by a group of 
states that have developed a micro structure based on collective identification, then 
this group of states will tend to favor the unipole’s practices and consider them as 
legitimate.
874
 As Wendt argues, states achieve a “collective identity,” a “we-feeling,” 
“common in-group identity,” and “loyalty” form security communities.875 Security 
communities are based on the idea that members of a security community will not 
consider the use of force against each other as they have a common conception of 
security and identity and act collectively against a threat to one’s security. Therefore, 
sharing a common conception of security and identity, members of a security 
community are expected to achieve agreement on the norms of the order, which in 
the contemporary world can be considered a promotion of human rights, democracy, 
free market economy etc. Due to the fact that “mere perception of being in a group is 
sufficient to generate in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination,”876 in-group 
states tend to see each other’s practices as legitimate as they agree on the norms on 
which one’s practices are evaluated. In this regard, the dominant behavioral tendency 
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in a “properly” functioning security community will be one of multilateralism and 
collective action against the threat rather than balancing.
877
  
Robert Jervis, as a Realist scholar, concurs with Wendt that the current 
international system is distinguished by the presence of a security community among 
leading states, which are the United States, Western Europe either as a unit or as 
individual states, and Japan.
878
 Considering the role of the United States in the 
construction of the West as a community along the lines of its identity during the 
Cold War era,
879
 it is no accident that current systemic rules that the security 
community holds the promotion of human rights, democracy, open markets, free 
trade and recently ‘responsible’ sovereignty exist.880 It might be for this reason that 
although there were the many instances in which the United States used force in 
international relations since the end of the Cold War, when the members of the 
security community cooperated with the United States and considered US actions as 
legitimate. For instance, the US led humanitarian interventions in the unipolar era 
were supported by the security community rather than being considered illegitimate 
or threatening. Naturally, these practices did not create a consideration of balancing 
against the United States. The exception that the security community did not fully 
support the United States was the Iraq War in 2003 because the United States 
‘partially’ failed to legitimize the causes of war against Iraq in the eyes of some 
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major actors of the security community like France and Germany while it had the 
support of Britain and the ‘new Europe.’881  
However, if the preexisting micro-structure is one that has a deep rooted 
conception of self-help, then the unipole’s practices and the norms that it introduces 
will not be subject to ‘in-group favoritism’. As the micro-structure is based on 
rivalry, it will not allow for common identification with the unipole. For instance, 
under current international relations, as Jervis states, China and Russia are the two 
powers that are not members of the security community of the leading states.
882
 The 
micro-structure that both states share with the unipole rests on the role structure of 
rivalry, which is being recovered from the conception of enmity since the end of the 
Cold War. Therefore, they do not have a collective identification with the United 
States in the realm of security and do not consider a threat directed to the unipole as 
one that is directed to their own security. For this reason, their cooperation and 
support to the unipole rests on the conception of self-interest. If the practices and 
norms of the unipole coincide with the interest of these states, then the unipole’s 
practices and norms are considered legitimate. If the unipole’s practices and norms 
contradicts the norms that China and Russia support, then US practices are 
considered illegitimate and threatening. For instance, as discussed in previous 
chapters, the international order that China and Russia envision rests on a different 
conception of sovereignty than the one supported by the United States.  Therefore, 
they tend to perceive US practices as contradictory to the ‘established’ order from 
their perspective and the United States as a hegemon with “revisionist”883 intentions, 
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which in turn enhance their threat perception and increase their tendency to balance 
against the unipole.    
As an overall assessment regarding the macro structure of unipolarity and 
balancing, it can be concluded that sovereignty is still the key determinant of the 
Lockean culture. Under unipolarity, it is a major factor that enables self-restraint. 
However, the terms of sovereignty are more open to individual interpretation of the 
unipole and those states that do not hold up to the unipole’s standards are susceptible 
to the unipole’s use of violence. The legitimacy of the unipole’s criteria and practices 
in the eyes of the significant others, determines the prospects of balancing against the 
unipole. In Wendt’s words, “Not all others are significant.” 884 Under unipolarity, 
only states with great economic, political, military capabilities, especially the ones 
with nuclear power are significant as they are able to protect themselves and have the 
potential to balance against the United States. However, under the current 
international system, some of the states under this category have developed a security 
community, a micro-structure, with the United States and they share common 
perspectives regarding the norms of international relations. Therefore, they tend to 
see the US practices as legitimate and do not consider balancing against it.  
China and Russia are not members of the security community and rivalry is 
the governing principle of their relations with the United States. Rivalry entails a 
self-regarding definition of security, which needs to be defined not only as the 
preservation of material well-being but also as the preservation of China’s and 
Russia’s great power status. From China’s and Russia’s perspective, unipolarity 
represents a “status”885 that enables the United States to be a “system-maker”  rather 
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than being a “rule-taker” and to act as an ‘exceptional’ power as if it was exempted 
from the established rules of international relations.
886
  However, having the self-
image of great powers, Russia and China have their own visions regarding the future 
of international order and do not want to be rule-takers. Evaluating the United States 
on the basis of their competing visions, China and Russia have not considered the US 
practices as ‘legitimate’ and have perceived US prominence as a threat to the 
realization of their versions of international order. Therefore, China and Russia have 
developed a self-regarding conception of status vis-à-vis the United States’ status 
because US unipolarity has declined China’s and Russia’s status as great powers who 
wanted to be part of system-making.
887
 It can be argued that this status-competition 
over system-making tends to produce balancing tendencies in terms of China and 
Russia. 
As Finnemore states, “the willingness of others to recognize legitimacy of a 
unipole’s action and defer its wishes or judgments shapes the character of the order 
that will emerge.”888 Therefore, the more the United States successfully promotes its 
principles and justifies its actions through principles that are acceptable to the 
‘significant others,’ the more it is granted legitimacy or even collective identification 
by leading states including China and Russia. The more legitimacy the United States 
has, the lesser the tendency to balance against another state, at the macro structural 
level will be. This implies that unless there is conciliation between the United States 
and China and Russia on their roles as great powers/system-makers and on the terms 
of international order starting with sovereignty, there will be a “status-
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competition”889 rather than collective identification and legitimacy. Briefly, it can be 
concluded that if China’s and Russia’s definitions of their status vis-à-vis the United 
States remains in self-regarding terms, it is likely that they might engage in balancing 
against the United States. 
 
 
7.5.2. Logic of Unipolarity and Balancing at the  
Micro-Structural Level (China, Russia) 
 
Balancing in constructivism, as discussed above, is a multiple realizable 
outcome under different social macro-structures in which self-help logic prevails. 
The previous section highlighted rivalry as the governing role structure of the macro-
structure of contemporary international relations and defined it in terms of having a 
self-regarding conception of status among leading states in the system. Therefore, the 
section concluded that the self-regarding conceptualization of security, defined in 
term of preserving one’s status, tended to create balancing tendencies at the macro-
structural level. This section of the Chapter aims to show how self-regarding 
conceptions of status have become possible between the United States and China and 
Russia since the end of the Cold War and rendered balancing against the United 
States possible thanks to the dynamics at the micro-structural level.  
Before going into the case of how interactions between the United States and 
China and Russia have produced a micro-structure that relies on self-help culture, it 
is necessary to remember how identity formation process takes place at the micro-
structural level. Micro-structure is the level of interaction in which states’ practices 
constitute common meanings (cooperative, competitive or conflictive), identities and 
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interests.
890
 As Wendt states, the process of identity formation at the micro-structural 
level functions on “the principle of ‘reflected appraisals’ or ‘mirroring,’ which means 
actors tend to see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see or 
‘appraise’ them in the mirror of others’ representations of the self.”891 Therefore, 
identity formation process relies on how self “mirrors” itself in “the practices of 
significant others over time” as “the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization.”892 
For instance, if the ‘significant other’893 treats the self as if it were an enemy, then 
due to the mirror effect it would be likely to internalize its role-identity in relation to 
the other.
894
  
In Wendt’s model regarding the process of identity construction, the ‘first 
encounter’ plays a significant role because states’ conception of self and other, thus, 
their security interests are constituted by their first encounter with each other.
895
 The 
‘first encounter’ is the basis for shared ideas, meanings, identity and interests.896 The 
process of identity formation relies on a process of signaling, interpreting and 
responding, which starts the process of creating common knowledge.
897
 Each signal, 
gesture and interaction adds to the pool of knowledge about each other and reinforces 
particular concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in interaction.
898
 In 
other words, by treating the other as if it is supposed to respond in a certain way, ego 
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and Alter eventually learn ideas that generate those responses and then by taking 
those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in their following 
interactions.
899
 If interactions are repeated long enough, these “reciprocal 
typifications” generate and instantiate relatively stable social concepts of self and 
other regarding the issue at stake.
900
 
In the process of identity construction, Alter and Ego mutually adjust to the 
representations of self and other conveyed in each other’s practices, their ideas about 
who they are and what they want.
901
 In other words, both Ego and Alter become the 
objects of perception because as Wendt states, “Ego’s ideas about the Alter, right or 
wrong, are not passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego, but 
actively and constantly constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego.”902 Through its 
representational practices, Ego alters conceptions such as: ‘it is an X’ (hegemon, 
great power, balancer, rival), and I expect you to act like an X, and I will act toward 
you as if you were an X. Therefore, who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who 
Ego thinks Alter is and the same applies to Ego. These active and constant 
perceptions about each other become meaningful or real when each tries to confirm 
them. 
The end of the Cold War brought a micro-structural change in international 
relations and as an unprecedented configuration of power unipolarity emerged as a 
‘first encounter’ for states in the system. Unipolarity defined by US preponderance 
was devoid of meaning in the sense that there was an uncertainty about how the 
United States would use its preponderant power in its relations with significant 
others. Expressed in constructivist terminology, there was no common knowledge 
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defining the relationship between the United States and China and Russia as ‘the 
significant others.’ Social micro-structure of unipolarity was without the “history of 
interactions.”903 However, since the end of the Cold War, interactions between the 
unipole and the significant others has produced meanings and ‘reciprocal 
typifications’ that could be explained with reference to Wendt’s ‘principle of 
mirroring’. 
In the process of role-identity construction, the U.S. and China mutually 
adjusted to representations of self and other conveyed in each other’s practices. They 
cast their ideas about who they were and what they wanted looking at each other’s 
practices.
904
 In other words, both the United States and China become the objects of 
each others’ perceptions. Rephrasing Wendt, the United States’ ideas about China, 
right or wrong, were not passive perceptions of something that existed independent 
of the United States, but actively and constantly constitutive of China’s role vis-à-vis 
the United States.
905
 Likewise, China’s ideas about the United States, right or wrong, 
were not passive perceptions of something that existed independent of China, but 
actively and constantly constitutive of the United States’ role vis-à-vis the China. 
Through its representational practices the United States said to China that ‘China was 
‘a rival and potential balancer’ and it expected China to act like a rival and potential 
balancer and it would act toward China as if China were ‘a rival or potential 
balancer’. Similarly, in its representational practices China said to the United States 
that ‘the United States was a ‘hegemon’ and it expected the United States to act like 
a ‘hegemon’ and it acted toward the United States as if the United States were a 
‘hegemon’. Therefore, in this context, who the United States was, in this interaction, 
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depended on who China thought the United States was and the same applies to 
China. These active and constant perceptions about each other became meaningful or 
real when each acted to confirm them since the end of the Cold War. 
In the case of the US-China micro-structure, China’s aspiration to grow as an 
economic and military power and its desire to be recognized as a great power in 
world affairs were considered as competitive policies directed against US primacy. 
As a result of the perceived ‘China threat,’ China started to consider itself as ‘peer 
competitor’ as a ‘major rival’. Expecting China to act as a potential balancer, the 
United States acted against China as if Beijing really wanted to balance against the 
United States and perceived China’s economic rise, its military modernization or 
regional security policies as acts of balancing itself. On the other hand, as discussed 
in the Chapter IV in detail, China considered the United States a hegemon. China 
expected the U.S. to contain China’s economic, political and military rise and 
perceived the United States security presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the United 
States relations with Taiwan, its stance on the Taiwan Straits in the 1996 crisis, and 
the 2001 spy plane incident as direct threats to its security and rise as a global power. 
Both actors acted on the bases that the other was a rival (in some cases as a threat) to 
the self and trusted source of mistrust.
906
 Cycles of interaction resulted in the 
construction of a self-help micro-structure, in which both states considered one 
another as an egoist who took advantage of the other for its own needs. 
In the case of the US-Russia micro-structure, after losing its ‘identity parity’ 
with the United States, Russia expected that the United States would act as a 
hegemon and treat Russia as a ‘junior partner’ rather than a ‘great power.’ Expecting 
the United States to act as a hegemon that would not respect Russia’s status and 
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security needs, Moscow started to act against the United States as if it aimed to 
prevent restoring Russia’s power position and take advantage of its existing problems 
to its own advantage. On the other hand, despite its declined power position, the 
United States considered Russia a ‘regional great power’ aiming to restore its 
previous position in the post-Soviet sphere of influence and expected Russia to act as 
it would search for regional hegemony and acted toward Moscow as if it was a 
regional hegemon. As discussed in the chapter on Russia, the United States’ political, 
military and economic relations with the former Soviet Republics, its support for the 
enlargement of NATO, and its retreat from the AMB treaty took place under the 
effect of ‘mirroring.’ These cycles of interaction between the United States and 
Russia produced a micro structure based on a self-help culture in which both actors 
defined one another as egoists, failing to respect one’s security needs. 
In addition to China’s and Russia’s interactions with the United States as 
causes of self-help micro-social structure, the United States’ threat or use of force in 
other parts of the world affected the content of US-Russia and US-China micro-
structures. Wendt defines “predation” as the efficient cause generating a self-help 
system either at the micro or at micro-level.
907
 Although China and Russia were not 
directly subject to US predation, the fact that the United States could use force 
unilaterally enhanced the sense of insecurity and increased their possibility of 
engaging in power politics. Both the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo in 1999 
and the Iraq War in 2003 intensified both states’ sense of insecurity. From China’s 
perspective, the impact of the Kosovo operation on China’s sense of insecurity 
became very remarkable because the Kosovo operation was the first serious 
encounter with the U.S. as the unipole at the end of the Cold War. When the US air-
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forces ‘accidentally’ bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo 
operation, the security of China’s identity as a great power was seriously damaged. 
Also, because the operation took place without UN authorization, China considered 
the operation illegitimate because it undermined the role of the UN Security Council 
in maintaining peace and security.   
From Russia’s perspective, the Kosovo operation was a breach of the 
Founding Act because Russia had assumed the United States should have consulted 
first with Russia before starting the operation. Similarly, Russia also protested that 
the operation took place without authorization of the UN Security Council. From 
both powers’ perspective, the UN Security Council represented institutionalization of 
their status as great powers with special responsibilities to shape the international 
order and preserve peace and security.
908
 Therefore, the bypass of the UN Security 
Council showed that the United States tended to assume “special responsibilities” on 
its own, while disregarding the status of China and Russia as great powers.  
From the perspective of China and Russia, having the status of number one, 
the United States used its primacy to challenge China’s and Russia’s role-identities 
as ‘great powers; it did not respect their “special rights” stemming from their status 
and it disregarded their security needs and interests.
909
 They were denied a major role 
in shaping international events, which they had expected through relying on their 
self-image as great powers. In this regard, the Kosovo operation represented a 
significant case for instantiation of self-help as common knowledge for micro-social 
structures of the US-China and the US-Russia relationship.  
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China’s and Russia’s perceptions of the United States as egoist were 
enhanced during the US ‘war on terror’ under the Bush administration. When the 
United States founded military bases in Central Asia, although China and Russia 
seemed to facilitate the process initially, they did not want these military bases to be 
permanent.  As great powers, both China and Russia considered Central Asia as their 
‘spheres of influence’ and great powers were supposed to “respect one another's 
spheres of influence.”910 In this regard, US presence in Central Asia was considered 
interference in their regional dominance and a challenge to their status.  US 
unilateralism in the Iraq War in 2003 became the latest significant international 
incident that marked the United States as an egoist who did not respect, recognize, 
and help to meet China’s  and Russia’s security needs.  
Moreover, both China’s and Russia’s conception of ‘great power-ness’ entails 
that great powers should not interfere in each other’s spheres of influence, which also 
means that they are not supposed to meddle in each others’ domestic affairs. As 
discussed in the relevant chapters, both China and Russia have a “thick” notion of 
sovereignty which is equated with the principle of non-interference into domestic 
political affairs in absolute terms.
911
 Although both powers adapted to the neo-liberal 
economic principles endorsed by Western financial institutions such as the IMF or 
the WTO, they do not accept any criticism about human rights, transparency, and 
democracy promotion, etc.
912
 Therefore, when the United States criticized China for 
human rights violations in Tibet and in the Xinjiang region, conditioned economic 
relations on the improvements on human rights after the Tiananmen Square incident, 
linked China’s entrance to the WTO organization with human rights, or supported 
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Taiwan’s independence, it not only interfered in China’s domestic affairs but also 
challenged its great power identity. Similarly, the United States’ criticisms about 
democracy, transparency, good governance, political freedoms, and human rights led 
Russia to advance a “sovereign democracy” concept, which meant Russia would 
determine its own path to democracy without any normative and political 
pressures.
913
 Both states perceived criticisms about their domestic politics as 
infringements on their sovereignty, and on their status as great powers expecting to 
be treated on equal footing by the United States. 
Nevertheless, the initial phases of the war on terror under the Bush 
administration resulted in betterment of bilateral relations between the US-China and 
the US-Russia.  The United States agreed to fight against the common threat of 
terrorism, albeit they had different terrorists in mind, both China and Russia 
supported the war on Afghanistan. Moreover, both powers agreed on the presence of 
US military bases in Central Asia temporarily. However, the issue-specific 
improvement of relations were not sustained enough to break the cycles of 
‘typifications’ in which the United States was defined as ‘hegemon’ from the 
perspective of China and Russia. On the contrary, since the end of the Cold War, 
thanks to their individual experiences with the United States and the United States’ 
security practices in international affairs, China and Russia learned that their great 
power identity, therefore their related security interests, would be respected, 
recognized, and met if the United States found their great power status as a valuable 
asset to achieve its own security interests and needs. They were treated as great 
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powers so long as they agreed to support US policies as it was the case in the 
installation of military bases in Central Asia.  
Therefore, in spite of the evidence of cooperative behavior, their history of 
interactions with the United States created a “reduced status”914 problem for China 
and Russia as the United States took advantage of its prime status at their expense. 
As Wendt stated, although the possibility of predation did not mean that it could 
happen anytime, once predation emerged, it conditioned the process of identity 
formation in a certain way and generated realpolitik tendencies.
 
Under unipolarity, 
the possibility that the United States could use predation unilaterally without 
considering China’s and Russia’s security needs increased both states’ concerns 
about their status in international relations.  Facing the problem of “reduced status,” 
both Russia and China constantly called for multipolarity/multilateralism because 
multipolarity implied a “flat hierarchy” in terms of status, which meant equal global 
status with equal rights and responsibilities.
915
 The calls for 
multipolarity/multilateralism have signified both states’ intentions to challenge US 
primacy and their tendency to balance against the United States. 
Looking at China’s and Russia’s balancing behavior since the end of the Cold 
War, it could be observed that both powers did not pursue hard balancing strategies 
which focused on the overall balance of power and sought to form a countervailing 
coalition to check US power regardless of the policies it pursued.
916
  In contrast, they 
pursued internal balancing strategies that meant to build up their power to match 
their status as great powers as material capabilities were crucial to acquire the status. 
Also, they engaged in soft balancing that accepted the current balance of power in 
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principle, but sought to obtain better outcomes within the given situation by 
coordinating diplomatic efforts so that they could prevent the United States from 
taking actions against their preferences which they considered as more legitimate.
917
 
As it was the case in the Iraq War in 2003, as Walt argued, China and Russia 
together with other powers united their positions and denied “the United States the 
legitimacy it sought,”918 Although a soft balancing strategy proved to be have limited 
capacity to stop the unipole, as Finnemore stated, attacks on legitimacy were 
important as they were “weapons of the weak.”919 These attacks on the legitimacy of 
the unipole had the capacity to undercut the credibility and integrity of the unipole 
and enable alternative political visions to be attractive to the other states, which 
might push the unipole to abandon selfish strategies. The United States’ inclusion of 
Russia and China and other opposing states into the post-war reconstruction efforts 
in Iraq, and passing the authority to the UN could be considered belated success of 
soft balancing strategies against the United States.  
Taken as a whole, this section explained that the United States and China and 
Russia formed their role-identities mirroring themselves in the practices of one 
another over time. They produced ‘reciprocal typifications’ as hegemon and 
rival/balancer and acted on the basis of these typifications. Their typifications were 
instantiated by their security practices, which resulted in construction of self-help 
micro-structures between US-China and US-Russia relations. The Chapter was also 
underlined that the US predation against other states in the system played a key role 
in the construction of self-help micro-structures between the United States and China 
and Russia. The Chapter underscored that US predation against other powers, as it 
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was in the cases of the Kosovo operation (1999) and the Iraq War (2003), did not 
pose a threat to neither China’s nor Russia’s individual survival but to the survival of 
their great power status and interests. US predation against the other states affected 
the threat perception of China and Russia and perpetuated egoist security identities. 
Therefore, this section of the Chapter concluded that as the bilateral interactions 
between the United States with China and Russia produced a culture of self-help in 
individualistic terms, China and Russia were likely to engage in strategies to balance 
against the United States, relying on the history of their interactions, unless the cycle 
that produced egoist understanding of security was broken by constant cooperative 
interactions.  
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7.6. Conclusion 
 
Chapter VII analyzed the question of whether China and Russia will balance 
against unipolarity defined by the US preponderance by relying on constructivist 
theory. For this purpose, first it underscored the distinctive understanding of structure 
in constructivism that relied on recognition of macro- and micro-level structures and 
discussed balancing as a multiple realizable tendency at both levels. At the macro-
structural level, based on the central argument that the macro-structure of 
international relations was made of social rather than material factors, the Chapter 
underscored that balancing was made possible by the distribution of ideas (culture) 
rather than distribution of capabilities. The Chapter further showed that balancing 
was a multiple realizable tendency under different cultures of anarchy. It pointed out 
that balancing was an effect of self-help security understanding rather than being an 
effect of distribution capabilities. Therefore, the Chapter challenged balance of 
power theory on the grounds that states’ tendency to balance depended on social 
rather than material factors. 
Second, the Chapter focused on micro-structural level analysis as a distinct 
level of analysis and focused on how self-help was constructed as a result of states’ 
interactions. Highlighting the role of predation in the construction of self-regarding 
identities under the “mirroring” effect, the Chapter argued that constructivism would 
take the side of balance of threat, being socially constructed, against the balance of 
power theory. In this regard, the Chapter underlined that perceptions of threat 
constructed by states’ interactions and balancing was made possible by insecurities 
produced at the micro-structural level. Therefore, the Chapter pointed out that 
balancing could be an effect of micro-structure, which showed its multiple 
realizability and need for looking at the micro-structural level of analysis. 
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Third, the Chapter discussed unipolarity as a distinct configuration of power 
that could be analyzed with reference to constructivism because the theory is 
compatible with changes in material power affecting social relations. The Chapter 
highlighted that the concept of polarity at the macro- structural level was defined by 
a “positional picture”920 of identities rather than capabilities and defined polarity as a 
social construction based on role-identities of enmity or rivalry. The Chapter noted 
that despite the distinctiveness of unipolarity as a material condition was recognized, 
the logic of unipolarity was not elaborated on from the perspective of constructivism. 
Therefore, based on the theoretical framework and tools provided by the theory, it 
was argued that unipolarity had understandings at the macro and micro-structural 
levels and they would play a role in shaping China’s and Russia’s tendency to 
balance against the United States. 
Fourth, Chapter VII also elaborated on the logic of unipolarity at the macro-
structural level and underscored that from the constructivist perspective, the identity 
of the unipole and the timing of unipolarity were significant in defining the social 
structure of unipolarity. The Chapter underlined that current unipolarity had a 
Lockean culture at the macro-level; therefore, it argued that under unipolarity, the 
survival of states did not depend on their individual capacity to defend themselves, 
except nuclear states, but on the self-restraint of the unipole based on the principle of 
sovereignty. However, it noted that as Lockean culture did not eliminate use of force 
in international relations, it was possible to observe the unipole using force against 
other states by changing the terms of sovereignty. The Chapter argued that since the 
end of the Cold War, the United States focused on ‘responsible sovereignty’ and 
especially after the September 11 attacks the concept of ‘responsible sovereignty’ 
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played a significant role in the United States’ legitimization of war against other 
states. In this context, the Chapter underlined rivalry as the governing principle of 
relations between the United States, China, and Russia and defined rivalry in terms 
of status-competition based on competing visions of international order. Therefore, it 
concluded that China and Russia tended to perceive threat from the United States’ 
status as the system-maker and would have a tendency to balance against the United 
States. 
In addition, Chapter VII analyzed how self-regarding conceptions of status 
were constructed and instantiated as a result of the interactions of the United States 
with China and Russia and how these micro-structural dynamics rendered balancing 
against the United States possible. It described how self-regarding conceptions of 
status were produced with reference to Wendt’s model of identity construction that 
was based on the principle of mirroring. It argued that both considering each other as 
a threat to their own status and acting as if the other really challenged its status, all 
three powers actively engaged in constructing certain identities vis-à-vis each other. 
As a result of these interactions, while China and Russia concluded that the United 
States was a self-interested hegemon, the United States concluded Russia and China 
were potential rivals and challengers. The Chapter highlighted that the United States’ 
unilateral predations that did not take into account Russia’s and China’s great power 
status played a major role in the perception of the United States as an egoist 
hegemon. Especially after the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo in 1999 and the 
US preemptive war on Iraq in 2003, China and Russia perceived serious threats 
against their status as great powers. Facing the ‘reduced-status’ problem, both 
powers perceived threats from the United States’ status as the unipole and started to 
define their status in self-regarding terms vis-à-vis the United States. Both states 
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started to demand multipolarity or multilateralism, both of which in practice meant 
flat hierarchical order in terms of status. Finally, the Chapter concluded that status-
competition generated by definition of role-identities in self-regarding terms might 
lead China and Russia to engage in balancing against the United States; however, 
given that material balancing was not a viable option, the Chapter suggested that soft 
balancing strategies, which were based on denying legitimacy, would be central in 
China’s and Russia’s balancing efforts against the United States.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This dissertation provided a constructivist analysis of balancing under 
unipolarity by examining the question of how the US war on terror has influenced 
China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the United States. In Chapter II, the 
study began with describing Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization and 
contributed to the literature by combining studies on Al Qaeda and transnational 
terrorism. The Chapter underlined that the organization’s power stemmed from its 
political-religious claim attracting international audience, its networked structure 
connecting recruits, operatives, supporters and sympathizers and its financial 
capacity enabling to act as an independent entity while making decisions and 
conducting operations. The Chapter emphasized that Al Qaeda’s capacity to exploit 
information and communication technologies for enhancing its political, 
organizational, and financial resources facilitated its transnationalization. Having 
described the nature of threat and the components of its power, the Chapter 
concluded that counterterrorism strategy against Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist 
organization required a network of counterterrorism coalitions at the international 
level so that it could address all aspects that enable the threat to be transnational. 
In Chapter III, the dissertation presented the US administration’s definition of 
threat and counterterrorism strategies focusing on its key national security and 
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counterterrorism strategy documents. The chapter contributed to the literature by 
highlighting how the Bush administration’s concept of responsible sovereignty 
enabled the US war Afghanistan and Iraq. Chapter III pointed out that similar to the 
scholarly literature on transnational terrorism and Al Qaeda the US administration 
also defined the terrorist threat as a ‘stateless global network’. Nevertheless, the US 
counterterrorism strategy was based on dealing with states that ‘whether through 
ignorance, inability or intent’ supported terrorists and provided physical or virtual 
sanctuary. Chapter III underlined that due to its state-oriented approach, the Bush 
administration asked states to fulfill their ‘sovereign responsibilities’ and categorized 
states as willing and able states, weak states, reluctant states and unwilling states 
looking at their willingness and capacity to act as responsible sovereigns. The 
Chapter highlighted the concept of ‘sovereign responsibility’ as one of the central 
themes of the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy. Chapter III argued 
that the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq were rendered possible by the Bush 
administration’s ‘zero tolerance’ strategy against states failing to fulfill their 
sovereign responsibilities. 
In this regard, the Bush administration’s preemptive war doctrine and its 
unilateralism relied on the administration’s determination to punish those states 
failing to act responsibly and cooperate with the United States. In addition, Chapter 
III underlined that in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Bush administration justified 
its causes of war on the basis that these states did not act responsibly and preferred to 
act together with ‘coalitions of the willing states’ rather than being formally 
restricted by any form of alliance and international organizations. The Chapter 
stressed that only in the Afghanistan case, the great powers in the UN Security 
Council agreed with the United States on the grounds that Afghanistan failed to act 
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as responsible state in fighting against terrorists and they showed their support by 
authorizing the war in the UN Security Council. The Chapter stated that although the 
Iraq war was part of the US war on terror, neither the causes of the war nor the 
method by which it was carried out were considered as legitimate by majority of 
great powers in the UN Security Council. Therefore, Chapter III concluded that the 
great powers were concerned with the United States’ violation of other states’ 
sovereignty but with the United States’ defining the terms of violating one’s 
sovereignty without waiting consent of the great powers in the UN Security Council. 
In Chapter IV, the dissertation analyzed the evolution of China’s security 
understanding in relation to the United States’ practices since the end of the Cold 
War to contextualize China’s reaction to the US war on terror and discussed the 
impact of the US war on terror upon China’s security understanding. The Chapter 
contributed to literature by providing China’s security understanding since the end of 
the Cold War era and by analyzing its national security documents. More 
significantly, it contributed to the IR literature by using the analysis of security 
understanding to examine China’s balancing tendencies as an alternative to power-
based approaches. Analyzing China’s national defense policy papers, the study 
underscored that China’s security understanding based on preserving its national 
integrity, sustaining its economic development, and attaining a great power status in 
international relations. Chapter IV also pointed out that in China’s security 
understanding the achievement of Beijing’s goals was strongly connected to the state 
of international relations in general and its relations with the United States in 
particular. Therefore, Chapter IV of the study highlighted China’s international 
relations based on safeguarding peace and pursing non-confrontational relations 
especially with the United States so that international security events would not 
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intervene in China’s economic, political, military affairs. In other words, China’s 
security understanding is comprised of its evaluations of international events in terms 
of their implications on China’s political unity, economic development and global 
status. In this context, it was stressed that the United States’ practices were the most 
significant factors in shaping China’s security understanding because they could 
harm Chinese national unity, hinder its economic development and prevent China 
from gaining great power status. It was also stated that China became very concerned 
about the US-led international order in which humanitarian interventions started to 
be accepted as a norm in international relations and the United States promoted 
democracy by linking the United States economic, political and military support to 
one’s record on human rights issues.  
Chapter IV evaluated the introduction of China’s New Security Concept as a 
strategy to promote an alternative vision of international order which would support 
China’s security interests without directly confronting the United States. Chapter IV 
also underlined that as China needed non-intervention in its domestic affairs to 
achieve its national goals, the central theme that China’s New Security Concept 
relied on was the inviolability of sovereignty. According to China’s 
conceptualization of sovereignty, all states were equal regardless of their power and 
no state should intervene in other’s domestic affairs, violate others’ territorial 
integrity and engage in acts of aggression. Nevertheless, it was noted that China did 
not oppose violations of sovereignty and interventions if the decision was taken 
under the authority of the UN and its Security Council, in which China held a great 
power status with a veto power. Therefore, it was stressed that visioning a multipolar 
international order, from China’s perspective, the UN Security Council was the most 
significant institution because it recognized the distinguished role given to the great 
308 
 
powers for management of international affairs and China’s status as a great power. 
It was emphasized that when the US security practices bypassed the UN Security 
Council, as it did in the Kosovo operation in 1999, China perceived a direct threat to 
its security defined in terms of its great power status in international relations. 
Chapter IV also underlined that especially after the Kosovo operation in 1999, China 
started to define the United States as ‘hegemon’ as it considered that the United 
States abused its power to promote its own vision of international order and its own 
domestic values violating the established norms of international relations.  
Giving the fundamentals of China’s security understanding and defining its 
vulnerabilities in relation to the United States in the post-Cold War international 
order, Chapter Four analyzed China’s reaction to the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and 
the war on Iraq in 2003, which were two major stages of the US war on terror. The 
chapter underlined that China’s approach to counterterrorism strategy was in line 
with its security understanding, according to which China demanded the United 
States to act under the authority of the UN and its Security Council. The Chapter 
maintained that China agreed on the legitimacy of the war on Afghanistan because it 
also considered Afghanistan provided support to terrorists and acted irresponsibly, 
which brought China’s support to the United States in the UN Security Council 
resolution authorizing the war and its silence against the US-led coalition of the 
willing states conducting the war outside of the UN umbrella. The study also laid 
emphasis on the fact that China’s support to the United States after the shocking 
terrorist attacks brought an opportunity for the betterment of the bilateral relations, 
which both states enjoyed. It was stated that as a result of the betterment of the 
bilateral relations, China’s evaluations regarding the state of the international 
relations and its own position vis-à-vis the United States were affected positively. 
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China’s perception was affected by the United States’ approach to China because it 
benefited from China’s help in critical issues like encouraging Central Asian states to 
allow the United States military presence and Pakistan to support the United States. 
The Chapter maintained that being treated as if it was the United States’ on equal 
footing, China considered the process as a positive sign that showed that the United 
States respected China’s concerns and recognized its great power status in 
international affairs. 
However, Chapter IV showed that the impact of the Iraq War on China’s 
security understanding reversed the positive environment that the cooperative 
relations caused after the September 11 attacks and the Afghanistan war.  The study 
maintained that the US decision to wage a preemptive war on Iraq without waiting 
for a UN Security Council resolution brought back China’s fears about US 
hegemonism. It was argued that the deep impact of the Iraq war on China’s security 
understanding was not because China considered Iraq as a central part of its national 
security in the traditional sense. The Iraq war had a strong impact on China’s security 
understanding because the US decision to wage a preemptive war bypassing the UN 
Security Council was considered a threat to the UN Security Council in which great 
powers assumed equal responsibility in the management of international affairs. As 
China considered the UN as a symbol of the multipolar order and China’s great 
power status, the Iraq war threatened China’s security. As stated in the chapter, 
China declared the Iraq war as an unnecessary and illegitimate war. In China’s view 
the war was waged because the United States was ambitious to preserve its 
hegemony, hinder the rise of great powers and thereby prevent multipolarization of 
the international structure. Having considered the Iraq war as a move against 
multipolarization, China perceived the war as part of the United States’ military, 
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political and economic containment strategy against itself. Therefore, the Chapter 
accentuated that the Iraq war increased China’s sensitivities regarding ‘US 
hegemonism’ and the US-led international order and led it to call for a 
‘democratized’, ‘fair’ and ‘rational’ ‘new’ international order. 
Finally, looking at China’s relations with the United States after the Iraq war, 
Chapter IV maintained that China’s complaints and dissatisfaction about the US-led 
order decreased when the United States cooperated with or consulted China and thus 
changed its evaluations of the international security environment positively. It 
showed that improved relations with the United States after the 9/11 attacks, the 
‘responsible stakeholder speech’ or the financial crisis of 2008 led China to focus on 
cooperation in the international security environment. Although the changes in 
China’s evaluation of the United States and international security environment 
showed that Beijing’s major concern was mainly the US practices, the United States’ 
self-interested and unilateral practices in the unipolar era shaped China’s 
understanding of the US preponderance and eventually made US power a security 
concern for China. Looking at China’s sensitivity regarding the US security practices 
carried out by disregarding the UN Security Council, which represented China’s 
ideal international order where it assumed managerial rights and responsibilities 
about the international order and it acted as a great power, the chapter concluded that 
gaining a great power status has been a central security concern for China. Therefore, 
it was suggested that China might follow strategies to establish multipolarity or 
increase its demands for multilateral unipolarity depending on its threat perception 
shaped by the United States’ practices.  
In Chapter Five, the dissertation focused on Russia’s security understanding 
in relation to the United States’ practices since the end of the Cold War to 
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contextualize Russia’s reaction to the United States war on terror and discussed the 
impact of the US war on terror on Russia’s security understanding. In this Chapter, 
the dissertation contributed to the literature by providing Russia’s security 
understanding since the end of the Cold War with reference to its national security 
documents. The Chapter of the dissertation also made contribution to the literature by 
analyzing Russia’s security understanding as a factor that might shape its tendency to 
balance against the US. Analyzing the Russian Federation’s national security policy 
papers since 1993, the Chapter maintained that Russia’s national security goals were 
to preserve its national integrity, recover its economic development and regain great 
power status in international relations. It stated that in Russia’s perspective, 
Moscow’s success in protecting its territorial integrity, economic recovery and 
revival as a great power depended on not only Russia’s domestic performance but 
also on international factors that were mainly defined by how the United States 
exerted its predominant power in international relations and on its relations with 
Russia.  
Having shown how certain security practices of the United States such as 
NATO enlargement, the Kosovo operation and undermining of the arms control 
regime posed threat to Russia’s great power status since the end of the Cold War era, 
the chapter underlined how preserving its great power status vis-à-vis the United 
States was a vital national security interest for Russia. Chapter V also stressed that 
due to its vulnerability against the United States, Russia’s foreign policy strategy was 
based on avoiding direct confrontation with the United States on international 
matters and preserving peaceful international relations for its internal development. 
In this context, it was argued that Russia’s foreign policy has become one of the most 
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significant instruments to achieve its national development and increase its status in 
the system. 
Giving the fundamentals of Russia’s security understanding and defining its 
vulnerabilities in relation to the United States in the post-Cold War international 
order, Chapter V looked at Russia’s reaction to the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and 
the war on Iraq in 2003. Chapter V underlined that Russia’s approach to the US 
counterterrorism strategy was in line with Russia’s national security objectives and 
its foreign policy strategy. The Chapter stressed that as Russia had defined 
transnational terrorism as a threat to international security, the United States’ call for 
international cooperation in fighting against the threat of terrorism was considered as 
an opportunity to develop better relations with the United States. It was maintained 
that Russia considered the US-Russia cooperation after the September 11 attacks was 
taking place based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, interest and benefit. 
It was underlined that the cooperation with the United States on these grounds led 
Russia to perceive the United States as a multilateral power and itself as a great 
power on the same footing within the United States. In this regard, it was argued that 
the initial phase of the US war on terror enhanced Russia’s expectations towards a 
multipolar world order organized with the principles of multilateralism. 
However, Chapter V of the study showed that the US war on Iraq changed 
Russia’s evaluations of the United States and the state of international relations in 
which it had assumed itself an equal partner to the United States while managing 
international affairs. Like China, Russia also considered the UN and the UN Security 
Council as the most crucial international institutions where a diversity of interests 
were represented and great powers assumed managerial roles regarding the 
international affairs, Moscow envisaged the United States’ bypass of the UN and the 
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UN Security Council before the Iraq war as a threat to the idea of multilateral 
international order and its status as a great power. It was also argued that Russia 
considered the US war on Iraq as another threat to the emerging multipolar order in 
which it assumed a great power status. Chapter V stated that Russia saw the war on 
Iraq as part of a deliberate US effort to weaken the UN, to lower the role of 
sovereign states as a fundamental element of international relations and to divide 
states with different rights and responsibilities so that the United States could 
preserve its dominant position in world affairs. In Chapter V, the study underscored 
that the United States’ unilateral and preemptive war on Iraq revived Russia’s 
criticism of the United States predominance and created a similar impact on Russia’s 
security understanding that the Kosovo operation made. Although Russia and the 
United States settled their bilateral relations, from Russia’s perspective, the lesson 
learned from the Iraq war was that multilateralism in a unipolar world would always 
be at the discretion of the United States and long-lasting multilateralism could be 
guaranteed only in a multipolar system. Therefore, the Chapter underlined that 
Russia’s call for multipolarity increased together with its desire to be one of the poles 
after the US war on terror. Finally, Chapter V concluded that the United States’ 
practices shaped Russia’s security understanding and constructed a meaning structure 
in which not only the United States’ practices but also its power eventually became a 
major security concern for Russia. 
In Chapter VI, the dissertation looked at Realist discussions on balancing 
under unipolarity. In this Chapter of the dissertation contributed to literature by 
making a categorization of the Realist literature by way of looking at the evolution of 
the Realist arguments in the face of absence of balancing against the US since the 
end of the Cold War. The Chapter underscored that since the end of the Cold War, 
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the Realist literature on balancing against the United States has predicated on either 
the Waltzian balance of power or Waltian balance of threat theory. Chapter VI 
maintained that the Realist scholars’ arguments regarding balancing in the unipolar 
structure evolved in relation to the fact that there has been no balancing against the 
United States. Looking at the flow of arguments in the studies under review, the 
Chapter divided the Realist literature’s discussions on balancing and unipolarity into 
four stages as follows: (i) the denial of unipolarity with the predictions of 
multipolarity; (ii) the acceptance of unipolarity as a temporary condition and 
questioning its stability and durability; (iii) the ‘great puzzle’ and the emergence of 
soft balancing  as a middle ground approach between balance of power and balance 
of threat; and (iv) the recognition of unipolarity as a distinct structural configuration.  
The Chapter underlined that at stage one although prominent balance of 
power scholars such as Waltz and Mearsheimer predicted balancing to emerge 
against the United States and estimated a multipolar structure to be formed soon after 
the demise of the USSR, their expectations failed. Under the absence of balancing 
against the United States, it was stated that the second stage of discussions on 
balancing and unipolarity centered on the stability and durability of unipolar system. 
The Chapter underlined that balance of power scholars such as Waltz and Layne 
started to define unipolarity as an ‘illusion’ and as a ‘temporary state of international 
relations’ to be replaced by multipolarity under systemic constraints. On the other 
hand, the Chapter pointed that balance of threat scholars such as Mastanduno and 
Wohlforth promoted the idea that unipolarity would be a stable structure and its 
duration would be defined by the United States’ practices. The Chapter stated that 
balance of threat scholars encouraged the United States to pursue multilateralism, 
and to reassure other great powers that it would not coerce or dictate its wishes on 
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others. Chapter VI of the study underlined that balance of threat scholars maintained 
that if the great powers did not perceive threats from the United States then they 
would not balance against it and unipolarity would last as a stable system. 
In light of the absence in balancing against the United States after the Iraq 
war, Chapter VI of the dissertation pointed out the third stage in the Realist literature. 
The Chapter underlined the emergence of soft balancing as a middle ground 
approach that reconciled balance of power and balance of threat arguments in the 
literature. Chapter VI stated that in the face of the great puzzle about the absence of 
balancing strategies against the United States, led scholars to reconceptualize 
balancing in a way to see great powers’ attempts to restrict the United States by using 
strategies other than engaging in military/hard balancing strategies. The Chapter 
highlighted that soft balancers relied on the assumption that the great powers would 
not be able to balance the United States militarily and even though they perceived 
threats from the US practices, such as its unilateralism in the Iraq war, the threat has 
not been existential for the great powers’ security. Therefore, the soft balancers 
argued that they did not need to balance against US power but to restrict the United 
States through means of cutting diplomatic, economic, and military support and 
delegitimizing its practices. Chapter VI of the study stressed that like balance of 
threat scholars, soft balancers also suggested that the United States refrain from 
challenging other powers’ security interests and pursue multilateralism so as not to 
be perceived as a revisionist state that wanted to change the international order. 
Chapter VI also stated that soft balancers shared the balance of threat scholars’ 
argument that avoiding to be perceived as a revisionist power, the United States 
could prevent the great powers to form balancing coalitions and preserve its primacy. 
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The dissertation highlighted that in the fourth stage, Realist scholars started to 
focus on the distinctive character of unipolarity and the implications of the unipolar 
structure for international relations. Chapter VI stressed that Realist scholars 
reviewed in this section stated the need for rethinking conventional concepts and 
understandings such as balance of power and great powers’ behaviors because they 
agreed that under unipolarity states, including the unipole itself, would behave 
differently. It was underlined that Realist scholars emphasized the general theoretical 
discussions on unipolarity needed to be made with reference to the current 
unipolarity at hand and that it was hard to discuss unipolarity without considering the 
identity, preferences and practices of the United States as the unipole. Chapter VI of 
the study underlined that these scholars agreed that the unipole was constrained by 
structural imperatives the least and the characteristics of unipolarity were closely 
linked to the identity of the unipole. Therefore, having argued that the identity of the 
unipole was crucial, they agreed that US identity and its practices would have a 
major impact on how the current unipolarity would be.  
The study showed that the Realist scholars discussed in the fourth stage also 
maintained that great powers’ tendency to balance against the United States would be 
shaped by how they perceived US practices. The chapter pointed out that in line with 
the balance of threat scholars and soft balancers, they argued that if the unipole 
pursued revisionist strategies contradicting security interests of other great powers, 
then they would perceive threats due to the increased sense of structural insecurity 
and they would balance against the unipole. The meaning of general theorizing in 
terms of the current unipolarity was that great powers would pursue balancing 
strategies against the United States if they perceive threat from the US practices. It 
was emphasized that these scholars considered soft balancing strategies as a more 
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viable option for great powers than hard balancing strategies and sided with the 
balance of threat stream of the Realist theory rather than the balance of power line. 
Chapter VI drew the following general conclusions. First, it underlined that 
Realist arguments started to lean more towards the balance of threat theory rather 
than balance of power as unipolarity endured and became accepted as a distinctive 
configuration of power. Second, the Chapter stressed that Realist scholars discussed 
balancing under unipolarity with reference to the identity and practices of the 
unipole, not only with reference to the distribution of power. Third, the Chapter 
stressed that as balance of threat arguments prevailed while estimating balancing 
under unipolarity, threat perception became the major explanatory variable rather 
than being an auxiliary one. Fourth, in addition to the use of social variables like 
identity and threat perceptions, the Chapter also pointed that Realist scholars like 
Jervis and Walt also used concepts like ‘security communities’ and ‘soft power’ to 
explain why some states would not balance against the United States. Fifth, the 
Chapter emphasized that although Realist scholars suggested that the US practices 
would define the characteristics of unipolarity and argued that the US could turn the 
international structure into either a competitive or cooperative one by changing 
others’ perception about its legitimacy, they failed to name what they meant by the 
characteristics of unipolarity is the social structure of unipolarity. Therefore, the 
Chapter highlighted the evolution of the Realist literature in the face of the absence 
of balancing under unipolarity. The Chapter maintained that the Realist scholars 
appropriated social variables in order to explain absence of balancing against the US 
and underlined the significance of the identity, perception and practices while 
predicting second tier states’ tendency to balance against the US.  Chapter VII also 
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concluded the Realist literature evolved in line with the balance of threat theory 
rather than the balance of power theory.  
In Chapter VII, the dissertation contributed to the literature by providing a 
constructivist analysis on balancing and unipolarity and by exploring the potential for 
Chinese and Russian balancing against the United States within this framework. The 
Chapter began by highlighting two kinds of structures in Wendtian constructivism: 
macro and micro (interaction) level structures and discussed balancing as a multiply 
realizable outcome that might be produced under self-help cultures at micro and 
macro levels. Chapter VII showed that balancing at macro structural level was an 
outcome of the distribution of ideas rather than distribution of capabilities and 
balancing was an effect of cultures in which states produced self-regarding and 
competitive role structures and acted on the assumption that the others were rivals or 
enemies. The Chapter showed how balancing was a multiply realizable outcome 
under Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures according to Wendtian 
constructivism. Chapter VII argued that Wendt’s constructivism challenged balance 
of power theory arguing that balancing occurs as a result of systemic insecurities 
produced and sustained by states’ practices. 
Having shown balancing as a macro-structural tendency, Chapter VII 
emphasized the significance of micro-structural level in production and reproduction 
of tendencies that generate balancing. The Chapter looked at Wendt’s model in 
which he described the production process of self-help system based on states’ 
interactions. It highlighted the role of predation in the construction of self-regarding 
identities under the ‘mirroring’ effect. Due to the role of predation in Wendt’s model 
about the production process of self-help culture at micro-structural level, Chapter 
VII of the study situated Wendtian constructivism on the side of Walt’s balance of 
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threat theory, threats being socially constructed. In this regard, Chapter VII stressed 
that perceptions of threat were constructed by states’ interactions and balancing was 
made possible by insecurities produced at the micro-structural level. Therefore, the 
Chapter underlined the significance of looking at micro-structural level while 
discussing the likelihood of balancing rather than considering it just an implication of 
distribution of power. 
Having provided a constructivist framework on balancing at two different 
structural levels, Chapter VII discussed unipolarity as a distinct configuration of 
power with reference to constructivism because it had a deep impact on the social 
relations of states. The Chapter highlighted that the concept of polarity at the macro-
structural level could be defined by a “positional picture”921 of identities rather than 
capabilities and characterized polarity as a social construction based on role-
identities of enmity or rivalry. It was noted that although Wendt’s theory recognized 
the distinctiveness of unipolarity as a material condition, it did not elaborate on the 
logic of unipolarity. Therefore, based on the theoretical framework and tools 
provided by Wendt, the dissertation argued that unipolarity had cultures at the macro 
and micro-structural levels and they would play a role in shaping China’s and 
Russia’s tendency to balance against the United States. 
Later, Chapter VII of the dissertation elaborated on the logic of unipolarity at 
the macro-structural level and underscored that from the constructivist perspective, 
the identity of the unipole and the timing of unipolarity were significant in defining 
the social structure of unipolarity. The Chapter underlined that current unipolarity 
existed in a Lockean culture at the macro-level; therefore, it argued that under 
unipolarity, survival of states did not depend on their individual capacity to defend 
                                                 
921
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 99. 
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themselves against the unipole, except nuclear states, but on the self-restraint of the 
unipole that internalized the principle of sovereignty. However, Chapter VII noted 
that as Lockean culture did not eliminate use of force in international relations, it was 
possible to observe the unipole while using force against other states by changing the 
terms of sovereignty. The Chapter argued that since the end of the Cold War, the 
United States focused on ‘responsible sovereignty’ and especially after the 
September 11 attacks and the concept of ‘responsible sovereignty’ played a 
significant role in the United States’ legitimization of war against other states. 
Chapter VII underlined rivalry as the governing principle of international relations as 
it has been governing the US-China and the US-Russia relations. The study defined 
rivalry in terms of status-competition based on competing visions of the international 
order. Therefore, the Chapter concluded that China and Russia tended to perceive 
threats from the United States’ unipole status as the system-maker and might have a 
tendency to balance against the United States. 
In Chapter VII, the dissertation analyzed how self-regarding conceptions of 
status were constructed and instantiated as a result of the interactions of the United 
States with China and Russia and how these micro-structural dynamics produced 
insecurities on behalf of China and Russia by rendering balancing against the United 
States possible. The Chapter described how self-regarding conceptions of status were 
produced with reference to Wendt’s model of identity construction that was based on 
the principle of mirroring. Chapter VII argued that considering each other as a threat 
to their own status and acting as if the other really challenged its status, all three 
powers actively engaged in constructing certain identities vis-à-vis each other. As a 
result of the interactions, while China and Russia concluded that the United States 
was a self-interested hegemon, the United States concluded Russia and China were 
321 
 
potential rivals and challengers. The Chapter highlighted that the United States’ 
unilateral predations that did not take into account Russia’s and China’s great power 
status played a major role in the perception of the United States as an egoist 
hegemon. The Chapter stressed that especially after the US-led NATO operation on 
Kosovo in 1999 and the US preemptive war on Iraq in 2003, China and Russia 
perceived serious threats against their status as great powers.  
Facing the ‘reduced-status’ problem, both powers perceived threats from the 
United States’ status as the unipole and started to define their status in self-regarding 
terms vis-à-vis the United States. Both states started to demand multipolarity or 
multilateralism, both of which in practice meant “flat hierarchical order” in terms of 
status. Lastly, Chapter VII concluded that there were macro and micro level 
conditions that tend to generate balancing behaviors against the United States.  The 
Chapter underlined that status-competition generated by definition of role-identities 
in self-regarding terms tend to lead China and Russia to engage in balancing against 
the United States. However, given that material balancing was not a viable option, it 
was suggested that soft balancing strategies, which were based on denying 
legitimacy, would be central in China’s and Russia’s balancing efforts against the 
United States.  
In conclusion, based on Wendtian constructivism, the dissertation argued that 
balancing is not a natural and inevitable outcome of the distribution of power in the 
system but it is an effect of social structures both at macro and micro level. Social 
structures consist of “the stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, 
perceptions and identities”922 or common knowledge held by the members of the 
                                                 
922
 Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," in The Return of 
Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, (Critical Perspectives 
on World Politics) (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 49. 
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system, who produce and reproduce common knowledge by their practices. During 
the production process of common knowledge, actors engaging in interaction try to 
get the others to see things in the way they see and they reward behaviors that 
support their definition of the situation and punish those that do not.
923
 As suggested 
by Wendt, power relations play a crucial role in determining the direction in which 
distribution of knowledge will unfold.
924
 In this context, Wendt defines power as the 
key determinant for reward and punishment system to work efficiently
925
 and shape 
the nature of social structure. In other words, although social structures are produced 
and reproduced by the practices of all states in the system, “not all others are 
‘significant’ others”926 and the practices of states with great capabilities are prone to 
have more impact on the social structure of the international system. Relying on 
Wendt’s assumption that states “where there is an imbalance of relevant material 
capability social act will tend to evolve in the direction favored by the more 
powerful,”927 the dissertation concludes by arguing that under unipolarity, the United 
States is capable of shaping social structure of international relations more than any 
other state in the system and is able to create its own ‘prophecy’ by means of its own 
security practices that shape all states’ security understandings. 
                                                 
923
 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 331. 
924
 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 331. 
925
 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 331. 
926
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